South
Asian Nuclear Security Regime
By Mirza Aslam Beg
The nuclear stand-off
between India and Pakistan over the past quarter
of a century has reached a point where saner elements
in both the countries have started thinking of developing
a common strategy for maintaining South Asian nuclear
security regime for peace.
The year 1998 was the turning point for Pakistan.
Its ambiguity on nuclear policy was put to test
by India and Pakistan demonstrated effectively its
capability, establishing a level of nuclear deterrence,
which ultimately has led to confidence-building
measures between India and Pakistan and has modified
the climate of confrontation.
The proposal for South Asian nuclear security regime
was mooted by the eminent Indian scholar, M J Akbar,
editor-in-chief of the Asian Age, who accompanied
Mr Natwar Singh, the Foreign Minister of India.
I met Mr M J Akbar on February 16 in Islamabad and
discussed the concept. The same day he participated
in a panel discussion organized by a private TV
channel and discussed the concept of South Asian
nuclear security regime. The main features of his
proposal were:
One: Iran is under threat for suspected nuclear
proliferation and if that threat materializes, the
whole region will get destabilized and Pakistan
will become a front-line state in the emerging global
nuclear stand-off, thus impacting India directly.
Two: There is a need for evolving a joint nuclear
strategy between India and Pakistan to face such
impending threat.
Three: By working on a joint nuclear strategy, India
and Pakistan would be able to safeguard their nuclear
status, which has helped establish a stable nuclear
deterrence in South Asia.
Four: The civil society should have a role in this
respect, and informal study groups may be formed
in both countries to study and analyze the proposal
and make recommendations for establishing a nuclear
security regime in South Asia.
The proposal has its merits but there are some gray
areas, which need to be viewed with caution:
One: India’s nuclear doctrine envisages joining
the “nuclear club of five”, hence their
nuclear policy supports stockpiling of nuclear weapons
- approximately 400 - with an intercontinental strategic
reach, considered necessary to play the global role
as the emerging geo-economic power of the 21st century.
Pakistan has no such ambitions. As early as 1989,
Pakistan adopted a policy of nuclear restraint.
The main features of this policy were: a minimum
credible nuclear deterrence; no hot tests to be
carried out, since cold tests had proved fairly
successful (reliability was tested in May 1998);
and to continue developing missiles to reach all
territories of India, implying that Pakistan’s
nuclear capability will remain India-specific and
Pakistan’s nuclear capability will not compensate
for its conventional capability. Obviously, nuclear
policies of India and Pakistan are divergent. How
can such divergence be corrected and harmonized?
Two: India has justified its nuclear doctrine on
the basis of threat from China - the ‘enemy
number one’. Pakistan sees no such threat
from China. How would the joint nuclear doctrine
of India and Pakistan address the Chinese concern?
Three: The proposed India-Pakistan nuclear strategy
for South Asia is to cater for the contingency emerging
after an attack on Iranian nuclear installations
materializes. Why should India and Pakistan wait
for a crisis to arise and not pre-empt it? In order
to pre-empt, we have to reach out to Iran and make
it a part of the joint nuclear strategy on the basis
of ‘US-NATO nuclear security regime’.
Iran has declared its intentions not to make nuclear
weapons, but would retain uranium enrichment capability
for peaceful purposes. Therefore, it would be proper
to consider ‘outsourcing our nuclear strikes’
to Iran - as US and NATO have done: “A specific
number of nuclear warheads which, under US and NATO
war plans, will be transferred to US non-nuclear
allies to be delivered to targets by their warplanes.”
“Preparations for delivering 180 nuclear bombs
are taking place in peacetime”, and equipping
non-nuclear countries with the means to conduct
nuclear warfare, is inconsistent with today’s
international efforts to dissuade other countries
from obtaining nuclear weapons.”
The arsenal is being kept at eight air force bases
in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey
and Britain. If India and Pakistan want to dissuade
Iran from going nuclear, then ‘out-sourcing
a nuclear strike’ becomes essential. Iran
has the missiles, which can reach Israel. Iran fears
nuclear capable Israel, and by outsourcing our nuclear
strike to Iran, a credible nuclear deterrence will
be established in the Gulf Region, the West and
South Asia.
This strategy will thus serve as a meaningful effort
towards non-proliferation: “A non-proliferation
policy, must therefore, achieve clarity on the following
issues: How much time is available before Iran has
a nuclear weapons capability, and what strategy
can best stop an Iranian nuclear weapons program?
How do we prevent the diplomatic process from turning
into a means to legitimize proliferation rather
than avert it? We must never forget that failure
will usher in a new set of nuclear perils dwarfing
those which we have just surmounted.” (Henry
Kissinger - Dawn 26 February 2005).
Four: The Kashmir issue is receding into the background
as the CBMs gain pace, like the agreement for bus
service from Muzaffarabad to Srinagar, from April
2005. The Kashmir issue has kept the two nations
hostage for over half a century. Can this burning
issue be swept under the carpet? The symptoms of
the flames turning into a wildfire are predicted
by CIA, National Intelligence Council: “Iraq
has replaced Afghanistan as the training and recruitment
ground for the next generation of professionalized
terrorists, who will create a framework for the
spread of radical Islamic ideology, inside and outside
the ME, Central Asia, (South Asia) SE Asia and Western
Europe.”
A significant development took place, on February
16 when I met Mr. M. J. Akbar. Soon after the meeting,
the bureau chief of a national daily came rushing
to me to break the news that twelve Iranian nuclear
sites had been hit by missiles. He said Radio Tehran
broke the news, which was picked up by our private
electronic media. I said such madness was just not
possible. It was indeed a disturbing news. But by
late evening, it transpired that the news was fake.
Whether the news was fake or prompted, it did help
Iran “test the nerves of the United States
and Israel,” who promptly declared that no
such strikes had been carried out. Thus, nuclear
deterrence between Iran and Israel crossed the threshold
of ambiguity, which indeed is a meaningful development.
On the part of Pakistan, Chinese sensibility will
remain paramount as Indian nuclear capability is
China-specific. With regard to Iran, Pakistan and
India must not wait for the holocaust to occur.
They should rather attempt to pre-empt such a happening.
The best way would be the outsourcing of nuclear
strikes to Iran as the US and NATO have done. The
strategy therefore must also include Iran as it
would ensure stability in the Gulf region, the West
and South Asia.
The South Asian nuclear security regime could become
a reality if the Kashmir issue is seriously addressed
well in time because the developments taking place
in Iraq and Afghanistan are ominous, as these would
not only intensify the Kashmir war of liberation,
but would have a global impact, as predicted by
CIA. Being pro-active is a better option than being
reactive.
(The writer is a former Chief of the Army
Staff. Courtesy Dawn)
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