More than Coincidence
By Dr Shireen M. Mazari
With
Pakistan having finally sought World Bank intervention
on the Baglihar Dam issue through the appointment
of a neutral expert under Annexure F of the Indus
Waters Treaty, a number of interesting developments
have been taking place. Without wanting to sound
conspiratorial, one cannot help but marvel at the
pattern that emerges from what appear to be mere
coincidental events. The pattern suggests a carrot
and stick approach (primarily the latter) - designed
to put Pakistan under pressure one way or another
on sensitive issues.
Also clearly emerging in this pattern is the extensive
Indo-US nexus. Beginning with India's responses
to Pakistan's request to the World Bank for appointing
a neutral expert on the Baglihar Dam, we saw India
initially maintaining a hard line posture with a
declaration that they would not stop work on the
Dam, regardless of the World Bank appointing a neutral
expert. However, by the time the World Bank head,
James D. Wolfensohn, visited Islamabad earlier this
month (February 7), the Indians began showing more
flexibility on the issue. One major reason for this
was the realization that this time, Pakistan means
business. India suggested that the World Bank facilitate
a round table discussion by a high-level joint India-Pakistan
technical team.
Given
the collapse of earlier discussions amongst technical
teams from both sides, talking under the World Bank
supervision will hardly alter the rigid Indian posture
on the issue. So why put forward such a proposal?
Clearly it was an attempt to get Pakistan to withdraw
its request for the appointment of a neutral expert.
There was also talk of India finally agreeing to
the Srinagar-Muzafarabad bus service, hopefully
without the sticking point of passports and visas
- which would not be legal in any case, since these
are requirements only across international borders.
Even more interesting, the Indians finally showed
a willingness to go for the gas pipeline from Iran
via Pakistan to India, although they guised this
in a format putting the onus on Iran to supply the
gas through the onshore pipeline.
This
new flexibility again was in the face of Pakistan's
decision to go ahead with this project- with a pipeline
from Iran to Pakistan - with or without India. The
Indians must also have finally realized the costliness
of alternatives. All in all, they seem to have also
understood that there is a growing feeling in Pakistan
that dialogue as merely an end in itself is not
worthwhile, especially in the face of Indian obduracy
on critical conflictual issues like Kashmir and
Baglihar. This does not mean that India has moved
away from its traditional stance on these issues.
All that has happened is that India is attempting
to continue delaying any substantive moves on these
issues through a flexible rhetoric. On the ground,
work continues on Baglihar and the Kishanganga project.
In the case of the latter, we have the same Baglihar
pattern of talks and more talks with no give from
the Indian side. Why we have not learned our lessons
from Baglihar is not too clear. In anticipation
of the arrival of the Indian External Affairs Minister,
Natwar Singh, in Islamabad on February 14, the Indian
Foreign Secretary declared, a day earlier, that
bilateral ties could take a "positive direction"
but that Indian security concerns needed to be addressed.
What about Pakistan's security concerns given India's
expansive armament acquisition agenda and covert
involvement in Balochistan? Of course, on the eve
of his departure, Natwar Singh himself again emphasized
the need for economic cooperation - with nothing
said on Kashmir or Baglihar. It is not simply the
shifts in the Indian posturing that should be seen
as a pattern.
Linked to what the Indians are doing, is the US
media campaign designed to put pressure on Pakistan
on the extremely sensitive nuclear issue. Strangely
enough, as soon as Pakistan "got tough" on Baglihar,
we saw a renewal of the attack on A.Q. Khan and
accusations of the Pakistani state being linked
to his proliferation activities. Time magazine put
forward a cover story on Dr Khan without even a
hint that he was simply an actor in a private proliferation
network that included a number of German and Dutch
individuals and companies. They continue to remain
faceless entities not up for scathing caricatures
and condemnation in the Western media. The Time
story again highlights the fact that the real target
of the anti-Khan campaign in the Western media is
not Khan as much as Pakistan itself and its nuclear
assets. Lest we see this as an isolated story, there
was a follow-up in the form of a conjectural story
in the UK's Sunday Telegraph (February 13) declaring
that Pakistan had "admitted" for the first time
that Dr Khan had indeed passed nuclear secrets and
equipment to Iranian officials.
The paper stated that a premier intelligence agency
of Pakistan had actually disclosed this information
to this newspaper. Now why would such an agency
in Pakistan disclose sensitive information to a
British newspaper? The newspaper goes on to state
that the Pakistani "admission" came during private
talks in Brussels at the end of January between
EU officials and senior ministers from Pakistan
and India. It boggles the mind to discover that
our senior ministers have become so confessional
before their Indian and EU counterparts - the dialogue
process notwithstanding. In the process of verifying
this rather disturbing story, I found a categorical
denial from all official sources, so was the Daily
Telegraph being used as part of the pressure build
up on Pakistan? Nor is this all. At around the same
time, we saw Democrat legislators Tom Lantos and
Frank Wolf in the US Congress drafting a bill which
would compel the US to check on democracy in Pakistan
even as the US and India began discussing nuclear
security issues with the IAEA in the first trilateral
meeting of its kind between India, the US and the
IAEA - with a regional agenda. Strange, again, why
Pakistan has not figured in this Regional Radiological
Security Partnership (RRSP) program. Patterns are
definitely emerging.
Every time Pakistan shows frustration at the impasse
on the dialogue as far as substantive issues go
and prepares to assert its views, Indians begin
playing games, while a host of extraneous issues
arise for Pakistan - media campaigns directed against
Pakistan and its nuclear program or increasing violence
within the country. For the Indians it is enough
that some CBMs in the areas of their choice get
through but as President Musharraf has stated, CBMs
are not enough unless there is movement on Kashmir
as well - given that that is the root of South Asia's
conflictual milieu. And so far there has been a
bizarre silence from India on the proactive out
of the box suggestions floated by the Pakistani
leadership. In fact, India seems to have mistaken
Pakistan's extraordinary flexibility for weakness.
This will be a big mistake because Pakistan is now,
to quote President Musharraf again, "beyond coercion".
There is a major gap in how Pakistan and India approach
the dialogue process. For India the dialogue has
become an end in itself - to be pursued while economic
concessions are gained and an illusion is created
for the world of a benign India pursuing peace with
its neighbors. For Pakistan the dialogue is a means
to an end - the end being conflict resolution. This
is the crux of the problem. (The writer is Director
General of the Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad.
Courtesy The News)
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