Turkey’s
Strategic Culture
By Ahmad Faruqui, PhD
Danville, California
Situated
at the crossroads of Asia and Europe, Turkey is
a pivotal state whose success or failure affects
the well-being of people located beyond its borders.
With a population of 72 million and a Gross Domestic
Product of some $300 billion, it has significant
economic mass. As discussed in a previous column,
it has begun accession talks with the EU. Should
that happen, Turkey would be well positioned to
serve as a political and cultural bridge between
the East and the West. And, given its position
as a moderate and democratic Muslim state, it
can serve as a role model for Muslim countries
that oscillate between political instability and
one-man rule.
For these reasons, the Turkish analogy has often
been suggested for Pakistan. Before it can be
applied, however, it is necessary to understand
the origin of Turkey’s “strategic
culture”, where the term is understood to
mean the processes through which political, social
and economic forces come together in the formulation
of national policy.
Much of Turkey’s strategic culture can be
traced back to the Ottoman Empire, Ataturk’s
attempts to eliminate all such influences from
Turkey’s strategic culture notwithstanding.
In September, a Turkish admiral invoked the decisive
defeat of the Genoese navy at the hands of the
Ottomans a few centuries back to send a fairly
blunt signal to the leaders of a neighboring country:
back off.
The Ottomans ruled for six centuries, from1299
to 1923. At its peak, their empire ruled more
terrain than any Muslim empire before or since.
Its decline began in the eighteenth century and
gathered pace in the nineteenth. Caught up in
internal political intrigues, the empire did not
keep up either technologically or politically
with rivals in Europe. Seeking to arrest the decline,
it began to imitate its long-standing Western
rivals. The Sultans launched a series of Tanzimat
(reforms) to redefine Turkey’s national
identity but these were largely superficial and
failed. European influences permeated Turkey’s
strategic culture to the point that the state
even redesigned its military uniforms to follow
Western fashions, much to the chagrin of those
soldiers whose families had served in the Ottoman
armies for generations. Toward the end, Turkey
became known as the “Sick Man of Europe.”
As the Great War broke out in 1914, the empire
cast its lot with the Axis Powers and lost. The
armies of the Allies moved into Turkey when the
war ended. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a dashing military
hero who had earlier distinguished himself in
the Battle of Gallipoli, drove out all occupying
armies in the years that followed. Thus was born
the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A grateful nation
bestowed upon him the title of Ataturk, father
of Turkey.
Ataturk, who had only seen the Ottomans during
their decline and fall, prematurely attributed
much of Turkey’s problems to its Ottoman
heritage. He banished Islam from Turkish politics
and embraced the French definition of secularism
— not so much neutral toward all faiths
as antagonistic toward public expressions of the
dominant religion. Unlike the French, he created
a National Security Council (MGK), in which the
military of which he had been a part, was prominently
represented. Henceforth, the MGK would be the
guarantor of Turkey’s independence and secularity.
Over time, the army would use the MGK to wield
enormous power behind the scenes in all matters
of state, most notably by excluding electoral
candidates who had Islamist or Kurdish leanings.
Favoring alcohol, cigarettes, and flashy women,
the extravagant Ataturk seemed more interested
in worldly pursuits than in the spiritual teachings
of Islam, which nevertheless were a key influence
in the life of the majority of his fellow citizens,
like they had been in the lives of their forbears
for centuries. In 1938, he succumbed to a very
European ailment, cirrhosis of the liver. General
Ismet Inonu, his deputy, succeeded him and served
as head of his party until 1972. Inonu’s
successor was Bulent Ecevit, who served as prime
minister on and off for 30 years until he was
finally ousted in the general election of 2002.
Turkey began a gradual and difficult transition
to democracy between 1960 and 1980, a period that
was marked by three coups carried out to preserve
the Kemalist vision. A new constitution was passed
in 1982 with a unicameral legislature (majlis)
of 550 members. This had the effect of limiting
the influence of the army in national politics.
Nevertheless, there was one more military interruption
in 1997, when the army removed the Welfare Party
(RP)-led government of Necmettin Erbakan for displaying
vaguely defined Islamist tendencies.
Another package of constitutional reforms was
passed in October 2001 that altered the composition
of the MGK to provide for a majority of civilian
members and officially reduced its stated authority.
The Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to
power in November 2002 with 66 percent of the
seats in parliament, ushering in the biggest social
change in the history of republic. But its leader,
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was unable to serve as prime
minister since he had recited a poem that evoked
an Islamist past, “The mosques are our barracks,
the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets
and the faithful our soldiers.” Abdullah
Gul took over as prime minister until a legal
change allowed Erdogan to take over in March 2003.
The AKP has a conservative base and most of its
leaders were leaders of the Welfare Party. The
party’s appeal stems from the popularity
of its call for a return to traditional Islamic
values. Party loyalists range from professionals
who dress in expensive Western fashions and interpret
Islam liberally to individuals, especially women,
who adopt a contemporary version of traditional
Islamic dress. Following the AKP’s victory,
the armed forces reluctantly acknowledged the
verdict of the voters and adopted a wait-and-see
attitude towards the new government.
The AKP leadership has been careful to avoid a
clash with the military. Erdogan’s wife,
who wears a headscarf, does not accompany her
husband to official state functions, where headscarves
are banned. Additionally, since Turkish university
students cannot enter the campus with a headscarf,
Erdogan sent his daughters to study at the University
of Indiana in the US. An astute politician, the
prime minister is staying within Ataturk’s
red lines. But for how long? The tension is palpable
as one poses the question to Turks. Their silence
points toward a major fault line in Turkey’s
body politic. In theory, the defense chief is
accountable to the prime minister. In practice,
as shown by Erbakan’s 1997 dismissal, it
is still the other way around.
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