The Nuclear
Danger in South Asia
By Shafik H. Hashmi
Professor Emeritus of Political Science
Georgia Southern University
US
Currently, the
western leaders and media are greatly concerned
about the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea.
There is growing apprehension that the new Iranian
government is determined on the production of nuclear
weapons, despite its constant denials, and that
the eccentric dictator of North Korea may already
be in possession of at least some nuclear weapons.
However, the potential danger of a nuclear war is
neither in the Middle East nor in the Korean peninsula:
it is in South Asia. As recently as 2002, there
was a distinct possibility of a nuclear conflict
between India and Pakistan. Even today, the nuclear
weapons of both countries are poised at each other,
ready to be launched at short notice.
The nuclearization of India and Pakistan is qualitatively
different from the possession of nuclear weapons
by the US, Russia, Britain, France, China or even
Israel. These other nuclear powers do not have any
major conflicts with each other. They are also not
next door neighbors with the exception of Britain
and France, which are allies and not enemies so
that there is no possibility that the two countries
would fight each other. On the other hand, India
and Pakistan have fought three wars and were on
the brink of a war two or three other times in recent
years.
As is well known, the main cause of enmity between
the two South Asian nuclear powers is the disputed
territory of Kashmir. The first Kashmir war was
fought in 1947-48, ended in a ceasefire, and resulted
in a de facto partition of the state. The larger,
more fertile and more populous part of Kashmir remained
in Indian hands, while a small, barren portion of
the state came under Pakistani control. Although
India had promised at the United Nations that the
ultimate decision about the future of Kashmir would
be made through a plebiscite in the state, within
a few years, it reneged on its promise. Frustrated
by the belief that India would not relinquish its
hold on Kashmir, the Pakistani rulers in 1965 decided
to smuggle thousands of guerilla fighters into the
Indian-occupied part of the state, hoping that the
Kashmiri Muslims would rise up against the Indian
occupation. However, no such uprising took place.
A regular war started between India and Pakistan
within and outside Kashmir, which ended after 17
days mainly because of intense American and British
efforts.
A third war between India and Pakistan broke out
in 1971 when India took full advantage of a mass
movement in East Pakistan against the central government,
providing training, weapons, and financial support
to the Bengali insurgents and then invading the
eastern wing of Pakistan. The war ended in Pakistan’s
defeat and in the emergence of East Pakistan as
the independent state of Bangladesh. India’s
plan to continue the war and invade West Pakistan
(the present-day Pakistan) as well was thwarted
by intense diplomatic pressure put by President
Nixon on the Soviet Union to restrain its ally,
India, from doing so.
In 1987, there was the fear that India might attack
Pakistan. Apparently, Pakistan’s disclosure
to the Indians that it was in possession of nuclear
bombs and President Zia-ul-Haq’s threat to
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, described later, ended
this crisis.
Due to continued discontent among a majority of
the Muslims in Kashmir, an insurgency started in
Kashmir in the 1990s, which has continued till today.
India charged Pakistan with being responsible for
the insurgency, and the situation reached a point
where, as stated earlier, there was the danger in
2002 of another full-scale war between the two countries.
In fact, in an interview given to Newsweek, President
Musharraf admitted that the two countries were “very
close” to a war; the then Indian Prime Minister
Atal Vehari Bajpai used the words “touch and
go” to describe the situation. The fear was
that if a war broke out it could turn out to be
the first nuclear war in history, with both sides
using nuclear weapons. The results, obviously, would
be devastating. It was essentially recognition by
the leaders of the two countries of the horrors
of a nuclear holocaust, coupled with American diplomacy,
in particular the forceful efforts of Secretary
of State Colin Powell, that prevented this great
human tragedy from occurring.
It is against this background that we need to analyze
the nuclear danger in South Asia, and the danger
South Asia poses to the rest of the world.
According to an article in The Atlantic magazine,
India’s “ ‘intention to acquire
(nuclear weapons) apparently dated back to even
before the Partition, when Jawaharlal Nehru, looking
forward to independence, said “I hope Indian
scientists will use the atomic force for constructive
purposes, but if India is threatened, she will invariably
try to defend herself by all means at her disposal.’”
