Unholy
Internal-External Linkages
By Dr Shireen
M Mazari
2005 has begun
in a hectic fashion for Pakistan, on the home and
external fronts, between which there are clear linkages
at certain levels. Regarding the external, India
has stonewalled Pakistan on conflictual issues,
especially Baglihar Dam and Kashmir. On the former,
it is still seeking to buy time to complete the
gates construction while on the latter it has gone
mute even on simple confidence-building measures
like the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus service, which
Pakistan agreed to without passports and visas.
In terms of actually resolving the conflict, India
is clearly not proceeding even towards evolving
a process that could lead to a solution acceptable
to all parties to the conflict. India has neither
responded positively to any of the new approaches
Pakistan has put forward, nor given any new "out
of the box" proposals. Instead, there is a reversion
to the hackneyed accusations about infiltrations
across the LoC and claims of Kashmir being a "symbol
of Indian secularism". Strange how an occupied territory
can symbolize Indian secularism but then India has
a history of expanding its borders through military
means - as in Goa, Hyderabad and Junagadh, with
Sikkim being brought into the Indian Union through
covert operations. Ironically, the Indian political
leadership is at variance with its military that
has declared that infiltration is down to zero.
How are these developments linked to Pakistan's
domestic environment? Well, Indians have developed
major access to Pakistan's Western borders through
consulates in Zahedan, Jalalabad and Kandahar. Is
it really a coincidence that whenever Pakistan expresses
dissatisfaction with the dialogue process, or when
Kashmiri freedom fighters take on Indian forces,
the violence in Pakistan's sensitive areas increases?
Pakistan's situation does have domestic roots, but
there are also linkages between these roots and
external forces intent on creating instability here.
It is in this connection that Pakistan should be
concerned with another external development relating
to our rediscovered ally, the United States.
A recent report by Seymour Hersh ("The Coming Wars",
The New Yorker, 24-31 January 2005) has caused a
major controversy. Washington claims that it is
"riddled with errors" but has not denied its main
claims - among other things, it reveals that the
US is now relying more on the Pentagon to undertake
clandestine commando operations. This has a strong
logic since the US has failed to accept the EU and
IAEA approach of dealing with the Iranian nuclear
issue through dialogue and accommodation. There
is the US trauma about the overthrow of the Shah's
regime and the subsequent US hostage crisis, and
Rumsfeld's reorganizing of the Department of Defense
given the various CIA botch-ups.
According to Hersh, the new chain of command for
these Pentagon operations will include the Under-Secretary
of Defense for Intelligence, Stephen Cambone and
Lt General Boykin - who once declared that his God
was superior to the Muslim God and that the Christians
were involved in a crusade! So it should surprise
no one if Boykin and Co plan military actions against
Muslim states like Iran. But for Hersh to drag Pakistan
into the picture is extremely damaging because it
threatens to impact sensitive Pakistan-Iran relations.
Pakistan has refuted allegations regarding its role
in the new Pentagon agenda of covert military operations
against Iran. If Iran's nuclear facilities were
to be attacked, we could well be next in line given
how uncomfortably our nuclear program sits with
the US. But then Pakistan has become the favorite
whipping boy of US analysts and journalists. Stephen
Cohen has brought out yet another biased book on
Pakistan - this time on the idea of Pakistan itself.
It seems he cannot accept the fact that many generations
of Pakistanis know no other identity, so there is
no doubt in their minds about their Pakistani identity.
Even more damaging is America's Secret War (2004)
by George Friedman, founder of a US strategic thinktank,
Stratfor. Friedman also claims that the US saw Pakistan
as "the most unstable, most pro-Al Qaeda" country,
with the greatest threat of nuclear proliferation,
thereby making it the most immediate problem. According
to him, the US used the Pakistan-India confrontation
of 2001-02 to blackmail Pakistan on the nuclear
issue. Given the massive personal risks that President
Musharraf has taken to support the US war on terror,
it is hardly comforting to be informed that "the
US had no trust in Musharraf's promises and wouldn't
bend" in their demand that US forces be allowed
access to Pakistan's nuclear installations.
Friedman claims that the US gained this access,
which the Pakistan government categorically refutes.
Ironically, while Pakistan has made itself a frontline
state in the war against terrorism, the US continues
to suspect it. But there is more to this. The US
wants to isolate Iran and contain China. And so
it cannot go along with development work in Balochistan
that would bring a Chinese presence there and increase
overland trade and the energy pipelines involving
Iran. Therein lies the linkage between another facet
of our external and internal political dynamics
- apart from the linkage between the war on terror
and Pakistan's military operations in Wana. Therefore
the Balochistan issue is crucial for Pakistan. There
are multiple layers here, from an overall political
problem to law and order in specific areas and the
inclusion of rape into this scenario. All these
issues need to be dealt with simultaneously, at
different levels. The law and order problem can
be reduced by immediately bringing the rapists to
justice.
The writ of the government must be established in
all parts of the country including the areas of
the tribal sardars. This can be done more effectively
through a cooperative approach that co-opts the
Baloch leaders and sardars, who from all accounts
are also being pulled in opposing directions. The
new "Baloch Liberation Army", as it terms itself,
is different from the BLA of the 70s - many of those
old comrades are now frontline supporters of the
US. The new supporters of BLA have a lot of money
and weapons. A Baloch Liberation Front in Iranian
Balochistan is funded from outside - and it takes
little to guess who the provider may be. Regarding
the BLA, those in the know point a finger in two
main directions - an ally and our large eastern
neighbor.
A lack of economic opportunities is leading many
young, educated Balochs to join the BLA. The sardars
do not want to lose their hold over them, so they
keep abreast of BLA developments but would also
like to see a reassertion of their power through
government backing. Hence there is a need to engage
in political dialogue and push through economic
opportunities for the locals. The Sui legacy - where
the rest of the country benefited while the locals
remained deprived - should not be repeated in the
development of Gwadar and Balochistan in general.
In any event, with education and greater economic
opportunities, the sardari or tumandari system will
die a natural death. But until then, why not take
along local leaders into the national mainstream
through dialogue and accommodation, while standing
firm on law and order and against criminal acts.
These are difficult times for Pakistan and we need
to bolster ourselves against the multiple external
threats that are exploiting our internal problems.
Therefore, we need to be more all-encompassing with
the diverse national forces. Uni-dimensional solutions
for multidimensional problems will not work. (Courtesy
The News) (The writer is Director General of the
Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad)
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