Indian
Unilateralism and Intransigence
By Dr Shireen
M. Mazari
Finally Pakistanis
are getting over their misplaced euphoria regarding
the dialogue process between Pakistan and India
and taking a hard look at the ground realities of
the dialogue so far. Pakistan has shown an amazing
amount of flexibility and accommodation on critical
issues like water as well as on the core issue of
Kashmir. India's response to these initiatives and
accommodative shifts has been at best continuing
rigidity and, at worse, negativity calculated to
undermine the whole process itself.
Clearly, the Indian
intent has been to make the dialogue process an
end in itself, even as the Indian business sector
seeks access into Pakistan and Indian civil society
is feted, ad nauseam, by Pakistani officialdom.
The question we need to ask ourselves is whether
we in Pakistan are prepared to accept this Indian
agenda? Meanwhile, India has stated categorically
that it will not stop work on the Baglihar Dam while
the World Bank makes a decision on the issue. On
Kashmir itself, India has not only failed to respond
positively to Pakistan's proactive proposals but
has backed off from the confidence-building measures
(CBMs) that it had earlier made much of at the propaganda
level. For instance, there is a strange Indian quietude
towards the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service in
the face of Pakistan welcoming such a proposal and
suggesting that it be implemented along the earlier,
50s' model - with no passports or visas.
In the face of this
intransigence on the main conflictual issues, it
is absurd for Pakistan to continue to quicken the
pace of civil society interaction and economic concessions.
There is a bizarre logic doing the rounds in some
segments of officialdom and civil society in Pakistan
that despite Indian intransigence over Kashmir and
despite the threat posed by the operation of Baglihar
Dam to the agricultural sector, we should allow
Indians to invest in Pakistan - something they are
already doing covertly - since this will give them
a stake in sustaining the dialogue. But what type
of dialogue? Surely not the one that is presently
in progress that has shown little in the way of
movement forward on conflictual issues? Will the
Indian business interests be able to pressure their
government into moving positively on Kashmir? So
far there have been no indicators in this direction.
In fact, the Indian plug seems to be to involve
Pakistani civil society so deeply into a meaningless
dialogue process that they forget Kashmir and the
water issue. Unfortunately, this will not be possible
- especially since the water issue threatens our
very existence and highlights the relevance of Kashmir
for Pakistan.
But the Indians will
continue to try and woo us over through frivolities
- especially through their Bollywood culture - given
that we seem to be sending mixed signals. This seeming
confusion on our part is regrettable because we
should be in no doubt over Indian intent as revealed
so far in the dialogue process. India has a history
of breaking all norms to push forward its agendas
wherever it can. If we study India's record of violating
international treaties and agreements, we will understand
how unscrupulously it plays the power game - especially
in relation to Pakistan. That is why we should have
seen what India was up to in the Baglihar case much
earlier on. After all, India has sought to break
the Indus Waters Treaty on earlier occasions also
and the present Congress coalition government had
expressed a view that it may actually seek withdrawal
from the Treaty itself. But India's track record
of violating formal agreements, at the bilateral
and multilateral levels, goes back to 1947 when
it began its membership of the international comity
of sovereign states by violating the agreed-upon
Partition plan. In 1972, India began violating the
Simla Accord, relating specifically to the Line
of Control almost as soon as it was signed.
Despite a commitment
by both Pakistan and India not to alter the LoC
unilaterally and to refrain from using force "in
violation of this Line", (2:ii) India crossed over
the post-1971 LoC and set up over half a dozen posts
on the Pakistani side of this Line. In 1984, India
not only violated the Simla Accord (6:ii) but also
the Karachi Agreement of 1949, which defined the
Ceasefire Line between Pakistan and India in Jammu
and Kashmir as prevailing after the UN-brokered
ceasefire of January 1949. In 1988, India violated
the Simla Accord once more by crossing the LoC and
establishing twelve posts in the unoccupied Qamar
sector. These almost habitual violations of the
Simla Accord call into question the validity of
this Accord today. India also violated the Pakistan-India
1992 Joint Declaration on the Complete Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (1:a,b,c). At the time, both
Pakistan and India showed that they did not possess
chemical weapons' stockpiles. However, when India
ratified the international Chemical Weapons Convention
in 1996, it declared a large stockpile of chemical
weapons, which showed that India had deceived Pakistan
into signing the bilateral agreement on chemical
weapons in the first place.
India's downing of
the unarmed Pakistan navy surveillance plane on
August 10, 1999 was a clear violation of the bilateral
Pakistan-India Agreement of 1991 on Prevention of
Air Space Violations and For Permitting Over Flights
and Landings by Military Aircraft - specifically
Articles 1 and 2(b). The violation of the Indus
Waters Treaty in the case of Baglihar is part of
this pattern of India's irresponsible, unilateralist
behavior, which is also reflected in the Indian
approach towards multilateral treaties and agreements.
India transgressed the UN Charter's letter and spirit
when it invaded Goa in 1961 and expanded India's
geographic contours. Its amalgamation of Sikkim
within the Indian state - from the status of Protectorate
- violated the spirit of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties (1969) which upholds the sanctity
of international treaties and conventions and inter
alia declares that successor states (as India was
after 1947 to British India; it gained its UN seat
on that basis) inherit treaty obligations of the
predecessor state.
After the 1971 war
with Pakistan, India violated the Geneva Conventions
relating to the conduct of war, specifically the
1949 Prisoners of War Convention (Article 118, Sec.
II of Geneva Convention III), on the issue of Pakistani
POWs, whom it continued to hold on to long after
the war had ended and Pakistan had returned the
Indian POWs. India's denial of the right of plebiscite
to the Kashmiris is a constant violation of UN Security
Council resolutions. Yet, India, as a member of
UN, has agreed to abide by the UN Charter under
which "The members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with the present Charter"
(Article 25). India also violated Article 24:1 of
the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (1982) during
the height of the Kargil crisis when it held up
a North Korean cargo ship carrying cargo destined
for Pakistan, at Kandla port on its Western coast.
The captain and crew were arrested and the cargo
confiscated.
India also declared
a blockade of sorts against Pakistan, which is an
act of war. Since India had not declared war on
Pakistan, legally it had no grounds for carrying
out any of these acts. With such an abysmal track
record on bilateral and multilateral agreements
and treaties, India has the gall to seek permanent
membership of the UNSC; the international community's
reluctance to censure India on this count is even
more absurd. In any event, Pakistan should be more
aware of the Indian duality that has dominated its
external relations since the Nehru era. The writer
is Director General of the Institute of Strategic
Studies, Islamabad (Courtesy The News)
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