General Musharraf
Goes on Struggling for Legitimacy
By Prof. Dr. S. Farooq
Hasnat
US
On May 18 a Pakistani official
spokesman said that General Pervaiz Musharraf, who
also happens to be the Chief of the Army, would
continue to hold office beyond 2007. There seems
to be no end to Musharraf’s controversial
rule. His appetite for power remains unlimited and
his desire to flout the democratic traditions of
Pakistan has no confines. His only rationale, to
be in power is his self-proclaimed indispensability
against international terrorism. He sends the message
that the forces of extremism would take over Pakistan,
more so its nuclear assets, once he is out of power.
In fact, it’s just the opposite, as whimsical
and illegal control would in fact encourage militancy
in Pakistan. It would undermine the genuine national
political parties and would inculcate a culture
of distrust and greed. All these factors taken together
would further weaken, not strengthen, the Pakistani
society. As witnessed in Afghanistan, unstable societies
are a hotbed for extremist tendencies.
The new world order presented a value system, according
to which the human rights and democratic institutions
were to be encouraged and enforced. By the end of
the last century it became unthinkable that in countries
where democratic institutions were in place could
follow any other path. The emphasis was on the strengthening
of the institutions, its rollback was not conceived.
On 12 October 1999 Pakistan became an exception,
when its military took over power, sacked the elected
Prime Minister (no matter how controversial he was),
dissolved the national and provincial assemblies
and suspended the constitution. This was the fourth
time that the army had intervened, through Martial
Law, although this time, it was not declared, as
such. The promised takings of the post-coup regime
were stereotypes, such as a promise of free and
fair elections, bringing true democracy in the country
and eradication of corruption. It was an echo of
the previous military dictatorships of General Ayub
Khan, General Zahya Khan and General Zia ul Haq.
Soon after his takeover, General Musharraf affirmed
that he would remain in office for not more than
three years.
Since 1958, the direct military rule in Pakistan
is spread over about three decades. From 1985 to
1988 President Zia ul Haq installed a civilian Prime
Minister, but kept the powers in his office, by
grossly amending the 1973 Constitution. After the
death of President Zia, a political process started
as a result of the 1988 elections, with the expectation
that future Pakistan would move towards a civil
society. For nearly 11 years (1988-1999) Pakistan
Muslim League, under Nawaz Sharif and the Pakistan
People’s Party led by Benazir Bhutto, alternately
shared power. Within the mainstream politics, for
the first time, a two-party system emerged, promising
that it would provide a kind of political stability
that was not seen before - although, both the leaders
could not use their authority to strengthen the
institutions, political or otherwise.
These governments lacked seriousness of purpose
and agendas for the future. Their commitment to
the welfare of the people was weak and matters that
affected the real lives of the people were never
addressed. Whenever the opportunity arose these
two leaders would jump to cooperate with the military
establishment. In fact, when in opposition they
would send out feelers to the chief of staff to
intervene. The civilian governments failed to allow
a democratic culture to take roots in the polity
of Pakistan. However, in spite of all its flaws,
the political process was serving to lay the foundations
of a democratic culture. More so, the participation
of the people was being reflected, in one way or
the other. It was believed that uninterrupted political
process would ultimately bring a civil society in
place and that Pakistan would get rid of the menace
of military takeovers.
The frail political governments were not all that
meek. The military interference was challenged from
time to time and measures were taken to take command
of the armed forces. One of the fragile Prime Minister
Muhammad Khan Junejo boldly challenged the corruption
and non-professionalism within the Armed Forces.
Just before his ouster, apart from other acts to
curtail the ambitious Generals, he had ordered an
inquiry into the Ojheri blast of April 10, 1988,
which was suspected to be the mastermind of an army
general to pilfer ate the arms meant for Afghan
Mujahideens. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on October
8, 1998 removed the Amy Chief for his interference
in politics and a naval chief was dismissed on corruption
charges. The third general to be dismissed was none
other than Pervaiz Muharraf, who was accused of
mismanaging the Kargil adventure. No matter Nawaz
Sharif wanted to clip the wings of the generals
to enhance his personal power, but these actions
fit well in explaining a delicate balance between
the military and the civilian authority –
where ultimately the civilian governments lost the
battle for control.
On its part, the military sat on the fences, putting
pressures on at least three main concerns of Pakistan,
namely, the nuclear issue, the Kashmir issue and
the Afghan issue. The military pushed the weak political
governments to accommodate retired generals at key
civilian positions thus severely compromising the
efficiency of national institutions. Apart from
that the military got increasingly involved in taking
control of the economic institutions of the country.
