Betwixt and
between America, China and Saudi Arabia
By Dr Ahmad Faruqui
Dansville, CA
Conventional wisdom
has it that three A’s sum up Pakistan’s
policy matrix: Allah, Army and America. But this
is a half-truth. To complete the picture, one
has to add a fourth A (Saudi Arabia) and a C (China)
to the list. While Pakistan has long-standing
ties with both patron states, these have become
more nuanced since America emerged as a global
hyper-power and India emerged as a regional power.
China’s influence on Pakistan stems from
its geographical proximity to Kashmir and Pakistan’s
northern areas. For decades, it supported Pakistan
on its forward Kashmir policy and Pakistan supported
it on the One China policy. During the Cold War
era, China competed with the Soviet Union for
leadership of the communist bloc. Its border skirmish
with India in 1962 made it a natural ally for
Pakistan. Eventually, Pakistan supported China’s
membership in the UN and served as China’s
gateway to the Muslim world, earning the epithet
of “China’s Israel” from at
least one analyst.
However, much has changed. Beijing is a global
power house. It has independently established
ties with all Muslim capitals. Moscow has become
its biggest arms supplier and trade with New Delhi,
at $20 billion a year, dwarfs its trade with Pakistan
by a factor of four.
So where does that leave Sino-Pakistani ties?
Some important clues can be assessed by reviewing
the agreements that President Hu signed during
his recent visit to Pakistan and even more by
the ones he did not sign. Hu waxed eloquent, in
good Mandarin tradition, saying that “our
relations are higher than the Himalayas, deeper
than the Indian Ocean and sweeter than honey.”
Hu’s visit provided a much-needed boost
to the embattled regime of General Musharraf.
It was the first in a decade by a Chinese president.
There was a lot of razzle-dazzle, parades and
garlands. But support on Kashmir was lacking.
In fact, this had been lacking since President
Jiang Zemin addressed the Pakistani Senate in
1996 and asked Pakistan to make peace with India,
signaling China’s desire to have peace along
its southern borders.
Even though Pakistan and China signed 18 economic,
social and defense deals during Hu’s visit,
topped by a free trade agreement (FTA) and a five-year
pact to boost “trade relations, joint ventures
and investment opportunities in Pakistan,”
the much-awaited agreement to build six additional
nuclear power plants was not signed, a salute
perhaps to Washington’s hyper-power status.
Nor was there any visit to Gwadar, a silent tribute
to Akbar Bugti.
It remains to be seen whether the FTA will bring
forward a tripling of trade. Governmental agreements
make for good rhetoric but cannot force the pace
of the marketplace beyond its natural limits.
If trade grows, the likely losers will be Pakistani
manufacturers, who cannot compete with their Chinese
counterparts. The main beneficiaries will be Pakistani
consumers and raw material suppliers so this will
largely involve a redistribution of income.
The visit confirmed that Beijing is likely to
remain Islamabad’s largest arms supplier.
Joint production of AWACS is now on the table.
The Pakistan army’s arsenal is heavily of
Chinese origin as is PAF’s inventory of
combat aircraft. The two countries are on track
for co-production of the JF-17 Thunder fighter
aircraft and may co-produce the F-22P naval frigate.
Chinese hardware, while hardly the best in class,
performed poorly in the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars.
But its low cost and plentiful availability make
it an attractive choice for the generals in Islamabad
who are apparently following Vladimir Lenin when
he noted, “Quantity has a quality of its
own.”
Pakistan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia
continues to grow. After his coup in October 1999,
Riyadh was the first foreign capital on the itinerary
of General Pervez Musharraf as he ventured abroad
in search of legitimacy.
Subsequently, Saudi Arabia accepted the deposed
Prime Minister, Nawaz Shariff, into exile. This
eliminated a major embarrassment for the man who,
while wearing the same uniform as General Zia,
did not wish to be seen as yet another vindictive
dictator.
As a follow-up to his 2002 peace plan for the
Israelis and Palestinians, King Abdullah of Saudi
Arabia gave Pakistan the green light to publicly
enter into a diplomatic conversation with the
Israelis. Talks were held in Istanbul between
the foreign ministers of the two countries but
went nowhere, since there was no support in Pakistan
for recognition of Israel prior to the creation
of a Palestinian state.
When Azad Kashmir and northern areas of Pakistan
were devastated by an earthquake, Saudi Arabia
topped the list of donor countries.
Defense cooperation continues to be a priority
between the two countries. In the past, Pakistan
has provided two divisions of troop ostensibly
to protect the two holy mosques but in reality
to guard the royal family against an indigenous
revolt.
Saudi Arabia is one of the world’s largest
arms importers and Pakistan is seeking to wean
it off its traditional European and US suppliers.
Encouraged by the visit of the Saudi Crown Prince
and Defense Minister in April, Islamabad is seeking
to sell up to 150 Al Khalid tanks to Riyadh, a
deal which may be worth $ 600 million. In addition,
the intelligence agencies of the two countries
are engaged in an intense hunt for the leaders
of al-Qaeda, including Saudi-born Osama bin Laden.
A complicating factor on the horizon is the warming
up of ties between Saudi Arabia and India. The
Kingdom is India’s largest supplier of crude
oil and host to more than a million workers. Symbolizing
a new interest in India, King Abdullah witnessed
the Republic Day military parade in 2005 from
the Red Fort in Delhi.
Whether and how this new relationship will affect
the Kingdom’s long-standing relationship
with Pakistan remains to be seen. But what is
apparent that the Kingdom, like China, has begun
to push Pakistan toward seeking a peaceful resolution
of the Kashmir problem.
This was noticeable during the Kargil crisis in
1999 and was visible a year ago when the Saudis
offered to mediate in the dispute. As expected,
the Indians demurred, killing the proposal.
Pakistan is likely to continue to depend on the
largesse of its patron states, even though its
special status with these states has been eroded
by India. The remarkable thing is that New Delhi
has done so without coming under anyone’s
tutelage. While some of this is undeniably due
to India’s larger size, much of the credit
goes to India’s democratic dispensation
that allows for the formulation of an independent
foreign policy.
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