(November 2005, p.68) Apparently, India started
working on the production of nuclear weapons as
early as the 1950s, while Nehru was the prime minister.
India’s defeat by China in 1962 further accelerated
India’s nuclear program. Just before China’s
first nuclear test explosion in 1964, “India
had the necessary ingredients for an atomic bomb:
nuclear fuel (from a Canadian-supplied Cirus research
reactor) and a facility to reprocess this fuel into
weapons-grade plutonium.” (Toby Dalton, “Towards
Nuclear Rollback in South Asia,” Current History,
December 1998, p. 412) Gradually, “India acquired
several nuclear power and research reactors (from
the United States) through the Atoms for Peace program.”
(Ibid)
It was during the prime ministership of Nehru’s
daughter, Indira Gandhi, that India conducted a
nuclear test in May 1974. “(B)eneath the desert
of Rajasthan, near the Pakistani border, India detonated
a fission device of roughly the same yield as the
bomb that had destroyed Hiroshima.... The desert
floor heaved, and a message of success was sent
to the capital, New Delhi. It read, “ ‘The
Buddha is smiling.’” (The Atlantic,
p.70) It was ironical indeed to use the name of
Buddha, a prince of peace, to break the news about
the explosion of a nuclear bomb, which could kill
and maim hundreds of thousands of human beings.
India made another ironical claim; when it called
its nuclear bomb a “peaceful device”!
Although India’s nuclear test was initially
based on the desire to achieve parity status with
China, it ignored the real probability that its
arch rival Pakistan would view it as a threat to
its own security and, unwilling to be left behind
in this race, would strive to match India’s
nuclear capability. In fact, soon after the Indian
nuclear test, Patrick Moynihan, US ambassador to
India, is reported to have remarked to Indira Gandhi,
“Madam Prime Minister, within a few years,
Pakistan will also conduct a nuclear test.”
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto started exploring
various avenues to make Pakistan also a nuclear
power. He was able to enter into an agreement with
the French under which the latter were to provide
Pakistan a nuclear reprocessing plant, which would
be used for Pakistan’s energy needs and would
not be used for military purposes. Bhutto’s
objective was to have a reprocessing plant built
with French assistance with which the Pakistani
scientists, engineers, and technologists would naturally
be associated. After acquiring the technical know-how,
according to the plan, these Pakistani personnel
would later on be able to secretly build a nuclear
reprocessing plant which could be used for the production
of nuclear weapons. During this period, Abdul Qadeer
Khan, a Pakistani metallurgist, educated in Germany
and the Netherlands, was working “for a Dutch
subcontractor (in) a multinational European (consortium
called URENCO) to develop centrifuge technology
for enrichment of uranium.” (Newsweek, June
8, 1998, p. 27) “...A. Q. Khan believed that
the Buddha had smiled in anticipation of Pakistan’s
death.... (W)ith the access he found to the URENCO
centrifuge technology, he realized that by chance
he was in a position to help Pakistan face the threat.”
(The Atlantic, p. 70) In 1974, he wrote a letter
to Bhutto and both met in Karachi in December. He
argued that Pakistan should try to enrich uranium
to produce a nuclear bomb. With Bhutto’s approval,
Khan returned to the Netherlands and started smuggling
copies of secret, valuable documents dealing with
“centrifuge designs” to the Pakistan
embassy and later, at the invitation of the Bhutto
government, migrated to Pakistan in 1975 and secretly
started working on building a uranium-enrichment
industry and a nuclear bomb.
