Seeds of Indian
Proliferation
By Adnan Gill
Rancho Palos Verdes, CA
A country indulges in Nuclear
Proliferation in one or two ways, as a donor or
as a recipient. As a donor it can export the nuclear
technology to other nation -- called ‘Horizontal
Proliferation’ -- or it can divert technologies
from its Civilian Nuclear Program(s) to its Military
Nuclear Program(s) -- called ‘Vertical Proliferation’.
India is guilty of indulging in both.
Horizontal Proliferation occurs when a country
exports its indigenous resources (knowledge/items)
and/or when it practices ‘Onward Proliferation.’
Onward proliferation takes place when a country
obtains a controlled item from overseas and retransfers
it, or exports a reverse-engineered item without
proper authorizations to a proliferant state or
to a terrorist group. Proliferant states and smuggling
networks use such tactics to avoid export controls
in supplier states. Experts like David Albright,
President of Institute for Science and International
Security (ISIS), believes proliferant states target
Indian industries; consequently, Indian Onward
Proliferation is expected be become a serious
problem.
Vertical Nuclear Proliferation occurs when a country
diverts knowledge and/or items from its safeguarded
programs to its military programs. David Albright
in an October 26, 2005 testimony before the US
House Committee described the Indian Vertical
Proliferation thus, “India’s extensive
military and civil nuclear programs are often
connected, sharing personnel and infrastructure.
In addition, some facilities currently have both
a military and civilian purpose.” The so-called
Indian “peaceful nuclear explosion”
(detonated on May 18, 1974) is a prime example
of Vertical Proliferation. The fact is also confirmed
by an Indian scientist Raja Ramanna who admitted
that the radioactive core of India’s first
nuclear device was the plutonium diverted from
its American-Canadian supplied civilian nuclear
reactor (CIRUS).
Since 1949, as a recipient, India has licitly
and illicitly received nuclear technology from
‘Nuclear Supplier Group’ (NSG) countries
like France, Great Britain, Canada, Germany, United
States and Soviet Union/Russia. The nuclear technology
transferred to India in the 1950s and 60s by NSG
nations like the United States and Canada is directly
credited to India’s first nuclear weapon
and its test (1974), a fact also confirmed by
the Indians themselves. For its part, India effortlessly
proliferates the nuclear technology to countries
like Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Sudan and South Korea.
Exploiting the dual-use nature of civilian nuclear
equipments and materials India had been using
the cover of civilian programs to produce nuclear
weapons. Experts believe, as in the case of the
1974 nuclear blast, the plutonium for at least
some of India’s nuclear devices tested in
1998 also originated from CIRUS. In a June 15,
1998 Washington Post (p.A23) publication ‘India
Cheated’, Victor Gilinsky and Paul Leventhal
reported: “You wouldn't know it from news
reports, but most of the military plutonium stocks
India dipped into for its recent nuclear tests
came from a research project provided years ago
by the United States and Canada. India had promised
both countries it would not use this plutonium
for bombs.” India boldly violates non-proliferation
conventions and brazenly breaks bilateral agreements
by transferring nuclear fuels and technology from
its so-called civilian nuclear programs to its
nuclear weapons programs.
The so-called "Atoms for Peace" reactor
was built by Canada and run by tons of heavy water
supplied by the United States. In return for the
reactor, India promised both suppliers in writing
that the reactor would be reserved for "peaceful
purposes" only. But in a display of barefaced
defiance and belligerence, India broke its promise
by diverting the plutonium from CIRUS to the manufacturing
of nuclear weapons that were tested first in 1974
and then in 1998. The fact that neither Canada
nor the United States has uttered a peep about
India breaching the signed contract with contemptuous
boldness is symptomatic of Western complicity
in the building and modernization of Indian nuclear
weapons arsenal through nuclear proliferation.
Since it began operating in the late-1950s the
Indian CIRUS reactor alone has produced well over
600 pounds plutonium which is enough to build
over 50 nuclear weapons. No wonder, the Indians
do not take non-proliferation seriously.
Strangely, despite Indian disposition to indulge
in nuclear proliferation when or as they please,
each new generation of American policymakers thinks
that they will be able to gain Indian restraint
and acceptance of nuclear controls by being a
little more accommodating to them. The Indians
long time ago learned of the American weaknesses
that stem from a mix of an obsolete Cold War mentality
and commercial greed. Hence, they effectively
exploit this American weakness to build, expand
and qualitatively improve their own nuclear arsenal.
Indian perseverance in the acquisition of latest
nuclear technology through covert and overt means,
and its practice of proliferation of nuclear technology
in both vertical and horizontal manners, worries
peace and non-proliferation experts. In the light
of unscrupulous and unrestrained Indian proliferation
record, experts openly question the Bush Administration’s
decision to transfer American nuclear secrets
to India which can potentially compromise American
national security due to Indian proliferation
practices, including the ‘Onward’
proliferation. They argue that helping to ramp
up India’s ability to import and export
controlled nuclear items can neither be in the
interests of the United States nor the global
non-proliferation efforts.
