Partition Players’ Politics: III
By Dr. Khan Dawood L. Khan
Chicago, IL


On the pre-partition stage, there was another player, casting a long shadow -- the not-so-silent creeper, World War II. Parts 1 and II of this series emphasized Jinnah’s role, with references to other players who are featured here.
Gandhi/Nehru:
To say that Gandhi and Nehru tried to use all opportunities to keep India united wouldn’t be true. Nor would it be true to say that the tactics used were entirely supportive of their goal. Among the latter fall their attempts to exploit the British preoccupation in WWII, and which include: Gandhi’s refusal to support the British in WWII against Hitler; his letters to “my friend” Hitler; Gandhi’s “open” letter to the British; failure of the Stafford Cripps Mission, and launching the “Quit India” movement in the depths of the WWII.
Since India was part of the Empire, the Viceroy, exercising his colonial power, committed the Indian resources to it, without any prior discussion with the Indian public or leaders. Obviously, this angered Indian politicians, particularly Gandhi and Nehru. The Congress party refused to support or cooperate with the British and did not approve of seeing India dragged into it. Tired of the continued British ambiguities on ‘transfer of power’ (their preferred term) to India, Congress politicians thought it best to use this British preoccupation to intensify their demands.
While Hitler was taking over Europe and threatening British invasion, Gandhi wrote two letters to what he called “my friend” Hitler. Besides being totally ineffective, the letters were not only politically naïve and unhelpful, given the circumstances. They put Gandhi in hot water with many groups in India and around the world, no matter how opposed he may have been to Hitler’s atrocities. In his first letter (23 July 1939), which the British government didn’t permit to go through, Gandhi seemed more defensive about his letter:
“Friends have been urging me to write to you for the sake of humanity. But I have resisted their request, because of the feeling that any letter from me would be an impertinence.” But because of the worsening situation (occupation of Czech-populated Bohemia-Moravia and impending invasion of Poland), he continues, “Something tells me that I must not calculate and that I must make my appeal for whatever it may be worth…It is quite clear that you are today the one person in the world who can prevent a war which may reduce humanity to the savage state. Must you pay that price for an object however worthy it may appear to you to be? Will you listen to the appeal of one who has deliberately shunned the method of war not without considerable success? … I anticipate your forgiveness, if I have erred in writing to you. I remain, Your sincere friend, M. K Gandhi.”
His second letter on Christmas eve (24 December 1940), also cited by Elst, was lengthy and in a similar vein, except that the situation had worsened: Germany and Italy controlled most of Europe, with Churchill still forced to defend the British Isles but most of the rest of the world wasn’t aware of the massacre and deportation of Jews. Gandhi said, among other things:
(1) “That I address you as a friend is no formality. I own no foes. My business in life has been for the past 33 years to enlist the friendship of the whole of humanity by befriending mankind, irrespective of race, color or creed.” (2) “We have no doubt about your bravery or devotion to your fatherland, nor do we believe that you are the monster described by your opponents.” (3) “But your own writings and pronouncements and those of your friends and admirers leave no room for doubt that many of your acts are monstrous and unbecoming of human dignity, especially in the estimation of men like me who believe in human friendliness. Such are your humiliation of Czechoslovakia, the rape of Poland and the swallowing of Denmark. I am aware that your view of life regards such spoliations as virtuous acts. But we have been taught from childhood to regard them as acts degrading humanity.” (4) “…we cannot possibly wish success to your arms …. But ours is a unique position. We resist British imperialism no less than Nazism… If there is a difference, it is in degree. One-fifth of the human race has been brought under the British heel by means that will not bear scrutiny.” (5) “Our resistance to it does not mean harm to the British people. We seek to convert them, not to defeat them on the battlefield.” (6) “We know what the British heel means for us and the non-European races of the world. But we would never wish to end the British rule with German aid.” Koenraad Elst, author of several books including ‘The Saffron Swastika,” has discussed these letters in some detail. Most of these initiatives by Gandhi were criticized and ridiculed, typified by a comment by Kristien Hemmerechts, a Flemish professor and author: “…Gandhi was a naïve fool who tried in vain to sell his non-violence as a panacea to the Führer.”
As if this weren’t enough of political naiveté` and gratuitous advice to other groups he didn’t know much about, Stanley Wolpert refers to Gandhi’s “open” letter to the British people (1940) as another unhelpful gesture:
“I want you to lay down the arms you have as being useless for saving you or humanity. You will invite Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to take what they want of the countries you call your possessions. Let them take possession of your beautiful island with your many beautiful buildings... If these gentlemen choose to occupy your homes, you will vacate them. If they do not give you free passage out, you will allow yourself, man, woman and child to be slaughtered... I am telling His Excellency the Viceroy that my services are at the disposal of His Majesty’s government, should they consider them of any practical use in enhancing my appeal.” Among those who criticized this “open” letter, perhaps Sri Aurobindo (in his book ‘India’s Rebirth’) put it most succinctly: “He must be a little cracked.”
This was not much different from his advice to the Indians when the Japanese, having taken over Burma, were threatening India: Gandhi’s strategy was to let them occupy as much of India as they liked and then to “make them feel unwanted,” according to Richard Grenier (in an article “The Gandhi Nobody Knows,” in the March, 1983 issue of “Commentary,” a monthly published by the American Jewish Committee, NY). It was, however, diametrically opposed to what he had thought of other wars -- he had supported three wars: the Boer War, the “Kaffir War,” and WWI, the last with considerable enthusiasm.
When war broke out in August 1914, he was in Britain, and according to an account by Grenier, he (unlike his views on WWII) “instantly contacted the War Office, swore that he would stand by England in its hour of need, and created the Indian Volunteer Corps, which he might have commanded if he hadn’t fallen ill with pleurisy.” On his return to India in 1915, he wrote to the Viceroy, more than once, to offer his help, e.g.: “I would make India offer all her able-bodied sons as a sacrifice to the empire at this critical moment.” When other pacifists expressed horror at this, he rationalized his comments, based on ‘Bhagavat Gita’ and the wars described in it showing how Indians “have always been warlike, and the finest hymn composed by Tulsidas in praise of Rama gives the first place to his ability to strike down the enemy.” On the insensitive comments Gandhi made about Jews and tried to minimize the magnitude of their suffering with a “direct parallel” to another situation, a Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber in his response (24 February 1939) reminded Gandhi of his own comments of 1922 on the matter of Indian rights: how Gandhi had “repeatedly said that I would have India become free even by violence rather than that she should remain in bondage.”
One more event that could have kept India united was the pledge by Stafford Cripps (March 1942): full Dominion status for an Indian Union, the Constitution to be framed by the Indians and option to withdraw from the Commonwealth. But certain clauses (e.g., option of provinces and princely states to withdraw from the Union; British rule through the war, or the Clause E) were totally unacceptable to Congress. Gandhi called it “a post-dated cheque on a failing bank.” Although the League saw an opening for a possible ‘Pakistan’, and was interested in pursuing it, the rejection by Congress left no option for it. “Many,” says Chadha, “blame Gandhi’s uncompromising attitude for Cripp’s failure,” as well as that of Congress party in general refusal to support the British in WWII against Hitler. (To be continued)

 

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