US Nuclear Deal with India More a Gamble Than a Risk
By David J. Karl
Director
Pacific Council on International Policy
CA

One of the most significant of the Bush administration's foreign policy accomplishments is the nascent strategic partnership it has brought about with India. To cement the relationship, the administration signed a controversial agreement to share sophisticated civilian nuclear technology with New Delhi. The agreement, which was passed recently by the US Congress, will effectively accept India as a de-facto nuclear weapons power, something the Clinton administration steadfastly refused to do.
The agreement provoked a storm of debate since it marks a departure in US nuclear policy, which for decades has sought to strictly control nuclear exports to countries -- like India -- that remain outside the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Because New Delhi is seen in much of the world as something of a proliferation pariah, it has been the subject of a rather effective international embargo on nuclear materials and technologies that has retarded the growth of its nuclear power industry. New Delhi wished to see this embargo lifted in order to meet its burgeoning energy needs, which are projected to double during the next two decades.
Although the Bush administration is ready to oblige New Delhi, opponents of the nuclear deal offered two basic criticisms. The first is that ending the embargo against India would undercut vital global efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons at exactly the moment when such efforts should be reinforced. In this view, granting India with what amounts to an amnesty from non-proliferation rules sends a dreadful signal to such countries as North Korea and Iran that would like to parlay their own nuclear intransigence into foreign concessions.
It is true that the global non-proliferation order is at a critical juncture. Yet the risks the deal's critics point to are likely exaggerated. The decision-making calculus of would-be proliferators is affected less by international double-standards and hypocrisies than by hard-nosed calculations of gains and costs.
A second line of criticism has been less prominent but perhaps more trenchant: The deal represents a bad bargain since India will receive major concessions that it has long desired, but it is unclear what tangible benefits the United States will get in return. New Delhi reportedly wants to buy at least eight nuclear reactors in the coming years, but the administration failed to secure a promise of preferential consideration for US companies vis-a-vis their Russian and French competitors. Despite strong fears of a nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the administration likewise did not receive any guarantee that New Delhi would limit the growth of its own nuclear arsenal. And although New Delhi plays an important leadership role among developing countries, the White House did not insist on Indian support of US efforts to reform the United Nations or to conclude a world trade pact.
In the end, the proposed deal with New Delhi is a geopolitical gamble whose prospects for success are still uncertain. Given its expanding economic and military power, there are compelling strategic reasons for the United States to seek a close partnership with India. Having New Delhi as an ally, for example, would be a strong hedge against the possibility of a hostile China.
Yet it remains to be seen whether New Delhi will be able to play the geopolitical role the Bush administration envisions. Unlike China, India is not yet well integrated into the global economy, and it is arguable whether New Delhi has the political will to undertake the painful economic reforms that would place it on the same power trajectory as Beijing. Moreover, given India's history of pursuing its own course in world affairs, it is uncertain how far New Delhi elites are willing to ally themselves with US interests. India's unconstructive role in the recently collapsed world trade negotiations offers a cautionary note in this regard.
Despite the uncertainty, the nuclear deal is a bet the United States should take. India is emerging as a factor on Asia's diplomatic and economic landscape, and it is a smart move to try to cultivate a closer relationship with the country.

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Editor: Akhtar M. Faruqui
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