Bhutto’s government was overthrown by a military
coup in 1977. The Supreme Court of Pakistan convicted
Bhutto and gave him the death sentence. Despite
pleas from all over the world, Ziaul Haq’s
government hanged Bhutto in 1979. Zia’s martial
law regime and Bhutto’s execution by this
regime isolated Pakistan in the international community
and the French, who were under great pressure from
the Carter administration to withdraw their offer
of building a nuclear reprocessing plant in Pakistan,
found a good excuse to withdraw their offer. However,
luck was on Pakistan’s side. On the Christmas
eve of 1979, large numbers of Soviet troops crossed
the international border and entered Pakistan’s
northern neighbor, Afghanistan, to salvage its tottering
communist regime. Reagan’s election in 1980
provided Pakistan an excellent opportunity to receive
massive economic and military assistance from the
US as Pakistan became the front-line state in combating
the Soviet threat which loomed large over the Persian
Gulf and South Asia. While Pakistan and the US jointly,
though indirectly, fought the Soviets in Afghanistan
for the next eight years, the former also made use
of its close alliance with the US by continuing
to work on its nuclear program, with Washington
looking the other way.
“By 1986 Pakistan had crossed the threshold,
and was able to fabricate several nuclear devices.”
(The Atlantic, p. 80) Newsweek has given another
interpretation to this development: “By 1986
Pakistan’s centrifuge technology was producing
weapons-grade uranium. And by then, US officials
believe, Pakistan had given China its uranium-enrichment
secrets in exchange for the design of a small nuclear
weapon.”(June 8, 1998, p. 27)
Towards the end of 1986, India amassed a huge number
of its troops on Pakistan’s borders and the
fear of another war was very much in the air. In
order to warn the Indians to refrain from any thought
of invading Pakistan, in January of 1987, with the
apparent blessing of the Pakistan government, A.Q.
Khan gave an interview to Kuldip Nayar, a prominent
Indian journalist, in which he made it clear that
Pakistan would use its nuclear weapons if its existence
was threatened; although he later denied having
made such a statement. The Indians also claimed
that their diplomats in Islamabad were warned that
Pakistan would not hesitate to use nuclear weapons
if attacked. Pakistan denied the veracity of these
statements. In this regard, another episode makes
interesting reading. According to The Atlantic,
“At the time (1987) when the opposing armies
stood face- to- face along the border, and India
was contemplating a pre-emptive strike, General
Zia flew to an Indian-Pakistani cricket match in
India, where he sat beside (Prime Minister) Rajiv
Gandhi and, it is alleged, at one point leaned over
and said, ‘If your forces cross our border
by an inch, we are going to annihilate your cities.’
Whether or not he spoke those words, India soon
withdrew its army.” (The Atlantic, p. 82)
By the early 1990s, it was generally believed that,
despite their official denials, both India and Pakistan
were either in possession of nuclear weapons or
could produce such weapons at short notice. Both
India and Pakistan had refused to sign the nuclear
non proliferation treaty. Pakistan, however, was
willing to sign the treaty if India did the same.
India’s argument was that the treaty was discriminatory
in nature and perpetuated the monopoly of five powers
over nuclear weapons. The Indian argument ignored
the obvious fact that the world would be more unsafe
if, for instance, 20 countries, instead of only
five, possessed nuclear weapons.
The government of Pakistan made several proposals
to end the nuclear race in South Asia, including
the following:
1. Both India and Pakistan should declare that they
would not produce any nuclear weapons.
2. Both India and Pakistan should agree that their
nuclear research facilities would be inspected by
the International Atomic Energy Agency or by the
inspection teams of the two countries.
Both these proposals were rejected by India. They
went into the dustbin of history when “in
May of 1998 India broke a twenty-four-year hiatus
and tested five atomic bombs, the largest of which
was claimed to be a thermonuclear (fusion) device
with a yield of forty-three kilotons, roughly three
times that of Little Boy, which took out Hiroshima.”
(Ibid, p.84) The decision to explode the nuclear
bombs “was made for domestic political reasons
by the insecure leaders of the governing Hindu Nationalist
Party, the BJP, who wanted to impress the masses
with their strength. Sure enough, after the tests
there was widespread jubilation on the streets.
The celebrants ignored the possibility that the
next time a nuclear weapon was ignited in India,
it might be dropping in from Pakistan and vaporizing
them.”(Ibid)
Pakistan took these tests very seriously and regarded
them as a direct threat, particularly because of
the statements made by some important Indian leaders,
including the Deputy Prime Minister L. K. Advani.