Their corporate interests got more expanded with
every new opportunity. With that trend the stories
of corruption and nepotism became a household talk.
Immediately after the coup, Army chief General Pervaiz
Musharraf, held a one and a half hour meeting with
the Ambassador of the United States, William B.
Milam, which according to some sources was described
as “good”. It was quoted that the American
Ambassador gave a patient hearing to the military
ruler and heard with interest his agenda to solve
Pakistan’s unresolved issues. It was known
that General Pervez Musharraf wanted to get a nod
from the United States, which was the sole super
power with the ability to influence the world/regional
events. General Musharraf’s legitimacy as
a military ruler, through a coup, could not come
from the people of Pakistan and he understood that
well.
Anxious as he was, the general was desperate to
legitimize his rule by whatever means. Like his
predecessor general Zia ul Haq, general Musharraf’
in 2002 undertook to legitimize his un-constitutional
rule by holding a national referendum. Like general
Zia, the system could not gain legitimacy by the
law of necessity doctrine alone so generously applied
by the highest court in Pakistan. The referendum
question was: "For the survival of the local
government system, establishment of democracy, continuity
of reforms, end to sectarianism and extremism, and
to fulfill the vision of Quaid-i-Azam, would you
like to elect President general Pervez Musharraf
as president of Pakistan for five years?" Insignificant
number of people cared to vote but the General declared
himself as the President for the next five years.
Interestingly, later the general admitted that the
referendum was flawed but he would still keep his
post for the next five years.
The Washington Post in its editorial of April 12,
2002 had suggested that the Bush administration’s
support for the general in holding a referendum
would be a mistake, unless he is willing to “work
within a legitimate democratic system”. But
political expediency overcame all other values.
Even today, the question of legitimacy is grave
for the president. He himself had admitted that
the referendum in which he was the sole candidate
was faulty. Also, referendums are not meant for
the purpose of electing a political office. When
used for this reason, it is as undemocratic in appearance
as is in practice. The wordings of the question
on the ballot were so confusing that it made little
sense to vote, either way. In spite of the inherent
flaw in the procedure, at the eve of that legitimizing
exercise, a number of questions were raised. It
was argued that “the referendum results could
be termed authentic only if the next elected parliament
and the provincial assemblies validate them. Secondly,
the president must not amend the constitution unnecessarily.
Thirdly, the newly elected president must not manipulate
the forthcoming general elections. Fourthly, once
his election is validated by the newly-elected legislatures,
general Musharraf should retire as the chief of
army staff.” On all accounts the general failed
to fulfill any of the conditions and thus even after
three years questions about his legitimacy as a
head of the State and government remain on the horizon
- as bright as ever.
By the first quarter of 2005, the Pakistani society
had become a hallmark of misrule as widespread corruption
and mediocrity became the standard norm. At the
macro level the issues of the legitimacy of the
regime and sovereignty of the nation remains the
main two concerns for the people of Pakistan. A
unanimous view exists that under repeated military
interventions, the Pakistani society has grossly
worsened and help is needed in all fields. A renowned
Pakistani Professor noted that the national “politics
has been reduced to a mere game of chess and with
the exception of rare voices in the wilderness,
transcendental principles have no relevance in statecraft”.
He further added “…for all the claims
of realism and pragmatism, the problems of an economy
in shambles, law and order in disarray and education
in tatters, and not addressed. Politics has fallen
into disrepute because the practitioners of Realpolitik
do not appear to have a clear vision of the chronic
ills of our society. In the realm of thought, we
are going in the dark”. The Pakistani society
today is a sad picture of the collapse of all institutions
and widespread degeneration. People have been led
to short cuts, greed, and other illegal means, thus
paving the way for incompetence and corruption.
Nearly every program that was launched by the military
government failed to achieve its goals with education
being the major victim.
Pakistan represents more of a society resembling
a medieval rule, with a resemblance of the dark
ages of the Muslim civilization, than a modern Islamic
nation with well-established structures of a civil
society. Professor Stephen Cohen remarks, “If
he (General Musharraf) resembles any past Pakistani
leader, it is General Yahya Khan - also a well-intentioned
general who did the United States a great service”.
The professor further hinted that Musharraf has
rented his country to the more powerful states.
General Musharraf gets his legitimacy from outside
as he fails to get it from the people of Pakistan.
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