Militarism
in Algeria and Pakistan
By Ahmad Faruqui, Ph.
D.
Danville, California
Leo Tolstoy
opens Anna Karenina with the line, “All
happy families are alike; every unhappy family
is unhappy in its own way.” Perhaps the
literati will forgive me for restating this as
a political postulate, “All democratic nations
are alike; every undemocratic nation is undemocratic
in its own way.”
In the case of Pakistan, unhappiness has come
in the form of militarism. As UCLA historian Stanley
Wolpert once put it, the army has been “Pakistan’s
protective wolfhound, always on duty, powerful
enough to keep any enemy at bay, or to destroy
its ‘master’ if he forgot the proper
password or feeding hour.”
The 1940 Resolution of Pakistan called for the
formation of a state for the Muslims of British
India so that they could be protected from the
tyranny of a non-Muslim civilian majority. While
that objective was achieved with the creation
of Pakistan in August 1947, the hypothetical tyranny
of a civilian majority was traded for the actual
tyranny of a Muslim military minority.
The military was to use the conflict with India
over Kashmir to declare itself the guardian of
the national interest and rule the country whenever
it felt that was threatened. So far, that has
happened in 32 of 57 years. Not only does this
extended military interlude contradict Pakistan’s
call for self-rule in Kashmir, it is also at odds
with the global trend toward democracy. Military
regimes that were prevalent for decades in Eastern
Europe and Latin America have yielded to democratic
governments.
Algeria, which is hosting this week’s Arab
League summit, also has a long history of militarism.
However, before drawing any parallels between
Algeria and Pakistan, it is important to recognize
some key differences between the two countries.
Algeria, with a population of some 35 million,
is five times smaller than Pakistan but its per
capita income is about four times higher. It ranks
as the world’s 16th largest oil producer
and 6th largest gas producer. Rents from oil and
gas production have created a rentier economy
akin to that of most Gulf states, allowing the
Algerian state to spread its largesse across the
citizenry in a way that is beyond the reach of
the Pakistani state.
Located at the relatively peaceful tip of northwestern
Africa, Algeria does not have an external security
problem akin to Pakistan’s conflict with
India. Even then, it has a relatively large military
of about 125,000 troops and spends more than 3
percent of its GDP on defense.
The presence of a large military has made it difficult
for Algeria to make a successful transition to
democracy. The war of independence from French
rule was waged by Front de Liberation Nationale
(FLN), a coalition led by a Francophone elite
that surprisingly relied on religious forces to
mobilize the population. Independence came in
1962 and Ben Bella, a war hero, was elected as
the first President. He was deposed in a coup
in 1965 by Colonel Houari Boumediene, another
war hero.
As in Pakistan, Islam is closely interwoven into
Algerian politics. Algerian Islamists emphasize
the religious nature of native resistance to the
French, beginning with the call by the religious
brotherhoods in 1830 for a jihad to liberate Algiers.
This continued through the War of Independence.
Capitalizing on this link, Boumediene pursued
a strategy of co-opting the Islamists. Boumediene’s
successor, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid continued
this approach.
Algeria’s army regards itself as the guardian
of the national interest. Oil revenues feed into
a vast patronage networks, giving the state the
upper hand in deciding the classic issue of politics,
i.e., “who gets what, when, and how.”
In Pakistan’s case, the military has accomplished
this by creating its own corporations, by appointing
retired senior military officers to civilian posts
and by granting them land at throwaway prices.
The year 1988, when Zia’s plane crash transformed
Pakistani politics, also proved to be a watershed
in Algerian history for entirely different reasons.
Declining oil prices forced the regime to eliminate
subsidies, disproportionately affecting the urban
working classes and leading to riots in all major
urban areas. The army brutally suppressed the
rioters, damaging its claim to be a force of national
liberation.
Belatedly, it called for multi-party elections,
hoping that the arrival of democracy would herald
an end to the state’s sagging fortunes.
For the first time in its history, Algeria witnessed
a relatively free political atmosphere with a
flourishing press, competitive political parties
and intense debate on the direction of the state.
But events would prove that the state was not
prepared to honor the electoral results.
In the municipal elections of 1990, the Islamic
Salvation Front (FIS) garnered 33 percent of the
popular vote. In an even greater upset, the FIS
captured 44 percent of the Parliamentary seats
in the first round of legislative elections in
December 1991. When it became clear that the FIS
would win an absolute majority in Parliament,
the military stepped in and nullified the election.
President Chadli resigned and a State Council
took power. This action of the Generals ended
Algeria’s liberal period and ushered in
a civil war that would consume 150,000 lives.
On a smaller scale, this was a replay of Pakistan’s
1971 tragedy.
Since 1992, the Algerian military has retained
power through controlled and contrived elections.
Colonel Liamine Zeroual won the presidency in
1995 in elections boycotted by the Islamists.
In 1999, the military put forward Abdelaziz Bouteflika
as its candidate. He had been called The American
during his prior tenure as foreign minister. Bouteflika
was elected unopposed. He declared an amnesty
and this led to many rebels laying down their
arms. Violence abated but a state of emergency
remained in place.
Bouteflika was re-elected to the presidency last
year. But by winning with 83 percent of the vote,
he caused many to question the results, including
the independent paper El Watan, which called it
a result worthy of Kim II Sung, the former North
Korean leader. Algeria’s tragic impasse
persists. Behind the façade of elections,
a military clique continues to wield power. President
Bouteflika has to operate within “red lines”
defined by the military.
While each nation is unhappy with militarism in
its own way, Algeria’s political parallels
with Pakistan are astounding and equally discouraging.
When it comes to using elections as a front for
military rule, Pakistan’s Army invented
the doctrine of Basic Democracy in 1959 and enshrined
it in the 1962 Constitution. Had Ayub patented
the concept, it would have made up for Pakistan’s
lack of oil revenues.
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