Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto Revisited
Part II (1967 - 1971)
By Siyasi Mubassir
On December 1, 1967, the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) was founded by Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto and a few of his associates, including
J.A. Rahim, Mubashir Hasan, Mumtaz Bhutto, Mustafa
Khar, Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Rafi Raza, and Hayat
Sherpao, meeting at the house of Mubashir Hasan
in Lahore.
The motto adopted by the group for the newly-created
party was: “Islam is our faith; Democracy
is our polity; Socialism is our economy; All power
to the people.” Later, Roti, Kapra aur Makan
(Bread, Clothing, and Housing), “became
the rallying call of the Party. It was a catchy
abbreviation of a slogan among students in India:
Roti, Kapra aur Makan; Mang raha hai har insan.
(Bread, clothes and housing is the demand of every
human being). In Pakistan, the slogan electrified
the masses.” (Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
and Pakistan; 1967-1977, Karachi, Oxford University
Press, 1997, pp. 8-9),
Bhutto, elected chairman of the party, went full
speed ahead, touring the country to spread his
message, which was focused mainly on highlighting
the plight of the common man and promising that
his PPP had the solutions to the people’s
problems. A second focus of the message was condemnation
of all aspects of the Ayub Regime, of which Bhutto
had been one of the main intellectual pillars
for eight years. According to Rafi Raza, who was
a close associate of Bhutto, a member of his cabinet,
and one of the very few persons who remained loyal
to him for the next 10 years, Bhutto “was
a new phenomenon on the Pakistani political scene,
well-groomed, young, articulate and charismatic.
He went to the people. They were impressed and
awed by this man.... His greatest assets were
his unlimited energy, flair for politics and appetite
for work. His driving force was above all his
ambition , supported by his intellectual vigor.”
(Raza, p.8)
Anti-Ayub Movement
In his anti-Ayub campaign, Bhutto exploited the
1965 war and the Tashkent Agreement. He argued
that Pakistan could have won the war but for Ayub’s
acceptance of a cease fire under international
pressure - an assertion which totally contradicted
the factual situation. He also claimed that he
would expose the “secrets” of the
Tashkent Agreement at an appropriate time, which
he never did - as there were no secrets to be
exposed. One of the major weaknesses of the Ayub
government was that neither the president himself
nor any one else in his cabinet, after Bhutto’s
departure, was a good public communicator. Thus,
all these charges were not effectively countered
and the people believed in what Bhutto was saying.
Bhutto took advantage of the general disaffection
thus created with the Ayub Regime. The main focus
of the Ayub Regime’s economic policies was
“grow more wealth” but this produced
few direct benefits for the common man. As World
Bank economist Shahid Javed Burki points out,
“(t)he economic program during the Ayub
period produced rapid growth but relatively little
gain at the lower end of the income distribution
scale.” (Shahid Javed Burki, “Economic
Decision-making in Pakistan” in Lawrence
Ziring, Ralph Braibanti, and W. Howard Wriggins,
Pakistan: The Long View, Durham, N.C., Duke University
Press, 1977, p.158). Mahbub-ul-Haq, one of the
Ayub government’s prominent economic advisers,
disclosed the fact that during the Ayub Decade,
a high percentage of the country’s wealth
was concentrated in the hands of only 22 families,
many of them not being “sons of the soil,”
but migrants from India.
The anti-Ayub movement started by Bhutto rapidly
picked up steam and because of the suffocating
atmosphere in which the urban middle classes,
labor, students, university and college faculty,
low-level government employees and moulvis and
maulanas had lived for almost 10 years, it resulted
in a veritable volcanic eruption in the urban
areas. Anti-government demonstrations, strikes,
and protests became a regular feature. Bhutto
had also toured the rural areas and for the first
time in Pakistan’s history, the villagers
felt the excitement of politics and realized that
they also counted.
