Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Revisited - Part III
Pakistan under Bhutto
By Siyasi Mubassir

(Similar in-depth articles on other leaders who have dominated the political scene in Pakistan will appear in these columns. – Editor)
After conquering East Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was planning to invade West Pakistan with the burning desire to take care of the “Pakistan problem” once and for all. She wanted to create an emaciated neighbor on India’s western borders or, preferably, to balkanize it. The man who saved Pakistan from this tragic and humiliating eventuality was American president Nixon, whose unrelenting pressure on the Soviet Union to restrain its Indian ally from invading the western wing saved what is now Pakistan. Nixon’s and Kissinger’s memoirs provide a vivid account of this rarely-discussed episode.
With one-third of Pakistan’s army in Indian hands, India’s quantitative superiority in all kinds of military hardware, and demoralization sweeping through the rest of the Pakistan army, one could assume that, after losing its eastern wing, Pakistan was in no position to withstand an Indian onslaught on its western front for longer than a few weeks. Had a full-fl edged war taken place, it would also have resulted in a great deal of destruction in Pakistan. Nixon, through Kissinger, convinced the Soviets that the US would not tolerate further dismemberment of Pakistan.
Among the reasons for Nixon’s unflinching support for Pakistan was the fact that he had little love for pro-Soviet India and was unhappy with Indira Gandhi’s unwillingness to help solve East Pakistan’s problem through peaceful means. Also, during the Eisenhower administration, Nixon, as the Vice President, had been an active supporter of Pakistan because of the latter’s membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later called CENTO) and the US-Pakistan defense agreement of 1956. Moreover, Nixon did not want India, a Soviet ally, to become the preeminent power in South Asia, and Pakistan to become another Bangladesh, a country without any teeth.
Nixon’s famous “tilt” towards Pakistan paid off when 10 years later, Pakistan became a bulwark for the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, and the Mujahedeen-Pakistan-US alliance forced the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan. The question may be asked why, if Nixon was so passionately pro-Pakistan, he allowed India to take over East Pakistan. The truth of the matter is that the Pakistani military action and the resulting atrocities in East Pakistan had sealed off any international sympathy for Pakistan’s case. As the Turkish ambassador in Pakistan told me at the time, “Your friends did not know whom to support-- the Pakistan government, or the majority of the people of your country (meaning the Bengalis).”
Few Pakistanis are aware of Nixon’s historic rescue of their country and those who are aware are reluctant to acknowledge its historic significance. Thus, when on 20th December 1971, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was sworn in as the President of Pakistan and the first civilian (and so far the last ) Chief Martial Law Administrator, most Pakistanis had no inkling that they could have faced a worse fate.

Economic policies
Soon after coming to power, Bhutto started implementing the economic policies enunciated in the Pakistan People’s Party manifesto. On January 1, 1972, the central government assumed the ownership and management of public utilities (electricity, gas, and oil) as well as of thirty-one units belonging to the following industries: iron and steel, basic metals, heavy engineering, heavy chemicals, motor vehicle assembly and manufacture, tractor assembly and manufacture, heavy and basic chemicals, petro-chemicals, and cement. The process of nationalization continued unabated, despite “warnings from many quarters, including from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai” (a staunch communist!), writes Rafi Raza, one of the top advisers in the Bhutto government, who later became minister in-charge of nationalized industries (Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan: 1967 - 1977, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1977, p.148).
On 18th March, 1972, life insurance businesses, including foreign companies, were taken over by the government. More than a year later, (on 16th August 1973), the vegetable ghee (shortening) industry was nationalized. “The government’s encroachment into this industry,” writes Shahid Javed Burki, “was resented by its own constituency” as “a good proportion of the cooking oil industry was owned by small and middle-sized entrepreneurs. Some of these people had been active PPP supporters and many others belonged to social groups that were favorably disposed towards the (People’s) party.” (Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1971 -1977, London, Macmillan Press, 988, p.117). Burki maintains that the “government’s takeover of the vegetable oil industry also disturbed for good the uneasy truce that had been reached between Bhutto and the business community. Bhutto had broken his promise; his assurance of no further nationalization until the elections of 1977 no longer seemed meaningful and the little confidence that the businessmen had developed in the regime was now completely gone.” (Burki, pp. 117 -118)
Despite the negative implications of these policies, the nationalization bandwagon continued to roll on with full speed: in January 1974, all domestic, privately-owned banks were nationalized, a step which Bhutto described as his “present for the New Year to the people of Pakistan” which eventually proved to be a present not to the people but only to those who had political clout: these government-owned banks failed to provide any benefits to the common man and became a source of loot for the influential individuals connected to the PPP, who started borrowing hefty sums of money from these government-owned banks, with no intention or ability to repay the loans. Many of these loans were usually written off by the government authorities.
