A Right to
Lie
By Ahmad Faruqui, PhD
Dansville, CA
In his seminal work on Pakistani-American
relations, Dennis Kux quotes General M. Ziaul
Haq as saying that a Muslim is allowed to lie
if it serves a good cause. Kux says Zia lied to
the Americans to conceal the intent of Pakistan’s
nuclear program.
But his canard did not stop there. He lied repeatedly
to the nation to perpetuate his presidency-in-uniform,
as brought out by his assistant, General K. M.
Arif, in “Khaki Shadows.”
Arif recounts that the military appointed Z. A.
Bhutto as president after the 1971 debacle. Bhutto
then appointed one of his benefactors, Lt.-Gen.
Gul Hassan, as army chief. But to keep him in
check, Bhutto never rewarded him with a fourth
star.
In a few months, suspecting Gul Hassan and co-benefactor
Air Marshal Rahim of harboring “Bonapartist”
tendencies, he dismissed both. Gen. Tikka was
named as the army chief and served a normal term
through 1976, after which he was named defense
minister.
On Tikka’s retirement, Zia was appointed
the army chief, ahead of seven more senior generals,
since Bhutto sensed no trace of political ambition
in him. Zia should have retired in 1979, as Bhutto
had reduced the army chief’s tenure to three
years. But within a year, Zia turned the tables
on his master. He would remain army chief until
his death in 1988.
Zia was not the only army chief who had a super-normal
tenure. Ayub was appointed the first Pakistani
army chief in 1951 and should have retired in
1955. Instead, by intimidating his civilian superiors,
he stayed in that position until the day came
in October 1958 when he simply overthrew them.
After he declared martial law, Ayub appointed
General Musa as the army chief. Musa was kept
in that post by Ayub until 1966. Had the war of
1965 gone better, he may have been retained longer.
Yahya succeeded Musa but his deposition of Ayub
in 1969 freed him from any tenure limits. But
for the fiasco of 1971, he would have remained
army chief for many years.
Zia’s coup of 30 years ago was advertised
as necessary to prevent a civil war and to hold
new general elections within ninety days. Instead,
Zia kept deferring elections and was ultimately
able to put Bhutto behind bars on a murder charge.
Arif suggests that the military had nothing to
do with the case, showing that the soldier in
him occasionally trumps the historian.
Just as Bhutto’s execution turned Zia into
a pariah, so did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
turn him into a statesman. Pakistan got billions
in American aid and in Western eyes, it became
a pivotal, frontline state.
Arif laments the culture of secrecy in the military
which has prevented lessons from being derived
from past failures. For example, when Zia asked
for a report to be put together on the 1965 war,
it was discovered that all officers had complied
with an order to destroy their war diaries.
Zia was abroad when Yahya passed away and he received
a request from Lt.-Gen. Sawar Khan to accord Yahya
a general’s funeral. Sawar noted that Yahya
had not been tried by a court. Zia approved the
request, over-ruling the charges that were made
against Yahya in the Hamoodur Rehman Commission
report.
While the nation was kept in the dark, Zia knew
it called for publicly trying Yahya and his fellow
generals for:
• “Being party to a criminal conspiracy
to illegally usurp power”
• “Criminal neglect of duty during
the conduct of war”
• “Moral degeneration [that] resulted
in indecision, cowardice and professional incompetence.”
Despite all his talk about restoring democracy
after he lifted martial law in 1985, Zia’s
real “parliament” was the corps commanders
conference. Even there, he dominated the proceedings
because his contemporaries were retired every
three years. The few who questioned Zia publicly
found their careers truncated, regardless of whether
they were in uniform or not.
The list included the hapless Junejo, hand-picked
by Zia as the prime minister. Junejo, who had
begun to assert his independence after the explosion
at Ojhri Camp, was sacked when Zia invoked the
Eighth Amendment.
Arif asserts that Zia’s personal dominance
in national affairs weakened the institutions
of the state including the ministry of defense.
The service chiefs discussed their issues directly
with Zia who made the final decisions, short-cutting
the due process. These cases were then processed
through the defense ministry to create a formal
record. The ministry which should have been supervising
the services was reduced to being a post office.
As his term came to a close, Arif requested that
his retirement be announced a couple of months
in advance, so he could do the official good-bye’s.
However, Zia kept delaying the request, saying
that Arif was only 57 years old and had a shot
at becoming the army chief (should Zia decide
to take off the uniform).
One day, Zia surprised Arif by telling him that
Junejo had decided to retire him. Knowing that
such a decision could not have been made without
Zia’s concurrence, Arif asked Zia if he
had lost his confidence. Zia denied it. Then Arif
asked why he had been under close observation
by junior officers. Zia denied that as well. Not
even the vice chief of staff was allowed to question
Zia.
Zia’s death in a plane crash gets a passing
mention, even less than one would find in a travel
guide, further deepening the mystery of what happened
to PAK 1 on August 17, 1988.
Arif asserts that Pakistan’s coup makers
had no qualms about their actions since they were
parroting Napoleon: “He who saves the nation
violates no law.” Arif acknowledges that
the modern world has discarded such thinking.
Soldiering and politics are both full-time professions
and cannot be combined.
The book amply demonstrates that Zia’s rule
degenerated into sycophancy as he became convinced
of his infallibility and his indispensability.
Yet, the longer he ruled, the more paranoid he
became. Anyone who was remotely seen as a power
center was removed. Loyalty trumped competence
in promotions and the army’s fighting blade
was dulled.
The author concludes with a plea for democracy,
saying “the military has no magic wand to
put the wrongs right. Its organizing ability and
efficiency are best utilized for the defense of
the motherland. It performs other tasks at the
cost of its defense obligations.”
It is a good thing that one of Zia’s disciples
has decided to come clean and share his wisdom
with posterity. But it is a royal pity he did
not share it with Zia, when it could have made
a difference.
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