Saddam’s
Generals Break Their Silence
By Dr Ahmad Faruqui
Dansville, CA
Through
the Iraqi Perspectives Project (IPP), Saddam’s
generals have broken their silence on why Iraq
lost the war three years ago. Their views in the
aggregate were summarized in a previous column
(April 9, 2006). This one presents the views of
key commanders, as reported in the final IPP report.
Minister of Defense, Gen. Sultan Hashim Ahmad
al-Tai: Regarded as one of Iraq’s bet generals,
he did not agree with the pre-war complacency
of Saddam’s inner circle: “Iraqi military
professionals were not surprised at US. actions
at all. We knew what preparations were required,
and what would happen if those preparations were
not done properly. . . . Even if we had a real
defense, we wouldn’t have stopped the Americans,
but we would have made the price exaggerated.”
But he kept his views to himself, preferring to
let officers junior to him voice their objections.
According to a corps commander, Tai “was
an honorable man but he gave up his strategic
vision in order to keep Saddam’s favor.”
Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Ibrahim Ahmad Abd al-Sattar:
Abd al-Sattar, who was also the chief of the armed
forces, did not question Saddam’s assurance
that war would not come to Iraq and that even
if his international supporters failed him, Washington
would not march into Baghdad. They had accepted
Saddam’s belief that Iraq’s “superior”
forces would put up “a heroic resistance
and . . . inflict such enormous losses on the
Americans that they would stop their advance.”
Saddam, who had seen how the Americans had routed
the Taliban regime in just over two months, convinced
them that Baghdad would not collapse like Kabul.
Commander, First Republican Guard Corps: He knew
that “there was nothing that could have
been done to stop the Americans after they began,”
but he did little to prevent Saddam from getting
into an un-winnable war.
Commander, Special Republican Guard, Maj.-Gen.
Barzan Majid: Despite his elite posting, Majid
was incompetent. One general noted that Barzan
owed his selection to being Saddam’s cousin,
and because he possessed two unique qualities:
“First, he was not intelligent enough to
represent a threat to the regime, and second,
he was not brave enough to participate in anyone
else’s plots.” Barzan says he was
forced into the most “dangerous job in the
regime” by Saddam. During the war, he spent
most of his time in hiding.
Saddam’s Principal Secretary, Lt.-Gen. Abed
Hamid Mahmoud: Ten days into the war, Mahmoud
conveyed Saddam’s directive to the French
and Russian governments that Baghdad would accept
only an unconditional withdrawal of US forces
because “Iraq is now winning and . . . the
United States has sunk in the mud of defeat.”
At that time, US tanks were a hundred miles south
of Baghdad, refueling and rearming for the final
push.
Commander, Second Republican Guard Corps: He described
the influence that the regime’s spying apparatus
had on military decision making, “First
a meeting would be announced and all the corps-level
staff, the subordinate division commanders, and
selected staff, as well as supporting or attached
organizations and their staffs, would assemble
at the corps headquarters. The corps commander
had to ensure then that all the spies were in
the room before the meeting began so that there
would not be any suspicions in Baghdad as to my
purpose. This kind of attention to my own internal
security was required. I spent considerable time
finding clever ways to invite even the spies I
was not supposed to know about.”
According to the IPP final report, the corps commander
knew he was the target of spying. To save himself,
he was forced to coordinate the surreptitious
activities of the various persons spying on him.
This lack of trust affected the ability of commanders
to lead their units and also the ability of unit
commanders to take advantage of their knowledge
of the ground to prepare optimal defenses. During
the war, staff officers in Baghdad were directing
unit deployments in fields they had never visited.
Commander, Al Nida (Armored) Division, Republican
Guard: Al Nida was considered to be the finest
division in the Iraqi order of battle. According
to the division’s chief of staff, its materiel
readiness was the best in the Iraqi military,
and its commander planned and conducted training
virtually independent of any higher authority.
Such autonomy was unheard of elsewhere, including
in al Nida’s sister unit, the Baghdad Division.
During a postwar interview, the divisional commander
attributed his exceptional authority to his being
from Saddam’s home town of Tikrit.
Commander, Baghdad Division, Republican Guard:
This general said that he had to “ask for
permission from the Republican Guard staff in
Baghdad to move brigade-size units and was still
doing so up until April 2 and 3 [2003].”
By then, it was too late to stop the coalition
forces from making their final drive toward Baghdad.
Un-named officer, Republican Guard: According
to him, the Security Office monitored all aspects
of senior Republican Guard officers’ lives,
down to their financial affairs and diet. Security
personnel even questioned the guards at senior
officers’ houses to learn details about
the officers’ lifestyles. He says, “The
Special Security Office knew how many times I
went to the bathroom. Republican Guard commanders
were not trusted to conduct any movement or even
so much as start a tank without permission. Requesting
retirement was impossible because the regime would
assume one opposed them politically, and one would
be arrested and jailed.”
Chief of Air Staff, Gen. Hamid Raja Shalah: He
was also the commander of Air Defense. In compliance
with Saddam’s orders, Shalah did not launch
a single sortie against the US and coalition forces.
The reasoning was that the Iraqi air force would
be no match against the US and coalition air forces
and it was best to husband its assets for future
use. Thus, Shalah moved the combat aircraft away
from operational airfields and had several of
them camouflaged in palm groves or buried in the
sand.
By placing sycophants in key military positions,
Saddam ensured that he would not be overthrown
by his generals. But he also ensured that his
military would not be able to stop the US from
overthrowing his regime. In retrospect, it seems
that Saddam’s generals were focused solely
on savings themselves from Saddam’s wrath.
He was focused solely on saving himself from their
coup. Strategic myopia was written all over Iraq.
No wonder Saddam’s regime collapsed in three
weeks, much faster than the Taliban regime that
he had ridiculed just weeks earlier.
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