Fallout of
Lebanese War Roils Israel
By Ahmad Faruqui, PhD
Dansville, CA
In the wake of what may well have
been the worst military blunder in Israel’s
history, the Chief of General Staff, Lt.-Gen.
Dan Halutz, has resigned. It is widely expected
that Defense Minister Perez will follow suit,
further weakening Prime Minister Olmert’s
coalition government. It does not help matters
that the President is facing indictment on rape
charges.
Gen. Halutz, a 40-year old veteran of the Israeli
Air Force, had served in his post for only 20
months. The general’s resignation contradicted
his earlier statements that he would not resign
unless he was found guilty by an inquiry commission
and reflected the rapid deterioration in the public
mood.
Halutz’s Lebanese campaign failed to achieve
any of its stated objectives. These included the
recovery of two Israeli soldiers whose abduction
last July by Hizbollah precipitated the conflict
and protecting Israel’s northern towns and
settlements from Hizbollah rocket attacks. To
this day, the soldiers remain in Hizbollah hands
and the only hope for their recovery lies in a
diplomatic solution. In addition, several military
commentators have stated that northern Israel
remains within the reach of Hizbollah rockets.
On a strategic level, Israel’s losses were
even greater. The war plucked Seyed Hassan Nasrullah,
the head of Hizbollah, from the depths of obscurity
and turned him into a household name. On the Arab
street, posters carrying his smiling face emerged
as a welcome alternative to the grim visage of
effete and feckless monarchs, dictators and tyrants.
Senior Israeli generals welcomed Halutz’s
resignation. Halutz is likely to be replaced by
a retired army officer, Gabi Ashkenazi, 53, who
fought in the 1973 Yom Kippur war and took part
in the 1976 Entebbe raid. Maj.-Gen. Ashkenazi
resigned from the army in 2005 when he was passed
over for the military chief’s job. Now,
it seems that that the political elite is returning
to the well-established formula of relying on
army officers to lead the military.
Soul searching about what went wrong in Lebanon
has begun within the Israeli military establishment.
Maj.-Gen. (reserves) Emmanual Sakal feels it was
a mistake to appoint an air force commander as
head of the General Staff. Sakal, formerly the
head of Israel’s ground forces, told Israel
Radio that it had been a mistake to think that
a pilot, “no matter how talented,”
could deal effectively with the problems faced
by ground forces in war.
He and others fault Halutz for his excessive reliance
on the Air Force to stop the Katyusha rocket fire
and for lack of consistency in his orders. Halutz
believed that combat planes and helicopters using
guided weapons would annihilate the Hizbollah
guerillas. Like many other air force commanders,
he believed that modern wars could be won by air
dominance on the battlefield. Air power is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for winning a conventional
ground war. In a guerilla war, it may be counter-productive
since large-scale civilian casualties will strengthen
the enemy.
The campaign in Lebanon confirmed this theory.
Halutz began the war with a brilliant air strike
but failed to exploit the opportunities it created
on the ground. Indeed, it may have been impossible
to win the war even if there had been sufficient
“boots on the ground.” Readers seeking
amplification of this point can consult the remarkable
survey of modern warfare in British General Sir
Rupert Smith’s new book. Smith argues that
today’s military institutions, which are
focused on waging “industrial warfare,”
need to retool their mindset for waging “war
among the peoples.” The new frontier is
not territory but the human mind.
After the Lebanese war, bereaved parents and politicians,
along with retired and serving military officers,
called on Halutz to resign. When GOC Northern
Command, Udi Adam, and Galilee Division Commander,
Brigadier General Gal Hirsch, submitted their
resignations, the clock started to tick for Halutz.
He was a proud man who had boasted that dropping
one-ton bombs on Palestinians in Gaza had not
bothered him in the least. To quote the British
Daily Telegraph, he fell on his Uzi.
Given his long tenure in the Israeli military,
it is inconceivable that Halutz would not have
been aware of what happened to the military chief
in Pakistan after his incursion into Kargil boomeranged
in 1999. Halutz must have wished that after leading
his forces on a fool’s errand, and after
causing significant harm to his country’s
global standing, in addition to causing the deaths
of thousands on both sides and impairing the national
security of his country, he too would have been
able to use the device of a coup to hide his sins.
He would have relished the prospect that awaited
Gen. Musharraf after the withdrawal from Kargil.
When the fiasco was plain for all to see, Gen.
Musharraf did not feel the weight of public opinion
on his shoulders. Instead, he arrogated more power
to himself by firing justices of the Supreme Court
that did not support the coup, getting himself
elected president by a misbegotten referendum,
and amending the constitution to give himself
unrivalled, absolute and indefinite power. By
the stroke of a pen, a man who had caused incalculable
harm to the country became the interpreter and
guardian of the national interest.
Seven years later, he would write in glowing terms
about Kargil, calling it one of the best campaigns
in Pakistan’s history. By so doing, not
only did he falsify facts, he also signaled that
he felt no remorse. Musharraf also closed off
the door for an honest inquiry, ensuring that
his successors will fail to imbibe the true lessons
of history and stumble once again into Kargilian
follies.
However much one might disagree with Israel’s
foreign policies, and however much one might deplore
its treatment of the Palestinians, one has to
admire the strength of its political institutions.
Halutz’s departure, much as it reflects
on the strategic myopia of his generalship, is
a tribute to Israel’s polity. After his
botched war effort, he ultimately took responsibility
for his actions and stepped down from office,
since he regarded it as a privilege bestowed upon
him by the people and not his birthright.
In the meantime, the people of Pakistan await
the dawn of the day when their military chief
will take responsibility for his actions. Instead,
he is planning to get re-elected by the existing
assemblies, hardly the actions of a man who believes
he is more popular than all other politicians.
Instead, these are the actions of a man who uses
his uniform to hide from the electorate.