Since the March 2, 2006 Indo-US nuclear deal,
the Bush Administration and Indian government
officials have mounted a deceptive PR blitz in
which they tirelessly champion India’s supposedly
"impeccable" nonproliferation record.
Factually, however, in order to buy into this
sugarcoated propaganda, one would have to ignore
and discount decades old Indian horizontal and
vertical proliferation record that started in
the 1960s when India decided to dip into irradiated
plutonium from its civilian CIRUS plant. Notwithstanding
the deceptive Indo-Bush Administration propaganda,
experts point to mounting evidence of Indian proliferation
record. Recently, ISIS unmasked a well-developed,
active, and top secret Indian program to outfit
its uranium enrichment program and circumvent
export control efforts of other countries.
Essentially, the Indo-US nuclear deal allows India
to buy foreign-made nuclear reactors while allowing
her to substantially ramp up her ability to produce
materials for nuclear weapons. Understandably,
the deal was widely criticized even within the
Bush-Administration. In 2001, the, American ambassador
to India, Robert Blackwill asked Washington to
rethink its nuclear policy towards India. But
Former Secretary of State Colin Powell wanted
a sensible incremental approach to increasing
sensitive trade with India. In a 2003 interview
Secretary Powell said, "We also have to protect
certain red lines that we have with respect to
proliferation."
Leading nonproliferation experts of Bush Administration,
John D. Rood and Robert G. Joseph tirelessly lobbied
for a deal in which India would have agreed to
limit production of plutonium and to place all
of its electricity-producing reactors under permanent
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards,
which would have been in accordance with the US
laws too. But the Bush Administration was so intent
on hammering out a deal with India that by the
time Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh arrived
in Washington, many of the key items on Mr. Rood’s
list had been taken off the table. Nuclear specialists
in the US government say their concerns about
weapons proliferation were overridden in final
talks with India.
Secretary Condoleezza Rice is believed to be the
force behind the hurriedly concocted and potentially
damaging Indo-US nuclear deal, which will arguably
compromise American nuclear secrets vis-à-vis
its national security. Reportedly, the deal is
a brainchild of Secretary Rice's counselor and
longtime colleague Philip Zelikow and (a Bombay-born
expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and a former aide to Blackwill) Ashley Tellis.
On April 3, 2006, the Washington Post (p.A01)
reported, “Upon Rice's return from Asia,
Zelikow began exchanging memos with Tellis, resulting
in a 50-page ‘action agenda’ for US-Indian
relations completed in mid-May.” While making
a case for India, in a memo Tellis argued, US
would have to “help New Delhi develop strategic
capabilities such that India's nuclear weaponry
and associated delivery systems” to deter
growing Chinese influence.
The Post also revealed Bush Administration’s
maverick strategy of assisting India in developing
nuclear weapons. It reported, “the Bush
administration originally wanted a pact that would
let India continue producing material for six
to 10 weapons each year, [but the signed deal]
would allow it enough fissile material for as
many as 50 annually.” The Indians were quick
to pick on American desperation to conclude a
deal. They outfoxed the Americans on the negotiation
table. The Post quoted a senior American official
involved in the negotiation: the “Indians
were incredibly greedy that day. They were getting
99 percent of what they asked for and still they
pushed for 100." It was as if the Bush Administration’s
sole goal was to please the Indians at any cost.
Sadly, instead of forcing India to freeze its
Vertical Proliferation, the US State Department
had been helping India get around the laws by
arranging for France and later China to continue
the Tarapur radioactive fuel supply. Considering
Indian proliferation record, instead of rewarding
India by signing the deal, at a minimum, the Bush
Administration should have insisted that Indian
plutonium covered by "peaceful purposes"
agreements be unavailable for nuclear weapons,
and that the Tarapur fuel is not reprocessed to
extract weapon-grade plutonium. Under the 1963
agreement, India was bound to get US approval
to reprocess the nuclear fuel. However, in a blatant
disregard to the signed agreement, India disputed
this and insisted it was free to reprocess the
used fuel at any time. Regrettably, the US government
as usual bowed to Indian demands fearing an irritant
in US-India relations and dispatched the disagreement
to the wastebasket of oblivion. Currently, there
is enough Tarapur plutonium to manufacture hundreds
of unaccounted nuclear weapons.
In March 2006, another ISIS report revealed details
of Indian illicit and secret nuclear procurement
program. The report effectively busted the myth
of the so-called ‘indigenous’ Indian
nuclear program. The report highlighted the indisputable
dependencies of Indian nuclear program on the
foreign sources. It stated, “India has a
long history of illicitly acquiring items for
its own unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Many
of India’s nuclear programs have depended
on extensive foreign procurement for materials,
equipment, and technology. Indian nuclear organizations
use a system that hires domestic or foreign non-nuclear
companies to acquire items for these nuclear organizations.
Such procurement appears to continue for its secret
gas centrifuge enrichment plant near Mysore.”
