China's New
Diplomacy
By Dr Shireen M. Mazari
The visit to Pakistan and India
by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao this month has brought
to the fore the new Chinese proactive diplomacy
in this region. One of the outstanding features
of this new approach to South Asia is the increasing
interaction between China and India -- not just
on the economic but also on the politico-diplomatic
front. The new agreements and statements from the
Chinese and Indians coming out of New Delhi early
last week reflected the transformed Sino-Indian
relationship, with the $13 billion trade between
the two countries a major factor in laying these
new foundations. This trade is expected to reach
$20 billion by 2007.
However, the Sino-Indian relationship has gone beyond
a purely economic dimension. The Chinese premier's
visit to India brought with it Chinese recognition
of India's annexation of Sikkim -- a quid pro quo
for India's earlier recognition of Tibet as an integral
part of China.
Another important development arising from the Chinese
premier's Indian visit is the agreement between
the two countries on a set of guiding principles
on which they will resolve their outstanding border
dispute. Amongst the important principles that the
two states will adhere to are that they will follow
well-defined and easily identifiable geographic
features and safeguard the interests of settled
populations. While the dispute itself will still
take time to resolve, given the size of the territory
involved, clearly the two sides have formulated
principles on which they will proceed. The process
has been made clear and the border dispute irritant
will be mitigated. The icing on the cake was India
declaring that it has no objections, in principle,
to China seeking SAARC membership.
However, despite the twist given in the media, China
made no firm commitment to supporting India's bid
for permanent membership of the UN Security Council.
Instead, the joint Sino-Indian statement issued
in New Delhi stated that the two countries agreed
that the reform of the UN "should be comprehensive
and multi-faceted and should put emphasis on an
increase in the representation of the developing
countries. The Indian side reiterated its aspirations
for permanent membership of the United Nations Security
Council." The Chinese side gave no firm commitment
to a support of India's bid, but it did state that
China "understands and supports India's aspirations
to play an active role in the UN and international
affairs."
So how does one see the new Sino-Indian relationship
from a Pakistani perspective? Clearly, Pakistan
can no longer rely on the historic legacy of its
relationship with China, or on the old Sino-Indian
antagonisms. Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to Pakistan,
as part of his overall South Asian trip, saw the
expansion of the traditional China-Pakistan relationship
with the signing of the Treaty of Friendship. This
was unique for both countries, since neither has
a similar treaty with any other country. For China,
especially, this treaty goes contrary to its traditional
approach to external relations; this reflects the
degree to which China is prepared to express and
reaffirm its commitment to Pakistan. Again, the
two countries' commitment to safeguarding each other's
territorial sovereignty is a major boost for Pakistan's
security. The economic commitments made by China
in the context of assistance for various projects,
especially in the nuclear energy field, and investment
in the private sector, are also a major step forward
in the expanding Pakistan-China relationship.
However, Pakistan has to face the new reality of
the burgeoning Sino-Indian relationship, especially
in the economic field. There is also a growing political
dimension, evident in the joint statement of April
11. Also, the fact that the Chinese premier traveled
to India, as well as other South Asian countries,
from Pakistan shows how the lay of the land has
altered for Pakistan vis-à-vis China. There
was a time when the Chinese government representatives
never traveled to India from Pakistan. In a similar
vein, Chinese academic delegations also travel now
to Pakistan through India or to India via Pakistan
– a shift away from the traditional Chinese
way of dealing with these South Asian neighbors.
China's new approach was very visible at a conference
organized by the Shanghai Institute for International
Studies in November, which involved a trilateral
interaction between Pakistani, Indian and Chinese
scholars for the first time. The Chinese maintained
an extremely sensitive approach and were surprised
to find that the Pakistanis and Indians were able
to interact frankly and critically without unpleasantness.
Clearly, they were unaware that acrimonious exchanges
at international conferences were not unusual and
did not adversely affect the spirit of international
conferences where Pakistanis and Indians interacted
with each other. In that sense, for them this trilateral
exchange was also a learning experience in understanding
some of the dynamics of interaction between Pakistanis
and Indians.
Does this mean that Pakistan should fear the growing
Sino-Indian relationship? No. But it should recognize
that China's and India's gravitation towards each
other is natural, given the economic and strategic
dynamics, and that Pakistan has lost tremendous
ground to India, purely because it has tended to
be overly sanguine about its historic ties with
China and failed to see the new realities that have
been evolving. The Indian inroads into the Chinese
intelligentsia and the market are extensive –
and both sides are clearly keen to build these even
further.
Additionally, Pakistan's lethargy in opening up
its consulate in Shanghai was a major loss in terms
of access in this critical city. The Indian influence
seems much greater in Shanghai than in Beijing,
and is greater within the civilian circles than
military ones. This also reflects Pakistan's almost
marginal interaction with the newly emergent Chinese
business community.
The Indians have also, over the years, developed
a number of China specialists, which we have been
unable to do. The difference is telling, because
India's China experts have developed a close liaison
with their Chinese specialists on India –
with frequent interaction. We need to evolve specific
expertise in the form of China specialists who not
only know Chinese history and politics but also
the language.
An interesting Indian idea being floated to Chinese
academics is the notion that Indian and Chinese
Muslims can be major players within the Muslim Ummah.
The Indians were also clever at exploiting Chinese
apprehensions regarding "Islamic extremists."
Of course, the Chinese remain sensitive to their
relations with Pakistan and continue to refer to
the "all-weather" friendship between the
two countries. This is certainly true, especially
at the level of civil society where there is tremendous
goodwill for China in Pakistan. But emotiveness
alone does not strengthen political relationships
amongst states – real interests need to be
sustained and expanded. Presently, both Pakistan
and China continue to have real interests in the
military and economic fields, but unless we become
more proactive on China, we will totally lose our
advantage in the next decade.
Already, the younger generation in China has little
knowledge of Pakistan's critical role in breaking
China's isolation in the fifties and sixties --
but they are aware of Indian culture and Indian
goods. Undoubtedly, China and India will always
remain in a competitive mode, but that will not
limit their cooperation in mutually beneficial areas.
We, on the other hand, by taking Chinese friendship
for granted and simply relying on our past are in
danger of losing out on our future.
(The writer is Director General, Institute of Strategic
Studies, Islamabad. Courtesy The News)
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