“In an interval of less than a year,”
writes Stanley Wolpert, “Zulfi had roused
most of West Pakistan, bringing its young men
from a state of apathy or despair to the brink
of righteous revolt against the military dictator
and his major pillars of support. He had set Sindh
on fire, stirred the Frontier, and taken Pindi
by storm....(Addressing a mammoth meeting in Lahore,
‘the heartbeat’ of Punjab, Bhutto)
took the jacket from his back and threw it into
the cheering, almost worshipful crowd of frenzied
young men, who looked to him as more than a political
leader. He was the stuff true martyrs and mahdis
were made of. There was fire not only in his speech
but in his bloodshot bulbous eyes that rarely
closed, hardly ever rested any more - sleep had
abandoned Zulfi by now.” (Stanley Wolpert,
Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times,
New York, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 126)
By 1969, the anti-Ayub movement had spread throughout
Pakistan, both in the east and west wings. Police
was often used to control or even disrupt demonstrations
and processions, occasionally resulting in civilian
deaths. However, the military generals refused
to help Ayub Khan in using force to suppress the
mass movement. At this stage, Ayub decided to
resign, handing over power to General Yahya Khan,
commander-in-chief of the army in March 1969,
the latter assuming the office of President of
Pakistan and the Chief Marshal Law Administrator.
It is important to note that while leading the
mass campaign against Ayub, Bhutto retained close
contacts with the other army generals, in particular
with the commander-in-chief of the army, Yahya
Khan and General Peerzada. Bhutto himself later
admitted to Rafi Raza his collusion with Yahya
Khan.
Arguing that there have been no fair elections
in Pakistan’s history, Bhutto asked Rafi
Raza rhetorically, “’Do you think
Ayub defeated Miss Jinnah fairly (in the presidential
election of 1964)? Do you think it was this unfair
election that finally overcame Ayub? No, it was
Yahya and I. We even had a code arranged for the
movement against Ayub, ‘Ceylon Tea Party’,
and that was how Ayub was toppled.’”
(Raza, p.327)
1970 Elections and the 1971 War
The Yahya Government organized general elections
for the National and Provincial Assemblies towards
the end of 1970. These were the first national
elections in Pakistan’s history and Yahya
Khan deserves credit for the fact that they were
fair and free from government interference or
intimidation. To the surprise of the Yahya Regime
and many others, Mujib-ur-Rahman’s Awami
League swept the elections in East Pakistan, capturing
160 out of 162 seats. The PPP obtained 81 out
of 138 seats in West Pakistan: winning 62 out
of 82 seats in Punjab and 18 out of 27 seats in
Sind. The leftist National Awami Party obtained
three out of four seats in Baluchistan and three
out of 25 seats in the North-west Frontier Province
(NWFP). With the exception of Jamiat-ul-Ulamai
Pakistan, which secured six seats in the NWFP,
the remaining Islamic parties were routed both
in West and East Pakistan. The Jamaat-e-Islami,
which had the tacit support of the Yahya Regime,
was able to obtain only four seats in the whole
of Pakistan.
National Assembly
The newly-elected National Assembly was also to
be the constituent assembly to frame a new constitution.
There were two major political problems facing
the country, both relating to East Pakistan and
the posture adopted by its leadership. In1966,
the Awami League had adopted a radical plan for
the future constitutional set-up for the country,
called the Six-Point Formula, whose main feature
was the demand for an extremely weak center with
only two powers - defense and foreign affairs.
The central government was not to have even the
power of taxation.
Now that the Awami League had won a “totalitarian”
majority of seats from East Pakistan, it felt
that it had the mandate of the Bengalis to implement
its formula. Since it had secured an absolute
majority in the National Assembly, its leader,
Mujib-ur-Rahman, was justified in expecting to
become the next prime minister of Pakistan. The
PPP, at the same time, had won a majority of seats
in West Pakistan; 80 out of 109 seats from Punjab
and Sind - the two provinces Bhutto called Pakistan’s
“centers of power.”
This kind of rhetoric further alienated Mujib,
who had no love lost for Bhutto and had boasted
that he would “fix” him. Mujib was
not willing to share power with Bhutto and was
apparently encouraged in this attitude by the
other West Pakistani politicians. Bhutto’s
demand for a share in the country’s political
power was also justified. His party represented
the two largest provinces of West Pakistan and
to expect that he would merely sit in opposition
for the next five years was not only unwise but
also unfair. Another complication was Yahya Khan’s
unwillingness to relinquish power. He wanted to
remain president ad infinitum. Thus, the emergent
post-election situation was that Yahya desired
to continue as president while Mujib, as leader
of the majority party, fully expected to become
prime minister and was unwilling to share power
with Bhutto-- notwithstanding the fact that it
was primarily through the efforts of Bhutto, strengthened
by an “invisible” Yahya hand, that
an apparently invincible Ayub had been dethroned.
