Reforming
the Jihadis
By Dr Ahmad Faruqui
Danville, California
Pakistani security forces have
detained hundreds of suspected jihadis and Islamist
clerics after a crackdown launched in the wake
of the July 7 London bombings. This crackdown
came after British officials revealed that three
of the four suspected bombers in London were Britons
of Pakistani lineage and at least two of them
had visited Pakistan recently.
General Musharraf has said that no suspect directly
related to the London bombings has been arrested
and the investigators were performing “a
very tedious job.” Musharraf, who has outlawed
10 extremist groups, said the police had been
ordered to catch the leaders of these organizations,
not to round up large numbers of people.
“I don’t want to arrest the workers,”
he told a group of foreign correspondents. “I
want the leaders of the banned groups.”
He appeared frustrated by the lack of progress
and said he wanted to get “all of the bigwigs.”
The president also pledged to enforce a ban on
anti-Western hate speeches being spread from mosque
loudspeakers or through audiotapes.
However, suspicion about the president’s
seriousness and commitment to rounding up the
jihadis is growing in the West and patience with
his approach is running out. After every major
incident, the president is seen as giving an ethically-grounded
speech on national radio and television about
the need to shun religious extremism. Scores of
people are shown as being rounded up during the
following weeks but eventually most of them are
released.
Seeking to address the skeptics about his true
motives, t he president has said that the campaign
to rein in the jihadis is much stronger now than
it was in 2002, in the aftermath of the attack
on the Indian Parliament in December 13, 2001.
Musharraf, who had spoken eloquently against terrorism
in his January 12, 2002 speech, now conceded that
the earlier campaign was “limited”
because he did not have “a free hand”
in dealing with the jihadis. He cited three factors
for why that campaign was limited: an unstable
economy, a confrontation with India over Kashmir
and insufficient international support for his
presidency. “Maybe the boat would have capsized”
if the government had pursued the campaign against
domestic militants more aggressively in 2002,
he said. “We took action, but there were
restraining factors.”
In retrospect, this statement appears to have
been incredibly myopic. The economy was unstable
in large measure because of domestic unrest caused
by anarchy brought upon by the jihadi militias
carrying out their politics of hate. The confrontation
with India over Kashmir was largely precipitated
by acts carried out by the jihadis. And there
was limited support for his presidency because
the world did not expect him to eliminate groups
that had been funded and created by the Pakistani
military.
By now there is ample evidence that the boat will
sink if decisive action is not undertaken now.
The costs of inaction are much greater than the
cost of decisive action. Musharraf’s anti-jihadi
policy is an illusion, a revolving door policy
in which suspects are arrested and released. Such
a policy undercuts the president’s claim
that “I have never done anything without
being serious. I don’t bluff. I do act with
realism. I am realistic, not idealistic. I am
extremely serious.”
As Ahmed Rashid noted in an interview with Der
Spiegel recently, “Despite the many crackdowns
made by the military regime of Gen. Pervez Musharraf,
we (Pakistan) haven’t effectively shut down
the Pakistani militant groups. The reason for
that is that these groups are very closely tied
into the military’s foreign policy and if
the madrassas they control — they all control
a certain number of such religious schools —
are not shut down, we’re not going to see
an end to militancy here. When crackdowns do occur,
they aren’t effective. Three hundred, or
even 2,000, people are picked up, they’re
held for 90 days and then they are freed as soon
as the attention and pressure from the West has
stopped. There has never been an organized campaign
to combat it.”
Sensing the need to do something stronger, the
president has decided to blame the violence entirely
on “foreigners.” This was the line
used a few months ago while mounting the military
campaign in Waziristan and it has now been used
to expel “foreigners” from the madaris,
including those holding dual nationalities. This
action is designed to dispel doubts about his
commitment and/or competence in prosecuting the
war against terror. Unfortunately, it is likely
to be viewed as window dressing.
The time for Pakistan to act decisively against
the jihadis is running out. Matters should not
be allowed to degenerate to the point that others
who regard themselves as the victims of Pakistani-spawned
terror may decide to step in to solve the problem.
That would spell the end of Pakistan’s sovereignty
and crimp the independence of its citizens.
Musharraf needs to act now, while he still wears
the uniform and wields the presidency. Otherwise,
what was the point of holding two offices. Being
the military man that he is, he will appreciate
the need to increase the “teeth-to-tail
ratio” in his message of enlightened moderation.
There are at least four ways to bring this about.
The first option is de-weaponization. This would
involve banning all private militias and asking
them to turn in their weapons. The successful
example of Northern Ireland comes to mind.
The second option is regularization of forces,
i.e., inducting the jihadi militias into the regular
armed forces. They could be used to create a much
needed reserve force, perhaps a National Guard
with a new command structure. Such a move would
help beef up the country’s genuine security
needs without provoking India, since such regular
forces won’t be able to mount proxy wars.
The third option is economic conversion. The jihadis
would be enrolled in technical schools and their
energies diverted to pursuing civilian careers
that would open to road to acquiring ownership
in civil society.
The fourth one is ideological neutralization.
This would involve teaching the teachers in the
madaris to remove hate and fanaticism from their
religious messaging. Enlightened scholars would
be used to impart the message of living in peace
with fellow human beings.
These four options are not mutually exclusive.
Combinations can be pursued to improve the chances
of success. Other options can also be determined
through brainstorming by experts from around the
world. Think tanks in Pakistan should hold conferences
in all four provinces to generate fresh ideas.
And the government should not only listen to these
recommendations but act upon them, while it still
has space for maneuver.
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