In July 1976, the process of nationalization reached the rural areas as well, where more than 3,000 small units engaged in flour milling, rice milling, and cotton ginning were taken over by the government. According to Rafi Raza, this nationalization “was both an economic and a political blunder.... It was absurd to nationalize the small rice mills, some of which were literally located in the backyards of the houses; these were later handed back, and some other anomalies corrected. But the main damage was done, because now even small businessmen were hesitant to invest. Worse, the entire bazaar became hostile and played a significant part in the 1977 post- election agitation against ZAB (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto).” (Raza, pp.284 -285) Why did Bhutto choose to make this decision? According to Rafi Raza, “He wanted to establish his peerless position; having outperformed the rightists on the Qadiani issue (by having the National Assembly declare that they were non-Muslims), he now sought to outdo the left within the Party, quite apart from trying to strengthen his support among the small farmers.” (Raza, p.284)
The official explanation of the PPP government’s overall nationalization policy was the following:
1. The “commanding heights of the economy” should belong to the people. Concentration of economic power should be reduced.2. The economy should be subservient to socio-political objectives.3. Financial resources should not be under the control of a few rich families. (Saeed Ahmad Qureshi, Privatization and Economic Policy, Islamabad, Government of Pakistan, 1993, p.4)
Notwithstanding the government’s stated rationale for nationalization, there could be other motives as well for the adoption of this most controversial policy. Anwar Syed has referred to one of them. According to him, “… Bhutto’s nationalization measures substantially expanded the domain in which his will to power could express itself. Not only the government departments, their budgets and personnel, but banks, insurance companies, schools and colleges, industrial plants and trading corporations, including their posts and funds, would be under his sway: thousands of jobs to which friends and supporters might be appointed and from which those hostile toward his regime removed.” (Anwar H. Syed, The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, New York, St. Martin’s Press. 1992, p.125)
Burki has also commented on the adverse effects of Bhutto’s economic policies: “It can be said with some confidence that their overall impact was negative.” ( Burki, p.163) According to Burki, “The performance of the economy during the 1970s was much poorer than in the 1960s. In some respects it was even worse than in the 1950s.” ( p.164) He also argues that the “income distribution worsened during the Bhutto period.” ( p. 166) He adds, “(T)here is little doubt, ... that the middle classes were worse-off as a result of the economic policies adopted during the Bhutto period. They also suffered political and social deprivation.” ( p.167) Burki believes that the “PPP emerged as a political party in which the power of such well-established groups as large landlords and such new groups as industrial workers and peasants was much in evidence.” (p.167) However, the countrywide agitation against the Bhutto regime in 1977, with the participation of large sections of industrial workers, does not support this assertion.
It can thus be argued that the negative outcomes of Bhutto’s nationalization program outnumbered its benefits. The main beneficiaries of this policy were the PPP leaders, their family members and supporters, the bureaucrats, laborers of state-owned industries, and the employees of state-owned banks and insurance companies. The PPP leaders were able to have their relatives and supporters appointed to various positions in the new “industrial/commercial empire” acquired by the government. “Provincial governments and local politicians forced the absorption of an uneconomic number of employees in the state sector,” admits Rafi Raza, who later became the minister in-charge of nationalized industries. ( Raza, pp.147-148) The bureaucrats found their jurisdiction extended and many of them lined up lucrative positions in the new public enterprises. Laborers employed in such enterprises gained greater job security and more benefits, with less pressure to work hard since it became very difficult to terminate the services of even the most inefficient employees. Productivity was no longer the main criterion for personnel decisions in the public enterprises and the economy, on the whole, suffered from the nationalization policy.

