August 08 , 2008

Pakistan’s Premier Spy Agency at the Center of Controversies

           

The Directorate of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), the premier external counter- intelligence agency of Pakistan, has been in media attention since July 26/08 when the Cabinet Division issued a formal notification transferring the agency’s administrative, financial and operational control from the Defense Ministry to the Interior Ministry. This raised such a furor among senior defense personnel, media-men, and leading politicians that the decision had to be retracted within eight hours. The extent of the frenzy and the umbrage that it had aroused may be gauged from the fact that the announcement of its withdrawal was hastily made at 3.00 am.
Asif Ali Zardari, PPP chief and the most influential person in the present political set up, called the transfer decision a step towards civilian rule that would “save the army from controversies and a bad name”. 
Mr. Rehman Malik, Adviser of Interior Ministry and a close confidant of Zardari, and the Interior Secretary, Kemal Shah, are said to have been behind the move.  Mr. Malik is not even a member of the parliament but he is perhaps the most important person in the hierarchy of power, next only to Mr. Zardari. He enjoys the protocol of a prime minister. While Mr. Yousuf Raza Gilani is the de jure Prime Minister, Mr. Rehman Malik operates as the de facto chief executive.
Students of affairs could not help wondering why the Prime Minister gave his powers over the ISI to an Adviser in his cabinet.
The Interior Secretary received an extension in service the very day the notification was issued  –an interesting coincidence (?).
Evidently, the notification  regarding the ISI was withdrawn in an indecent haste under the pressure of the top brass.  The real pressure, however, appears to have come from the senior echelons of the US State Department, Pentagon and the CIA. They had been registering, directly or indirectly, their unhappiness over the performance of the ISI in the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan.  
The ISI had been operating hand-in-glove with the CIA during the decade long war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Once the Soviets withdrew, the US virtually abandoned the Mujahedeen, the freedom fighters, to their own devices instead of helping them in the setting up of a stable government committed to development, peace and progress. The vacuum was filled by heads of militias and warlords. An internecine strife followed with crime and debauchery holding sway. In mid-90s, a group of students, called Taliban, revolted against the sinister behavior of the warlords.  Pakistan’s ISI helped Taliban in setting up their rule in the country. Products of Pakistan’s religious schools (Madresas), the Taliban enforced radical and highly anachronistic laws based on their peculiar interpretations of Islamic precepts. Members of Al Qaeda, mostly of Arab origin, who decided to remain in Afghanistan  developed close liaison with the Taliban. 
Despite the decade long Islamization process of Gen. Zia, Pakistanis remained forward-looking and committed to modernism.  The ISI maintained contacts with the Taliban leaders despite the vast difference in perception. Then came 9/11 and the war against Al Qaeda and Taliban by a coalition led by the US. 
Faced by Hobson’s choice  -if you are not with us, you will be bombed to the stone age-  Pakistan took a somersault and moved  to the US corner. Instances are not wanting of the sincere cooperation of the country in the war against terror fought in its neighborhood. Pakistan was hailed by the Western media as a frontline state in the war. 
To cope with the spill over of the conflict onto its own soil, the government at one stage detailed as many as 100,000 troops; over 1000 of them were killed in combat. The terrain favored the militants. Then, the bigoted youth were mesmerized into becoming suicide bombers who could seldom be detected. This gave a new dimension to the war, as did the improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The US was financing the war effort of Pakistan. It expected Pakistan to do more, as the bottom line was below its expectations. The NATO commanders and Karzai government, started escape-goating Pakistan for their own limited successes. It was blamed for allowing its tribal areas to be used as sanctuaries for the Afghan militants, forgetting the fact that the porous border could be effectively plugged only by building a fence all along the border. Kabul authorities are opposed to any fence on the border –the Durand Line- as it would create a barrier for their territorial agenda.
Pakistan government policy from the days of Musharraf regime has been to negotiate peace deals with the tribal leaders of the area. The present government too clearly stated, after detailed consultations with all coalition partners,  that it would prefer peace deals to battles. The US is totally opposed to such deals as it is convinced that they wouldn’t work out like the earlier deals made by Musharraf regime. The insurgents have an ambitious agenda and a virtual movement that cannot be dampened half way through. Insurgent attacks in Afghanistan have, for instance, gone up 40 per cent this year compared with last year. The war must therefore continue till the menace is totally rooted out.
This divergence in views is at the root of the US accusations against the ISI.  The stories appearing in the past few days in the NY Times, Wall Street Journal, LA Times  and other media have evidently been leaked to prepare public opinion at home and to pressure Pakistani leadership  into accepting unilateral invasion/bombing of quarters on Pakistan territory suspected of harboring militants belonging to Al Qaeda and Taliban.  
Pakistan’s stand that it is well equipped to take any action itself against miscreants in its territory has been countered by pointing out the unreliability of its intelligence outfit.  The stories about rogue elements in the ISI passing on to their Al Qaeda or Taliban cohorts secret information received from Western intelligence sources, have been cited in this regard.
Although Pakistani authorities have called such stories “rubbish”, senior officers of CIA have presented fairly convincing evidence in support of their contentions. 
Prime Minister Gilani would be well-advised to rein in the ISI and purge it of all rogue elements.   Some basic structural changes are also indicated. The Agency’s role in internal politics has earned it infamy. This role legitimately belongs to the DIB and should be transferred to that service. That would put an end to the current monopoly of the ISI on the country’s national security policy.
Over the years, the ISI has grown manifold in size and acquired enormous secret funds. It developed the habit of going solo and covering its activities by a dark cloak of secrecy.  Many considered it to be a state within a state. Its role in the formation of IJI and the Mehran Bank scandal is common knowledge.  So is its role in destabilizing civilian governments. Of late, it was accused of being the chief operator in the episodes of missing persons; it took a Chief Justice to get the innocents released from its clutches.  The political wing of ISI need must be disbanded and its activities should be subject to scrutiny by a Parliamentary committee, as is the custom in many democratic countries.
The entire gambit of the ISI operations, including the US accusations, should be discussed on the floor of the parliament. Why is the PM and his cabinet fighting shy of seeking the opinion of the elected representatives?  Is it just because the two most crucial persons  -Asif Zardari and Rehman Malik-  are not yet its members?