Bhutto had not invested so much time and energy
to bring about this historic change of government
to simply remain out of power indefinitely. As
the days passed, a war of words broke out between
Mujib and Bhutto, each blaming the other for being
obstinate and creating obstacles in reaching a
political solution. Yahya Khan had separate protracted
dialogues and discussions with Mujib and Bhutto
but without success. When Bhutto realized that
Mujib was unwilling to share power with him, he
raised the slogan, “Idher hum udhar tum”
(We here, you there!). He elaborated this idea
on March 15, 1971: “We say that power should
be handed over to the representatives of the people
in both wings. We say that at the Center power
should be transferred to the majority parties
of both the wings, and in the provinces to the
majority parties in the provinces. Only such an
arrangement will ensure the unity of Pakistan.”
(Z. A. Bhutto, Marching towards Democracy, January
1970-December 1971, Rawalpindi, Pakistan Publications,
n.d., pp.194-95, quoted in Wolpert, p.151)
As the situation existed then, this was a viable
and rational proposal. However, the other West
Pakistani politicians, who apparently had as much
aversion for Bhutto as did Mujib, strongly criticized
Bhutto’s proposal. Wali Khan, leader of
the National Awami Party contended that Bhutto
had “no standing” in the NWFP and
therefore he did not represent that province (Wolpert,
p.151). Mumtaz Daulatana, leader of the Council
Muslim League, argued that “since there
is only one Pakistan ... there can be no question
of two majority parties in one country... running
the affairs of the country.” (Dawn, Karachi,
17 March 1971, quoted in The Bangladesh Papers,
pp.249-50, quoted in Wolpert, p.151) Akbar Bugti,
a political leader from Baluchistan was extremely
critical of Bhutto. “Bugti believed that
Mujib was willing to lead a unified Pakistan.
Bugti blamed Bhutto for the current deadlock,
insisting that he was ‘worse and more ruthless
than former President Ayub Khan’”
(Dawn, Karachi quoted in The Bangladesh Papers,
pp.237-38, quoted in Wolpert, p.150) (Incidentally,
when Bhutto came in power after the fall of East
Pakistan, he appointed Bugti as the governor of
Baluchistan). Unfortunately, the non-PPP West
Pakistani politicians’ dislike of Bhutto
proved to be dysfunctional and strengthened Mujib’s
unwillingness to share power with him.
The conflicting interests and demands of the prominent
political leaders and the totally divergent perspectives
from which the three principal actors - Yahya,
Mujib, and Bhutto - looked at the unfolding events
and developments resulted in the failure of arriving
at a peaceful solution and led to the self-destructive
military action in East Pakistan by the military
rulers, undertaken with Bhutto’s approval,
on the night of 25th March 1971.
In the above context, a remark by the great German
Chancellor and statesman, Bismarck seems to be
pertinent. He once remarked that “there
was no such thing as political intuition: political
genius consisted in the ability to hear the distant
hoof beat of the horse of history - and then by
super human effort to leap and catch the horseman
by the coat-tails.” (Isaiah Berlin, “Winston
Churchill” in Personal Impressions, NY,
The Viking press, 1981, p.15.) In 1971, the question
was who, among the three principal political actors
in Pakistan, had the “ability to hear the
distant hoof beat of the horse of history”?
Yahya Khan was not a well-read man and as described
by Bhutto, was too drunk most of the time to make
any insightful decisions. Mujib was a fiery orator
but a mediocre politician, about whom Justice
Murshad, the Chief Justice of East Pakistan High
Court used some strong language while conversing
with this writer. He said, “Mujib is a donkey;
but let him become the prime minister.”