He “declared that Islamabad would have to
submit to this reality, particularly as it affected
the dispute over Kashmir, and that Indian troops
would henceforth chase Kashmiri insurgents in ‘hot
pursuit’ right back across the border in Pakistan....
As part of the package, the Indian press was full
of taunts, challenging the Pakistanis to show, if
they could, that their nuclear arsenal was anything
more than a bluff. Either way the Indians figured
to gain: if the Pakistanis did not now test a nuclear
device, they would demonstrate their weakness, with
delicious consequences for local balance of power;
if they did test, and successfully, they would join
India as a target of international sanctions, and
would suffer disproportionately...” (Ibid)
The US government put a lot of pressure on Pakistan
not to follow India’s example and President
Clinton made several offers to Pakistan, including
increased financial aid and supply of more and new
weapons. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was initially
interested in accepting the US advice. However,
four major factors tilted Pakistan’s decision
in favor of conducting nuclear tests. Firstly, almost
all political parties, including Benazir Bhutto’s
People’s Party, and particularly the religious
parties, started a mass agitation against the government
for procrastination in this matter and demanded
vociferously that Pakistan should immediately conduct
nuclear tests in response to India’s. Secondly,
as stated above, some of the statements by the Indian
leaders were extremely bellicose, threatening Pakistan
with all sorts of consequences, if Pakistan did
not change its policy with regard to Kashmir. Such
statements were taken very seriously by the Pakistani
rulers who, realizing Pakistan’s weakness
in conventional weapons vis-a-vis India, felt that
by not going nuclear, Pakistan would be too vulnerable
to Indian pressures and demands. Thirdly, despite
President Clinton’s assurances to Pakistan
that the US would considerably increase economic
and military assistance to that country, the Pakistan
government knew that in the American political system,
based on separation of powers, the president’s
powers with regard to foreign aid were limited.
Because of the controversial nature of the issue,
some members of Congress could block the president’s
request for increased aid to Pakistan. Fourthly,
Nawaz Sharif openly admitted to President Clinton
in a telephonic conversation with the latter that
he would be ousted from power if he did not accede
to popular demand with regard to the tests.
“On the night of May 27, 1998 just hours before
the scheduled test, word was received from Saudi
intelligence that Israeli fighters, flying on behalf
of India ... were inbound to take out Pakistan’s
nuclear facilities.... Pakistan scrambled its own
fighters and rolled its missiles out of their shelters
in preparation to launch.... (T)he Indians responded
immediately by preparing their own aircraft and
missiles, and for a few hours the countries came
close, perhaps, to a nuclear exchange. Had this
occurred, it would have been just the sort of reflexive
slaughter that people fear .... But on the night
of May 27, at least the leaders of Pakistan had
the sense to hesitate and pick up their phones.
The United States and other nations assured them
that they were safe, the Israeli attack never materialized.”
(Ibid)
On May 28 Pakistan responded to the Indian challenge.
“That afternoon a small group of Pakistanis
associated with the weapons program gathered in
a concrete bunker in Chagai (Baluchistan) facing
the chosen mountain seven miles away. Pakistan later
reported that five nuclear bombs had been placed
inside the test tunnel ..., 800 feet beneath the
mountain’s peak. The bombs were fission devices...
containing highly enriched uranium .... One bomb
was said to be large, and four to be small. They
were wired to detonate simultaneously.... The official
number of five was intended to match India’s
test exactly - with the special surprise of a sixth
bomb tested elsewhere two days later, to one-up
the score. The tunnel was sealed with heavy concrete
plugs. At 3:15 p. m.... a technician pushed the
button saying “Allah- o-Akbar.’ ”
After a delay of thirty-five seconds... the mountain
heaved, shrouding itself in dust.... When the dust
settled , the mountain’s color had turned
white.” (Ibid, p. 85) It is ironical that
because of the institutional rivalry between the
Kahuta Laboratory and the Pakistan Atomic Energy
Commission (PAEC) and pettifoggery in Pakistani
politics, the Kahuta Lab personnel, the real builders
of the Pakistani bomb, were given a marginal role
on this eventful occasion and Samar Mubarakmand
of the PAEC was chosen the leader of the test site
and after the test, it was he who was received as
a hero by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and hundreds
of cheering admirers at Islamabad airport.
