Progress
under Musharraf Not Enough without Political Reforms
By Haider Mullick
Former Scholar Intern
The Wilson Center
US
After more than seven years of military rule
under Pervaiz Musharraf, Pakistan shows signs
of stable economic growth, yet major cracks are
visible in the political and judicial reform process.
Pakistan needs a long term vision beyond foreign
aid dependent economic growth; a vision based
on responsible and representative leadership of
the Muslim world abroad, and a true democratic
setup at home ensuring sustainable economic development.
This is not merely an image problem but an institutional
problem that is rapidly eating away the international
and national legitimacy of Musharraf’s regime.
To be fair, Musharraf has had a fair share of
colossal international and national crises, and
he deserves credit for successfully stabilizing
the economy during and after these crises. The
terrorist attacks against the US in 2001, and
later in India in 2003, forced a sudden and deliberate
change in foreign policy. Sky-rocketing prices
and record high unemployment in the late nineties
mandated recruitment of technocrats such as Shaukat
Aziz to stabilize the economy by trade liberalization
and deregulation. These policies were supported
– and to a great extent still are –
by a generous influx of foreign aid and remittances
from the Pakistani Diasporas after the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the massive October
8 earthquake in 2005. This aid was forthcoming
despite the uncovering of the A Q Khan nuclear
proliferation network. The economy on balance
grew and tensions with India declined. However,
many economists suggest that such an inflow of
aid and remittances is ephemeral at best and dangerously
misleading at worst.
With a fast growing economy a move to promote
democratic reforms seemed logical. It made political
and economic sense to set precedent by strengthening
and reforming political and judicial institutions.
But for autocrats all around the Muslim world,
any such move would directly challenge the presidential
decree. Thus this move never happened –
the various levels of national elections in the
last seven years produced members of parliament
who were to serve in a body with little or no
legislative power regardless of merit or intent
towards public service. Policies such as affirmative
action for women and educational prerequisites
for parliament membership sounded good on paper,
but soon they became tools of exploitation in
the hands of corrupt politicians. The Pakistani
government, crammed with political appointees
and with no parliamentary or constitutional supervision,
had the façade of a democracy but none
of the de facto power of functionality.
The government’s case for a centralized
power was strengthened by a surprise win in the
2002 national elections by the Islamists in the
two provinces of NWFP and Baluchistan, and the
loss by secular parties notorious for poor governance
and handicapped by leaders in exile. For Musharraf,
they were all a group of crooked politicians with
no intention or plan to improve the economy –
the backbone of the regime’s claim to power
and the engine behind the war on terror. This
became the primary rationale behind the regime
– if the West pushed for fair and transparent
elections then it aided an Islamist revolution
in Pakistan. For seven years, fear mongering became
the mantra of the military regime, and could be
used to justify or forced implementation of any
federal policy.
Some analysts would argue the necessity, if not
the altogether desirability, of autocratic rule
in jump-starting a developing country’s
economy confronted with high poverty and low literacy.
But they can only go so far as justifying dogmatic
rule; if this trend continues for seven years
without any real democratic reform then the system
begins to collapse. Sustainable development comes
from long-term planning. Where will Pakistan be
by 2015 with or without US or other foreign aid?
With or without Musharraf? For example, if the
Supreme Court of Pakistan has mandatory term limits,
and has been frequently saddled with political
appointments not having parliament or senate approval
it is merely at the beck and call of the president.
The people of Pakistan must never kneel to this
form of un-elected and unaccountable power which
destroys the very foundations of a constitution
in that it results from the direct weakening of
judicial power.
It is truer today than ever before: the geopolitics
of the Indian subcontinent dramatically changed
when President Bush signed a civilian nuclear
cooperation pact and praised India for everything
that Pakistan did not have or had not achieved.
The economy of Pakistan has picked up, but political
and institutional reforms seem nonexistent, while
India enjoys economic growth, strong institutions
and an independent judiciary. The cracks in Musharraf’s
regime have been widened by recent accusations
of its ineffectiveness in apprehending Al-Qaeda
operatives, a surge in food prices, and sectarian
violence in Sind and Baluchistan.
Where do we go from here? I was nineteen when
I watched the president present his multifaceted
idealistic agenda to the people of Pakistan in
October of 1999. I am happy to see the country
register high economic growth rates, but saddened
by the lack of checks and balances on the president’s
power. History is not on Musharraf’s side
– military rule in the 1960s and 1980s showed
the ineffectiveness of long-standing autocratic
rule primarily supported by foreign aid. For decades
generals Ayub Khan and Ziaul Haq ruled the country.
In Turkey and Singapore regimes that were first
autocratic created the foundations for future
democratic nation states. However, military rule
in Pakistan has failed to create a sustainable
constitutional political system albeit short-term
economic growth.
Without a politically inclusive and empowered
middle class and a strong constitution, civil
society lacks the protection of the rule of law,
and thus fails to bring about a true system of
checks and balances enshrined in a constitution
that will survive any assassination attempt –
something Musharraf may not survive. His regime
must bring a culture of constitutional liberalism
for social harmony and sustainable economic growth
or else the cracks will widen and he will lose
the very power he hopes to retain. Musharraf must
cede to the will of the people by forming a pluralistic
government that respects voices of dissent. An
internationally recognized democratic regime would
placate the West’s fear of a nuclear Islamic
state and provide a model for other predominantly
Muslim countries. If Musharraf wishes to stop
the beginning of the end of his regime he must
renounce the temptations of autocracy and lead
an effort to spread a political culture of accountability,
responsiveness, liberty and rule of law. Time
is running out.
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