(In an interview in Dacca in the summer of 1970)
Among the three, Bhutto was the only leader--
extremely intelligent, a savant, well-read in
history and international relations-- who could
be expected to foresee the tragedy that was coming,
but he failed to rise to the occasion. Rafi Raza
also refers to Bhutto’s lack of foresight
at this historic moment: “Events proved
that he over-estimated military power, under-estimated
Bengali nationalism, and most surprisingly, did
not properly anticipate India’s determination
to seize this opportunity to break (up) Pakistan.”
(Raza, p.83)
With regard to Bismarck’s comment cited
above, it can be said that among all the 20th
century political leaders of the subcontinent,
the only person who had “the ability to
hear the distant hoof beat of the horse of history”
was Jinnah. No Congress leader, including Gandhi,
came close to the degree of prescience, which
the Quaid-i-Azam possessed. For instance, he had
warned Gandhi as early as the 1920s that his “civil
disobedience” and “non-cooperation”
movement would bring disastrous results, but the
latter did not pay heed to Jinnah’s warning.
General lawlessness and the communal riots that
became a regular feature of life for decades in
the sub-continent were a direct result of Gandhi’s
promotion of “civil disobedience.”
His movement, which was supposed to be based on
“non-violence,” became, in fact, excessively
and uncontrollably violent.
The violence let loose by General Tikka Khan and
General Niazi in East Pakistan and the equally
ferocious response by the Mukti Bahini were widely
reported in the international media. The overall
result was the creation of a totally negative
image of Pakistan and the Pakistan army throughout
the world.
In May 1971, Dr. G.W. Choudhury, Yahya’s
Bengali constitutional adviser, went to Dacca.
Following is his account of the visit: “It
was the worst experience of my life. Everywhere
I went, I heard the same story: one person had
lost a son; another a husband; many villages were
burnt ... My next meeting with Yahya took place
in Rawalpindi... Yahya’s first question
was what I had seen in Dacca. My prompt reply
was no foreign newspaper had exaggerated ... I
also told him that it was not only the number
of deaths but the manner in which innocent persons
had been killed and women raped that had destroyed
our cherished homeland for which the Muslims of
the subcontinent had sacrificed so many thousands
of lives.... He knew my devotion to the concept
of a united Pakistan and he also knew that I had
never supported Mujib’s veiled secessionist
plan.” (G.W.Choudhury, The Last Days of
United Pakistan, Bloomington, Indiana University
Press, 1974, pp. 190-93 quoted in Wolpert, p.157)
During the next six months after the military
action in East Pakistan, the Indians claimed that
no fewer than “9.5 million inhabitants of
Bengal took refuge in India. Among them were many
Hindus but also numerous Muslims ....” (France
Bhattacharya, “East Bengal: Between Islam
and a Regional Identity” in Christophe Jaffrelot,
ed. (translated from French by Gillian Beaumont),
A History of Pakistan and Its Origins, London,
Anthem Press, 2002, p.57). Indira Gandhi continued
to harp on the influx of refugees to India and
argued that it was cheaper for her to wage a war
against Pakistan than to continue to bear the
burden of millions of refugees. Subramunyam, a
senior Indian military strategist called this
situation an “opportunity of a century”
for India to attack East Pakistan and to “liberate”
the Bengalis.
In the fall of 1971, “Yahya conveyed a secret
peace plan promising, in effect, immediate implementation
of (Mujib’s) all Six Points to Indira Gandhi
through her new ambassador in Islamabad ... But
now that Indira had her Soviet backing, she did
not bother to respond to such clandestine overtures.”
(Wolpert, p.161) Indira Gandhi did not wish to
miss the “opportunity of a century”
and on 22nd November, 1971, Indian troops entered
East Pakistan and a full-fledged war commenced.