There are different reports about the number of
nuclear weapons India and Pakistan currently possess.
But it is certain that they have enough to destroy
major cities in the two countries and kill and maim
hundreds of millions of their citizens. In addition,
a nuclear war would create major environmental hazards
way beyond South Asia. As stated above, the two
countries were on the verge of a nuclear war in
1998 and 2002. There is no guarantee that such an
eventuality would not arise again. It is, therefore,
a matter of utmost seriousness not only for India
and Pakistan but for the whole world, especially
for the United States, to foreclose any possibility
of a nuclear holocaust in South Asia.
Some Pakistani intellectuals have suggested a unilateral
nuclear disarmament by Pakistan. This is an unrealistic
and unhelpful proposal. Nuclear weapons have proved
to be a deterrent in South Asia as with the world’s
great powers; they have had a sobering effect on
policy makers and have proved to be an argument
for not going to war. In all probability, a war
would have broken out in 1998 or in 2002, but for
Pakistani nuclear capability.
However, in order to preclude any possibility of
a nuclear war in South Asia, some steps are necessary,
including the following:
Without any delay, India and Pakistan should sign
a No-War Pact. More than 50 years ago, such an agreement
was proposed by Prime Minister Nehru but was rejected
by the Pakistani government. The latter’s
argument was that as long as the Kashmir dispute
remained unsolved, the no-war pact would simply
legitimize the status quo in that state. After the
1971 war, Pakistan took the initiative and made
the no-war pact offer to India. However, this time
Nehru’s daughter, who was Prime Minister,
refused to sign such an agreement. She demanded
a more comprehensive treaty, which would not only
exclude the use of military force by either state,
but would also include close economic, cultural,
and commercial ties between the two countries. At
that time, Pakistan was not willing to go that far.
Now that the so-called “confidence-building
measures” are in full swing and regular and
frequent exchanges of delegations in all walks of
life are taking place between the two neighbors,
it is imperative that both countries should at least
solemnly declare that war will not be an option
to settle their disputes.
The “command and control” system with
regard to nuclear weapons is a crucial element in
nuclearization. There should be safety checks with
regard to the power of an individual to push the
button. Also, a foolproof arrangement should be
in place to preclude any possibility of an accidental
war. One hopes that the hot line already established
between Islamabad and New Delhi works in all situations
and is never severed by mechanical problems or human
inefficiency, both not uncommon occurrences in South
Asia. It is generally believed that India and Pakistan
have dispersed their nuclear weapons throughout
their territories in order to protect them from
the possibility of being destroyed by a single strike.
It is imperative to assure their total security
from theft, vandalism or any other mishap.
As has been pointed out earlier, the main cause
of enmity between India and Pakistan is the Kashmir
dispute. If this dispute is settled, there is no
reason that these South Asian neighbors cannot live
in peace and harmony. In fact, it was the ardent
hope of Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, that his
country and India would have the same kind of friendly
and peaceful relations as the US and Canada. For
the solution of the Kashmir problem the United States
could play a vital role. As the only Super Power
it has the ability, in fact the responsibility,
to help solve this dispute, which has taken, more
than once, the two Asian neighbors to the brink
of a catastrophic nuclear disaster and has already
resulted in the loss of thousands of lives. Solving
the Kashmir dispute would also bring about some
other major benefits, notably important economic
and social gains. The colossal amounts these two
countries are currently spending on their military
buildup could be diverted to provide better health
and educational facilities for their teeming populations,
and improve the overall quality of life for hundreds
of millions. Also, it is important to bear in mind
that an educated populace, with ample employment
opportunities where people are optimistic about
their own and their children’s future, produces
fewer terrorists.
Fear, ignorance, and poverty are the breeding grounds
of terrorism.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