Bhutto’s Style of Governance: Rule by Fear
As is generally known, Bhutto belonged to one of the richest landowner families - waderas - of Sindh, personally owning more than 100,000 acres of land. Despite his education at prestigious schools in California and at Oxford, his behavior as president and prime minister was primarily that of a wadera. A graphic description of the life of a typical Sindhi wadera has been given in the minority report written by M. Masud in the Hari (peasant) Committee Report of 1948.
(H)e has many servants, fine horses, and a large supply of weapons. He is fond of ‘pomp and show’, keeps expensive cars, goes after women, drinks excessively, and entertains lavishly. He replenishes his dwindling purse by swindling his haris (tenants) and by protecting and patronizing robbers and cattle-lifters. He bribes civil and police officials who reciprocate his attention by overlooking his atrocities. He makes a show of his high living, official connections, and command of gangsters to overawe other zamindars. His prestige and feudal honor are at stake in his rivalries with them. He has ... to maintain his prestige among his retinue and the haris who would lose faith in him if they were to know that he was weaker than his rivals. He must, therefore, keep a reputation of zulm (cruelty) and zabardasti (high-handedness) by spreading awe all around. (M. Masud, Hari Report: Note of Dissent, Karachi, The Hari Publications, n.d., pp. 9 - 14, quoted material on p. 11, quoted in Syed, p. 8).
To what extent Bhutto’s style of governance was influenced by his wadera background is an issue that will next be examined.

Zulfi-Rahim Effect
Very early in his presidentship, Bhutto made it known that even his old friends should not show any familiarity with him. In a cabinet meeting also attended by senior bureaucrats, when a member of his cabinet, who also happened to be an old friend, addressed him as “Zulfi”, he retorted in coarse graphic language, which cannot be reproduced here verbatim, but could be roughly paraphrased as: “If I have intimate relations with your wife it doesn’t mean that you should also be on intimate terms with me.” This was a clear message to Bhutto’s friends that they should not treat him as their friend but as their supreme boss. It is small wonder that some of his ministers started calling him “Aali Jah,” meaning “Your Exalted Highness.”
Another incident, one that sent shock waves to the ruling class was the criminal treatment of J.A. Rahim, the senior most cabinet member, by Bhutto and his thugs. Wolpert gives a graphic description of Rahim’s “brutal and tragic fall.”
Until 3 July 1974 he (J. A. Rahim) had been one of a handful of confidants, advisers, even ‘friends’ though some insisted that Zulfi had no friends, only followers, servants, or family. ... It was hardly surprising, therefore, that J.A. was one of a select group of cabinet ministers and important political advisers invited to dinner at the prime minister’s house on 2 July. The handsomely embossed invitation said 8:00 p.m. ... Rahim ... knew that Zulfi liked his guests to be punctual. ... (H)e showed up on time, as did all the others. But Bhutto was nowhere to be seen at eight, nor did he appear even so much as to show himself from the room “upstairs,” where he remained closeted on some “more important business,” at nine, ten, or eleven o’clock. (Wolpert, p. pp. 239 - 240)
Rahim, an old man, could not wait any longer and just before midnight, he got up and said, “Pakistan is becoming a rajwara (raja’s kingdom) and Mr Bhutto is its raja.” Then he left for home. According to J.A. Rahim,
About 1.0 a.m. ...(s)ome men of the FSF (Federal Security Force) were climbing up the front balcony for the purpose of entering my bedroom.... Said Ahmed Khan, Chief of the Prime Minister’s Security, who was at the head of that mob of armed FSF thugs, ... and several others rushed in ... armed with rifles or sub-machine guns. ... Besides being beaten by fists I was hit by rifle butts. I was thrown to the ground and hit while prostate. ... My son tried to intervene to protect me and was himself assaulted by FSF men.... I was dragged out by my legs, then thrown into a Jeep... bleeding profusely from a wound in the nose, the left nostril having been ripped open. No medical attention or first aid was offered. After nearly a couple of hours Mr. Rafi Raza arrived at the police station. (Quoted in Wolpert, p. 240)
Rafi Raza has also corroborated Rahim’s story. According to Raza, “(W)hen I got home I found that he and his son had been beaten up and taken to a nearby police station. I brought them back to their house after two in the morning and with difficulty, secured the help of a doctor.” (Raza, p. 300)
The criminal beating of J. A. Rahim, a highly respected minister, was according to Rafi Raza, “intended to serve as a lesson and to instill fear in others.” (Raza, p. 30) The obscene rejoinder to a minister, narrated earlier, and the physical assault on Rahim produced, what might be called the Zulfi-Rahim Effect. For ministers, PPP leaders, governors, and senior bureaucrats, who came in regular contact with Bhutto, the Zulfi-Rahim Effect became the guideline, making them live in fear and sapping any possibility of their giving him bold and honest advice.