The limited Pakistani military presence in East
Pakistan, handicapped by the betrayal of a majority
of the Bengali population, was no match for India’s
superior war machine. On 9th December, General
Niazi, the military commander in East Pakistan
“informed GHQ that the regrouping of troops
and readjustment of battle positions had become
impossible owing to enemy air activity and the
extreme hostility of the local population.”(Raza,
p.131) At this stage, the Bengali governor of
East Pakistan, A. M. Malik asked Yahya’s
“approval for peace proposals.” Yahya
agreed and “also said that Lt-Gen. Niazi
would be instructed to accept the Governor’s
decision and make necessary arrangement. Assuming
the Governor had the President’s approval,
Maj.-Gen. Farman Ali, (Martial Law Administrator
of East Pakistan) passed on the cease-fire proposal
to the UN Representative (in Dacca), Paul Marc
Henry. A few days later, on 13 December, presumably
following ZAB’s (Zulfikar AliBhutto’s)
plea to the President (emphasis added), GHQ urged
Niazi to hold on.” (Raza, p.131-32) It is
surprising that Bhutto advised Yahya Khan to continue
the war despite the fact that General Niazi and
General Farman Ali, who were present in the battleground
and fully aware of the existing military situation,
were keen on a ceasefire and had Yahya’s
consent. On 14th December, Malik and his cabinet
resigned and asked for the protection of the International
Red Cross in Dacca. The same day, Yahya sent a
message to Niazi, saying that he “should
now take all necessary measures to stop the fighting
and preserve lives of all armed forces personnel,
all those from West Pakistan, and all loyal elements.”
On the night of 15 December, the Army Chief of
Staff confirmed that Niazi could accept the terms
of surrender proposed by the Indians, which met
Niazi’s requirements” (Raza, p.132).
That day Bhutto was giving a fiery speech at the
Security Council. He attacked Britain and France,
castigated the Council and declared: “So
what if Dacca falls, So what if the whole of East
Pakistan falls? So what if the whole of West Pakistan
falls?... We will build a greater Pakistan.”
(Quoted in Raza, p.128) With these brave words,
he tore up the papers in his hands and walked
out of the Security Council chamber. Bhutto’s
behavior in the Security Council and his advice
to Yahya Khan soon after 9th December to prolong
the war are puzzling at best for he knew that
Pakistan was losing the war. Thus, whatever chances
of obtaining any respectable terms of ceasefire
existed at that time disappeared within a few
days. A smiling General Niazi surrendered to General
Aurora of the Indian army on 16th December,1971
in Dacca and 93,000 Pakistani soldiers became
prisoners of war in Indian hands.
In Rawalpindi, Yahya and his coterie of generals
believed that “business as usual”
would continue and that they would retain power
in what remained of Pakistan. However they were
in for a rude shock. On 20th December, General
Hamid Khan addressed junior officers of the Pakistan
army in Rawalpindi. After his talk, the young
officers began “shouting ‘Bastards!’,
‘Drunkards!’, ‘Disgraceful!’
and ‘Shame!’...Lieutenant- General
Hamid Khan’s composure and that of the generals
of the front row had completely collapsed....
Yahya Khan had played his last card. The game
was up.” (Salman Taseer, Bhutto: A Political
Biography, London, Ithaca Press, 1979, p.130,
quoted in Wolpert, p.170)
Rafi Raza describes the negative impact of the
fall of East Pakistan on the rank and file of
the Pakistan army and Bhutto’s ascension
to power: “It caused bitterness, indiscipline
and insubordination against the army leadership.
We learnt that Air Marshal Rahim and Lt.-Gen.
Gul Hassan were instrumental in prevailing on
the Yahya junta to hand over power peacefully
to ZAB.” (Raza, p.134) Bhutto took the oath
of office of the President of Pakistan and the
(first civilian) Chief Martial Law Administrator
on the same day when General Hamid and the other
top military brass had been humiliated by the
younger officers of the Pakistan army.
Summing Up
After leaving Ayub’s cabinet, Bhutto galvanized
the whole of West Pakistan. It was the first time
that a national leader had reached almost every
nook and corner of the west wing. He was a man
for all seasons. He could address each audience
in its own language: a sophisticated presentation
before the elite, an emotional speech in front
of the students, and wearing shalwar and qameez,
he could mesmerize laborers and peasants. Bhutto
was at his best when he captivated his audiences.
It was most unfortunate that after the elections,
he and the arrogant, unyielding Bengali leader
could not arrive at a “civilized”
solution. Both Mujib and Bhutto eventually succeeded
in acquiring what they most desired - power. But
the deplorable events that took place in East
Pakistan between March and December, 1971 would
forever constitute a dark chapter in Pakistan
and Muslim history.
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