The report also cataloged the deceptive and illicit
procurement network established by Indian Department
of Atomic Energy. “In an attempt to hide
its true purpose from suppliers and others when
it started this project in the 1980s… Under
the direction of India’s Department of Atomic
Energy, Indian Rare Earths (IRE) Ltd. of Mumbai,
a public-sector undertaking focused on recovering
minerals and processing rare earths, procures
sensitive materials and technology for a secret
gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plant codenamed
the ‘Rare Materials Project' (RMP) outside
Mysore, India. The Bhabha Atomic Research Centre
(BARC) operates the plant and appears to both
coordinate procurements for this facility with
IRE and pursue procurements for its own divisions
through IRE. RMP itself is rarely acknowledged
by the Indian government as a gas centrifuge plant.”
An impressive and resolute Indian proliferation
record spans over five decades. The Indian nuclear
program is developed, nourished and sustained
by the Nuclear Supplier Group nations through
direct and/or indirect assistance. Whenever the
Indian establishment failed to secure direct and/or
indirect assistance from the NSG, it stole the
nuclear technology through secret underground
nuclear proliferation networks.
Each state that covertly or overtly paddles nuclear
technology to India makes mockery of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that entered into
force on March 5, 1970. Article III – 2
of NPT states, “Each State Party to the
Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or
special fissionable material, or (b) equipment
or material especially designed or prepared for
the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for
peaceful purposes, unless the source or special
fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards
required by this article.”
Even though, India is not a NPT signatory it has
constantly fought to undermine and weaken the
NPT and IAEA charters. American and European nearsightedness
and compliancy has directly resulted into Indian
constancy in pursuing nuclear bomb-making and
nuclear proliferation. It is not surprising that
the Indians expect the game of proliferation to
continue.
Practically every nuclear reactor running or planned
in India is either provided and/or built by a
foreign country or had been designed from foreign
blueprints -- stolen and otherwise. Every ounce
for the radioactive cores of Indian nuclear weapons
comes from the nuclear reactors that India deceptively,
legally or illegally secured from foreign nations.
Pointing to the serious risks posed to the American
national security, in his October 26, 2005, testimony
before the House Committee on International Relations
Hearing on the US-India David Albright warned,
“This agreement could pose serious risks
to the security of the United States. If fully
implemented, it could catapult India into a position
as a major supplier of both nuclear and nuclear-related
materials, equipment, and technology. With a weak
and poorly enforced export control system, [Indians]
could become major suppliers to the nuclear weapon
programs of adversaries of the United States,
in some cases possibly using technology which
the United Sates originally provided.” India
also has a huge manpower trained in nuclear secrets,
which inherently makes it a considerable knowledge
transfer risk.
Non-proliferation experts insist that India should
be sanctioned for its proliferation record. To
support their argument, they cite statements of
Indian statesmen who admitted that the fears of
international sanctions kept the nuclear weapons
program in low-gear. The former Indian President
Venkataraman said, all "preparations for
an underground nuclear test at Pokhran had been
completed in 1983 when I was the Defense Minister.
It was shelved because of international pressure,
and the same thing happened in 1995." Another
example cited is of former Indian Prime Minister
Gujral: "The Americans got in touch with
Mr. (Prime Minister) Rao and for some reasons
it was felt expedient to postpone the tests...
It was a major decision where all dimensions and
aspects had to be calculated. No decision could
be taken in a hurry ignoring all the political,
economic and international relations dimensions."
When it comes to Nuclear Proliferation, India
suffers from credibility problem. In a May 13,
1998, testimony before the US Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
then Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth
explained how the Indian government cannot be
trusted with its mere assurances. "We were
told privately and publicly that India would continue
to show restraint in the non-proliferation field,
and would do nothing to surprise us… As
a direct result of India's decisions and actions,
we are now compelled to look again at our approach
to India,” said Mr. Inderfurth.
Stung from Indian deceptions, after the 1998 nuclear
test at Pokhran, Secretary Inderfurth advised
Congress to coarse India in parting ways with
its shadowy proliferation practices and encouraged
it to become a responsible nation that respects
non-proliferation norms. He said, “Instead
of highlighting our cooperative efforts with India...
we will now need to put much of the cooperative
side of our agenda on hold and deal with the consequences
of India's actions. We must focus anew on seeking
a meaningful Indian commitment to cease from further
testing, to join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
immediately and without qualifications, and to
respect other international non-proliferation
norms.” Emphasizing the difficulty in trusting
India, Secretary Inderfurth also advised the Senate
Subcommittee that due to dishonorable Indian practices
the US should revaluate its relations with India.
“We will need to assess how we will deal
with India in accordance with Glenn Amendment
and other US laws, which require sanctions far
more restrictive than those placed upon Pakistan
under the Pressler Amendment… I must caution
that India's actions have made [engagements] far
more difficult.”
Indian culpability in every step of Nuclear Proliferation
cannot be ignored anymore. Instead of rewarding
it for proliferating nuclear secrets and technologies
to other nations and to build its nuclear weapons
arsenal, IAEA and NSG will have to place sanctions
on it to or, at minimum, slow down its mad pursuit
of becoming a nuclear superpower. On account of
Indian hegemonic behavior towards its neighbors
and its inherent domestic instability steaming
from a society built on racial/communal discriminations,
the World Community cannot afford lose nukes from
an unreliable and potentially fractured nation,
like it almost witnessed when the Soviet Union
was fractured.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