When Jam Sadiq Ali, another Bhutto supporter and PPP leader became the victim of Bhutto’s wrath, he could have faced a worse fate than Rahim’s but for his personal connections at the right place at the right time. According to former Federal Security Force Director Masood Mahmood, Bhutto once told him, “ ‘Jam Sadiq Ali is a mouse. Can’t you find a cat to take care of him?’ Masood immediately informed his friend Jam Sadiq Ali, who flew from Karachi to London the next day.” (Wolpert, p. 309.)
One of Bhutto’s closest lieutenants, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, who was Governor and Chief Minister of Punjab stated in the Lahore High Court, that it was true that “when somebody showed political differences with Mr. Bhutto he used to be jailed and based on his personal likes and dislikes, revengeful action used to be taken against political opponents but sometimes he also showed tolerance” (quoted in Wolpert, p.309).
Rule by fear was applied to both friends and foes. It has been noted by Khalid B. Sayeed that during the session of the National Assembly in November 1975, when “the opposition members voiced their bitter opposition to the way the government was pushing through a constitutional amendment limiting dissent, the Federal Security Force was brought in and several protesting members were beaten and physically ejected from the assembly.” (Quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, New York, Praeger, 1980, p. 107)
In November 1974, during a speech in the National Assembly, the Pathan opposition leader Wali Khan “repeated his ‘stale’ old phrase ‘Bhutto and Pakistan cannot coexist.’” (Wolpert, p. 243) This was a brave statement to make as Wali Khan had survived four assassination attempts.
According to an intelligence report reaching Bhutto, another opposition leader, Ahmad Raza Qasuri, had said on 27 October 1974 that “’the Prime Minister ... had broken Pakistan into pieces to install himself into power and that he was a traitor and son of a traitor.’” (Wolpert, pp.243-244). On the night of 9th November, Kasuri was going home in his car with his father, mother and aunt. On a dark road, his car came under attack with automatic gunfire from two directions. In the shooting, his father, Ahmad Khan Kasuri, who was sitting next to him, was fatally wounded, “his shirt and seat soaked with blood.”

Wolpert writes,
In his First Information Report (FIR) Ahmad Raza told them (the police) exactly what he could remember ... and when they asked if he had any idea of who the perpetrator might be, he answered without a moment’s hesitation, ‘Zulfikar Ali Bhutto!’ That was the name he repeated and insisted upon having recorded in the FIR.... (N)o amount of pressure, advice, subtle warnings, or reasoning could move him to retract one jot of the FIR accusation. (Wolpert, p.244)
Wolpert adds, ”When Kasuri’s father was killed, Bhutto’s FSF Director-General Masood Mahmood recalled, ‘The Prime Minister phoned me up to say,. Mian (Abbas) has done balls! Instead of killing Kasuri, he got his father!’” (Wolpert, p. 244)
Summing up
The economic growth that was a major contribution of Ayub Khan came to a standstill during the Bhutto regime and the nationalization of major industries and other economic concerns proved to be dysfunctional. The promises Bhutto made in his first speech after becoming the president and what he actually gave to the country were worlds apart. He had promised that he would bring democracy to Pakistan. In reality, he destroyed whatever democratic institutions and ethos existed in the country. He had said in his speech that an ordinary man in the street could tell him to “go to hell.” These were hollow words. As we have noted above, the Zulfi-Rahim Effect permeated the Pakistani establishment and a dire fate awaited the opposition; their members were assaulted in the National Assembly chamber, four assassination attempts were made on Wali Khan, and Ahmad Raza Kasuri was targeted to be killed (although he survived, his father was shot dead). Bhutto’s rule was certainly rule by fear.
Some Pakistani scholars living abroad, who only glimpsed the charming side of Bhutto’s personality, did not see the dark side of his rule. They were not aware that Bhutto’s Pakistan was a far cry from Jinnah’s dream of a liberal, democratic state.


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Editor: Akhtar M. Faruqui
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