A
Tale of Truths and Half-Truths
By Dr Afzal Mirza
Maryland
Much has been written
about the memoirs of General Musharraf in the
press. So many reviews have appeared that almost
every detail of the book is now known to the readers.
Many commentators have criticized the General
for writing this book while he was still in service.
They have also questioned the constitutionality
of writing a book while being still in service
thus violating the oath of secrecy. These points
might be valid but these should not have been
made an issue because the act of writing a book
of memoirs in itself is something that should
be appreciated provided the writer has ample free
time at his disposal to write such a book. Our
General on the other hand is an all-powerful head
of the state running the country single-handedly
therefore obviously he had acute paucity of time.
Even then he burned the midnight oil to write
this book which is something amazing.
Going through the book one finds that there are
parts that have been written or dictated by him
and there are parts written by the ghost writer
or writers perhaps. In the preface to his book
the General writes, “I decided to write
my autobiography after Pakistan took center stage
in the world’s conflicts including the war
on terror. There has been intense curiosity about
me and the country I lead. I want the world to
learn the truth.” I think he is partly right
here because during my stay in the US for the
last four years or so I have come across hundreds
of books on the subject of terrorism in libraries
and bookshops and most of them are not quality
books. Here the book industry like all other businesses
is governed by the laws of market economy and
the publishers believe in striking while the iron
is hot.
Frankly speaking ever since Pakistan and Musharraf
were catapulted to center-stage in the American
media I was planning to write to Musharraf to
commission someone to write his biography but
I knew that running a dispensation in the most
turbulent part of the world would not allow him
to find time to write such a book himself. But
demands of the market economy like water determine
their own course and the General being a clever
person pounced upon this opportunity and instead
of getting a biography written by someone else
he himself accomplished the task thinking that
the truth coming direct from the horse’s
mouth would have more credibility and the royalty
money would all be his.
In his book Musharraf has written the truth but
not the whole truth. So the world has been fed
on his version of truth. Forgetting that he is
in love with himself and has depicted his ascension
to power in Pakistan as the best thing that ever
happened to that unfortunate country Musharraf
has not been fair in discussing many issues and
most of the personalities. One can understand
that he could only build his own image by denigrating
many personalities whom the general public in
Pakistan adores as their heroes. Right from the
day he took over Musharraf has been criticizing
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in a wily manner. Late H.K.Burki,
who was a great admirer of Bhutto and after Musharraf’s
coming to power became his admirer too, wrote
in his last column that Musharraf should refrain
from vilifying that “ already much maligned
person.”
From his present diatribe against Bhuttto one
could only understand that Musharraf has been
carried away by the enormous character assassination
campaign carried out against Bhutto after the
East Pakistan debacle. As pointed out in a section
of the press it seems that since Musharraf’s
father Syed Musharaffuddin was in the foreign
ministry which was headed by Mr. Bhutto there
might be some personal disagreements that prompted
him to paint Bhutto as the biggest villain of
all. Unfortunately Syed Sahib was not a big shot
in the ministry but that reminds me of the autobiography
of Syed Muhammad Raza, another foreign ministry
official, entitled Mere Zamane who is all praise
for his foreign minister. Musharraf has singled
out the reference to the Poland Resolution and
laid all the blame on Bhutto for the dismemberment
of Pakistan giving Yayha, his coterie of generals
and every one else almost a clean slate. I would
just draw his attention to Ambassador Sultan M
Khan ‘s book Memories and Reflections of
a Pakistani Diplomat published by The London Center
for Pakistan Studies. On page 382 he has given
details of the resolution as under:
“The Security Council.
Gravely concerned over the military conflict on
the Indian sub-continent, which constitutes an
immediate threat to international peace and security.
Having heard the statements of the Foreign Minister
of India and the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan,
Mr. Bhutto, decides that:
(a) In the Eastern theatre of conflict the power
will be peacefully transferred to the lawfully
elected representatives of the people headed by
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who would immediately be
released.
(b) Immediately after the beginning of the process
of power transfer the military actions in all
areas will be ceased and an initial ceasefire
will start for a period of 72 hours.
( c )After the immediate commencement of the initial
period of ceasefire the Pakistan Armed Forces
will start withdrawal to the preset positions
in the Eastern theatre of conflict with a view
to evacuation from Eastern theatre of conflict;
(d) Similarly the entire West Pakistan civilian
personnel and other persons from West Pakistan
willing to return home will be given opportunity
to do so under the supervision of the United Nations
with the guarantees on the part of all appropriate
authorities concerned that nobody will be subjected
to suppressions;
(e) As soon as within the period of 72 hours the
withdrawal of the Pakistani troops and their concentration
for that purpose will have started the cease-fire
will become permanent. As soon as evacuation of
West Pakistan Armed Forces would have started
the Indian armed forces will start their withdrawal
from the Eastern theater of military operations.
Such withdrawal of troops will begin actually
upon consultations with the newly established
authorities organized as result of the transfer
of power to the lawfully elected representatives
of the people headed by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.
(f) Recognizing the principle according to which
territorial acquisitions made through the use
of force will not be retained by either party
to the conflict, the governments of India and
Pakistan will immediately begin negotiations through
appropriate representatives of their armed forces
with view to the speediest possible implementation
of this principle in the Western theatre of military
operations.”
The purpose of reproducing here the full text
of the resolution is that the record be put straight
concerning the Polish Resolution. In his book
Musharraf writes, “But Bhutto rejected a
resolution proposed by Poland that might have
prevented the loss of East Pakistan. It seems
that he had concluded that he could never come
to power as long as East Pakistan was there.”
Mr Khan writes that “Bhutto rejected the
Polish Resolution there and then. Whether or not
he tore it up in the Security Council is irrelevant.
