December
01 , 2006
Ruler
Derby in Pakistan
The current political scenario
in Pakistan is dominated by fanciful speculations,
uncertainties, threats of resignations from Assemblies,
and rumors of secret deals in violation of open
commitments and charters.
The leader of the ruling party (PML-Q) has strongly
denied the rumors and the strongman of the country,
President Pervez Musharraf, has assured the nation
that elections will be held in the country next
year on schedule. He has even labeled them as “the
mother of all elections” -whatever that means.
The bright spot in the scenario is that there is
no groundswell of public protest against the existing
rulers.
The situation, however, makes one wonder why governance
in Pakistan has been marked by almost rhythmic swings
between civilian and military rules –a kind
of ruler derby.
The derby reflects the inability of the ruling elite
to commit honestly to the form of government they
have themselves enshrined in the constitution. With
the exception of the first military ruler, Ayub,
who proclaimed honestly ‘democracy doesn’t
suit the genius of the people’, all other
leaders past or present have declared allegiance
to democracy. What they practiced was hypocrisy.
Elected leaders have been behaving like dictators
and military dictators have been masquerading as
elected, civilian leaders. Z.A. Bhutto used to even
don a jacket resembling the uniform of a General.
On the other hand, Gen. Zia almost always appeared
in public in sherwani and pretended to have been
an elected President on the basis of a fraudulent
referendum -a monumental hypocrisy!
The dichotomy is rooted in the colonial legacy of
(1) viceregal (authoritarian) tradition in which
decision-making is in a descending order, and (2)
parliamentary tradition which prescribes the process
of decision-making through debate and discussion
in an ascending order. The British resorted to either
of the two depending on which one, in a particular
circumstance, served their colonial interests better.
The viceregal or authoritarian tradition provided
a centralized, hierarchical apparatus to ensure
law and order and to collect revenues to siphon
off the surplus to the colonial coffers.
The British rule fortunately coincided with an era
dominated by liberal ideology and practices. British
liberals and Indians educated in England introduced
into the Indian polity liberal values and parliamentary
precepts. The political parties founded in India
by these liberals led the democratic struggle for
independence that culminated into the creation of
India and Pakistan.
While democracy thrived in India it withered away
within a decade in Pakistan, making room for the
viceregal, authoritative rule of a combine of the
army and civil bureaucracy.
Why did Pakistan follow a path different from that
of India? Main reasons are as follow.
The areas that constitute the present day Pakistan
came under the British rule a century or more after
the colonization of south, east and central India.
North-western India had been under the authoritarian
rule of a Sikh dynasty that had successfully subjugated
the local population, an inherently virile and enterprising
people, and made them see the benefits of authority
worship.
The British found this tradition quite advantageous
from the point of view of their colonial objectives
and therefore strengthened it further and treated
the area as the strategic preserve for viceregal
rule.
The founding fathers, the two Quaids, who were strong
proponents of democracy, passed away within the
first few years of the creation of the new state.
The low caliber of the other politicians admitted
the usurpation of power by senior civil and military
officers. The executive thus became much more powerful
than the legislature. There being no outstanding
political figure, politics became a game of musical
chairs for the Prime Minister’s office. The
first fair and free elections could not thus be
held before 1970, almost a quarter century after
independence, and that too under the supervision
of a military dictator. The puny politicians, over-awed
by a powerful civil and military bureaucracy, failed
in adding sinews to the democratic institutions.
And, they failed more miserably in taming the warrior
sector of the society.
The warrior caste, the military, received invigorating
shots in the arm by the Western powers, the US in
particular, owing to the country’s membership
in CENTO and SEATO and bilateral defense alliances.
Military aid that flowed into the country strengthened
further the military-bureaucratic elite.
The colonial structure of power under the Viceroy
comprised the civil bureaucracy, the army and the
feudal aristocracy. While the Indian leadership
got rid of feudalism within the first few years
of independence, the leaders of Pakistan in the
same period were inescapably absorbed in attending
to the more urgent problems, such as the enormous
influx of refugees, the setting up of a nascent
government, and finding finances for essential expenses
since its agreed share in central funds was teasingly
held back by New Delhi. The Indian success in abolishing
feudalism, made the landed gentry of Pakistan realize
that it could survive only as an adjunct of the
establishment. Allowed to continue, the feudal barons
entered the political arena, often with the blessings
of the establishment, and continued to expand their
clout till they virtually monopolized elected offices.
The most important factor in a democracy –the
voter- became a non-entity, to be remembered only
at the time of elections. The leaders could rule
but not lead; they could wield power but not authority.
The judiciary has almost always justified military
take-over under the dubious ‘law of necessity’.
Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad’s summary
dismissal of the parliament as far back as 1953,
was found valid by the apex court on the basis of
this law. That verdict has served as a precedent
to justify all subsequent military coups.
The above factors have contributed historically
towards the ascendance of the men in uniform to
the top of the ruling combine. That does not however
mean that the parliamentary tradition was permanently
thrown out of the window.
The politicians, from Mohammed Ali Bogra to Nawaz
Sharif did get opportunities to assert their authority.
The fall of Dacca provided the best opportunity
to Z.A. Bhutto to cut down the military in proportion
to the reduced size of the state. But, surprisingly
he increased the defense budget three fold.
No doubt, he was a man of outstanding talents and
caliber. His domineering personality was marred
by an unmitigated arrogance which affronted the
army (he called the army chief ‘my monkey
General’) and invited the annoyance of the
West (he gave a call for a Third World conference,
launched the atomic program, and tore in public
the letter of the US ambassador).
He was, however, the only populist leader who could
have done a lot for his people. His excessive arrogance
and his bid for a role far bigger than the size
of his state admitted, led him instead to the gallows.
Pakistan got involved in the decade-long Afghan
war. The deleterious effects of this war are too
well-known to merit mention here. The army had served
the purpose for which it had been receiving Western
aid. That source dried up with the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The vast war machine, one of the best
in the world, became the total responsibility of
the indigenous tax payers. The politicians in the
decade after Zia, lacked the guts or the vision
to adroitly tackle the situation, subjugating military
security to economic security.
Benazir and Nawaz Sharif focused, instead, on feathering
their own nests. They went on borrowing from all
foreign sources till the country’s credit
worthiness became questionable.
Nawaz Sharif, in his obsessive compulsion to concentrate
power, thought that he could domesticate the military
as he had done with the other pillars of government.
He sacked the naval chief, Comdr. Fasih Bukhari,
and then the army chief, Gen. Jehangir Karamat.
Then he went to replace Gen. Pervez Musharraf with
a family friend, Gen. Ziauddin. He ignored the corporate
personality of the army and its special identity
and standing in the polity.
In view of this situation, any restructuring of
this war machine has to come from within itself.
During the current phase of the military rule, the
amendments in the constitutions and the setting
up of the National Security Council have accorded
a legal status to the role of the man in uniform
in the governance of the state. That is a part of
history and of reality. Then the geography of the
country, its strategic location, and its backyard
serving as the breeding ground and hideout of terrorists
have placed a heavier burden on the shoulders of
the men in uniform. No wonder, external powers seek
strategic partnership of the country and offer substantial
military aid.
Aspirants of civilian rule in the country will have
to keep these realities in sight before exciting
the people to take to the streets and start damaging
national assets. Saner councils and a spirit of
give and take will produce a balance between the
civil and military sectors and to mutual advantage.
(The writer may be reached by e-mail at: arifhussaini@hotmail.com)
