Pakistan’s
Quest for National Identity
By Dr Ahmad Faruqui
Danville, California
Almost
60 years after its independence, scholars continue
to debate Pakistan’s national identity.
But what really matters is what Pakistanis take
it to be. My conversations with scores of Pakistanis
during the past few years have revealed not one
but four definitions of national identity. These
are a state for the Muslims of South Asia, an
Islamic state, a secular democratic state, and
a garrison state.
There is no consensus about the vision of the
founding fathers. Some say they wanted Pakistan
to be a democratic state while others say they
wanted it to be an Islamic state. Jinnah’s
early death in 1948, followed by the murder of
his chief lieutenant, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan,
in 1951 ensured that the vision of the founders
would die with them.
It did not help that in due course of time, a
man of great cunning seized the mantle of power.
A former civil servant turned Governor-General,
Ghulam Muhammad deposed the democratically elected
prime minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin, in 1953. This
act was carried out in concert with the army chief,
General Ayub Khan. It was a coup in all but name.
The Cold War hit its stride that year, as Dwight
Eisenhower moved into the White House and made
John Foster Dulles his Secretary of State. In
August 1953, the CIA carried out a coup in Iran
that deposed a democratically elected premier
and installed the Shah. In 1954, Pakistan began
to receive large amounts of US military aid and
signed the SEATO treaty to stop communist advances
in Southeast Asia. In 1955, it signed the Baghdad
Pact (later CENTO) directed at containing the
Soviet Union. These moves strengthened the Pakistani
military at the expense of other institutions
and facilitated Ayub’s coup in 1958. Pakistan
signed a mutual defense agreement with the US
in 1959. Three more coups would occur in the next
four decades. Each coup maker ended up serving
American interests, with Yahya providing Nixon
an opening to China, Zia fighting off the Soviets
in Afghanistan and Musharraf fighting Al Qaeda.
This procession of coups would fragment Pakistan’s
national identity, giving it all the confusion
of a man in mid-life crisis. In some ways, nations
are like people. As Newsweek commented recently,
they have “bodies and spirits, sinews and
desires.” So let us examine the four visions
of national identity a bit more closely.
The first vision is based on the two-nation theory
of statehood. At the time of Partition, 400 million
people lived in India of whom 100 million were
Muslims. After Partition, two-thirds of the Muslims
lived in Pakistan, making it the world’s
largest Muslim state. Today, this vision is a
historical relic, since there are about twice
as many Muslims in India and Bangladesh combined
as there are in Pakistan.
The second vision is that of an Islamic state.
During his 11-year rule, Zia sought to create
such a state without success. The irresolvable
problem is that there are multiple interpretations
of an Islamic state. Whichever brand of Islam
comes to power, it would seek to impose its vision
over everyone else. Indeed, there is nothing to
prevent radical groups from taking power in Islamabad
and imposing Taliban-style rule or a Tehran-style
theocracy. Clearly, neither outcome would be desirable.
The third vision is that of a secular democratic
state. Elected leaders would set all national
policies, including defense and foreign policy,
as well as economic, financial, social and political
policies. The government would reflect the will
of the people. This vision has been implemented
at various times with limited success. It has
failed largely because a strong military has not
allowed the elected civilians to develop independent
defense and foreign policies.
The fourth vision is that of a stratocracy, a
state run by the military. This vision survives
because weak politicians give the army the perfect
excuse to push them aside under the Law of Necessity
propounded by Hans Kelsen. The military way of
thinking has even made inroads among the educated
middle class, which is convinced that without
the big stick of the military, the nation will
degenerate into anarchy. Thus, the men on horseback
are regarded as a blessing when they come galloping
out of the barracks to restore law and order.
For decades, their war cry was that the country
was in danger of being invaded by a big external
enemy to the east. Now, they want to protect it
from the internal extremists that are in many
ways their brainchild.
It is time that Pakistanis gave up their grand
historical ambitions and learned to live with
a more realistic vision, a simpler dream. The
first two visions are not feasible and need to
be dropped. So also the fourth vision, since that
leads to nowhere. The major threat to Pakistan’s
national security comes from a strategic culture
based on intolerance. The process of debate and
free competition of ideas that leads to vitality
and rebirth of identity in democratic countries
is absent.
Thus, the only way forward for Pakistan is to
proceed with the third vision and to take concrete
and irreversible steps to change the strategic
culture of Pakistan by making it into a modern
and secular democratic state. With its Muslim
majority, there is no reason to chase the impossible
dream of making it into an Islamic state. Any
such move would be divisive, as was ample demonstrated
during the Zia years.
A lot depends on what happens in 2007, when Pakistan
turns 60 and holds general elections. Those elections
should allow for the rule of law by pushing forward
with the development of civilian institutions.
But this can only happen if Washington, which
has supported the Pakistani military’s frequent
intervention in politics, insists that the elections
restore sovereignty to the parliament, exclude
the military from the executive and grant full
independence to the judiciary.
The army should ensure that fair elections are
held and go back to the barracks. It should not
intervene politically under any conditions. If
elected leaders pursue bad policies, they should
be removed through parliamentary processes. If
they break the law, they should be prosecuted
in courts, not disposed of by a coup. Strong and
uncorrupt civilian leaders will not emerge under
the shadow of military strongmen. Military rule,
by masking weaknesses in governance, stifles the
growth and development of civilian institutions.
Such a cure is worse than the disease. Moreover,
by its recurrence, it perpetuates the notion that
Pakistan is a collection of warring tribes that
are held together at the barrel of a gun.
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