On December the 15th Poland presented a revised
resolution the only difference being the deletion
of Mujibur Rahman’s name but basically it
was no different from the previous one.”
The resolution in question practically called
for dismemberment of Pakistan which was inevitable
whether Pakistan accepted or rejected this resolution.
On what basis has Musharraf concluded that acceptance
of this resolution could save East Pakistan is
not clear.
Another person vilified by the author is Abdul
Qadeer Khan. There is no doubt that Dr Khan was
a discovery of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto but after the
judicial murder of the latter Dr Khan became a
protégé of the army and worked hand
in glove with the generals in power. Even during
the short so-called democratic period when the
army played the puppet game with the politicians
Khan directly reported to the army chief ignoring
the two civilian prime ministers. I remember one
statement of Benazir Bhutto who once said that
when she officially visited Iran she was surprised
when her Iranian hosts told her that her army
chief and A.Q.Khan had offered them nuclear technology.
Musharraf was Director General Military Operations
and he says that he was “kept totally out
of nuclear circuit”. He writes, “I
did not know the facts (at what stage of development
we were); and as we would all discover they didn’t
either thanks to the complete trust and freedom
of action given to A.Q. Nobody ever imagined how
irresponsible and reckless he could be.”
Musharraf concedes, “For years A.Q’s
lavish lifestyle and tales of his wealth properties
corrupt practices and financial magnanimity at
state expense were generally all too well known
in Islamabad’s social and government circles.
However these were largely ignored by the governments
of the day in the larger interest of the sensitive
and important work that he was engaged in. In
hindsight that neglect was apparently a serious
mistake.” So far so good, but Khan could
not be alone in this network and Musharraf is
totally silent about Khan’s accomplices.
He doesn’t say what became of them.
Another issue that Musharraf has discussed in
the book is the Kargil Conflict. This subject
has been mentioned by almost every author who
has written a book on the affairs of the region.
Musharraf’s own ex-boss Nawaz Sharif has
in various statements mentioned that he was kept
unaware of what was happening on Kargil heights.
He only came to know of it when the situation
went out of control of the then chief of army
staff who begged him to use the good offices of
America to pull them out of this muddle. Musharraf
has very ably outlined the technical details of
the operation but has blamed Sharif for backing
out. “Considered purely in military terms
the Kargil operations were a landmark in the history
of Pakistan Army,” he claims. But let me
quote from Hassan Abbas’s book Pakistan’s
Drift Towards Extremism”, in which he writes,
“The masterminds of the operation were driven
by the belief that their nuclear capability provided
a protective shield to Pakistan... All the four
generals involved in the Kargil project had remained
instructors in different military training institutions
during their careers, teaching young officers
how vital it is to weigh the pros and cons of
a military offensive in terms of understanding
the possible ramifications, and enemy reactions.
It is strange that these generals forgot the basic
military lesson and seriously miscalculated Indian
capabilities in terms of military strength and
political influence in the international arena."
He continues: "The people of Pakistan had
been subjected to the largest whispering campaign
in history to expect a great victory. When the
operation fizzled out like a wet firecracker they
were a nation left speechless in anger and disbelief.
Musharraf and the planners could not give any
excuses in public but privately they let it be
known that the blame for scuttling of a brilliant
operation lay on a panic-prone prime minister
who could not stand up to the US president...
Nawaz Sharif too could not say anything in his
defense publicly but privately he let it be known
that his generals had taken him for a ride...
From this point on every action and word of Musharraf
and Nawaz was under scrutiny of the other, fueling
a spiraling of mutual suspicion and distrust."
The generals Abbas speaks very high of include
Lt Gen Ghulam Ahmad Khan, Musharraf's chief of
staff ,who died in a car accident. "With
his demise Musharraf increasingly lost touch with
reality and became a willing prisoner in a web
of flattery... I cannot help recalling one of
the conversations between Saeed A Malik and General
G A -- Malik was strongly asserting that everything
was 'do-able' provided the Musharraf government
had the will to do it and G A stunned the audience
when he said, "But, sir, first they (Musharraf,
Mahmood and Aziz) have to get out of the cage
of Kargil, otherwise all their efforts will be
reactive…
"After his death, Musharraf slid rapidly
into the mold of his military predecessors who
stepped in to save the country," Hassan Abbas
points out.
In his book Engaging India (Diplomacy, Democracy
and the Bomb), Strobe Talbott, American Deputy
Secretary of State during the Clinton Administration,
wrote, “It quickly became apparent that
the new chief of the army staff Parvez Musharraf
had even less regard for Sharif and the civilian
leadership than his predecessor Karamat. In particular
Musharraf found the Lahore Summit galling…Musharraf’s
chance came near the tiny town of Kargil about
five miles on Indian side of the line.”
About Kargil he writes expressing his doubts in
brackets, "The American Government followed
the conflict with growing alarm which could easily
become a nuclear cataclysm... Tony (Zinni) warned
Musharraf that India would cross the LoC itself
if Pakistan did not pull back. Musharraf professed
to be unimpressed. Back in Washington the administration
let it be known that if Sharif did not order a
pullback we would hold up $ 100 million IMF loan
that Pakistan sorely needed... We did not know
whether Sharif had personally ordered the infiltration
above Kargil (doubtful) reluctantly acquiesced
in it (more likely) or not even known about it
until after it happened (possible). But there
was no doubt that he now realized that it was
colossal blunder…Adding to the danger was
the evidence that Sharif neither knew everything
his military high command was doing nor had complete
control over it… Pakistan was almost universally
seen to have precipitated the crisis ruining the
promising peace process that had begun in Lahore
and inviting an Indian counteroffensive.”
(The author is a senior writer based in Maryland
USA who can be contacted at drafzalmirza@yahoo.com)
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