India's Insatiable
Appetite
By Dr Shireen M Mazari
When India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh spoke
at the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis
(IDSA) on November 11, his reference to "failed
states" emerging in the region triggered a
terrible sense of deja vu. It was once again a reminder
of India's appetite for constant expansion of its
national borders. After all, apart from Israel,
India is the only other state to have expanded its
territory through the use of force and military
power since its creation. Besides the annexation
of the princely states of Hyderabad and Junagadh
and the occupation of Jammu and Kashmir, India took
military action in Goa in 1961 followed by the incorporation
of that state within the Indian Union in 1962. Then,
in 1975, Sikkim was swallowed up by the Indian Union.
The case of Sikkim is particularly interesting because
it shows the devious manner in which the Indian
state manipulated events to end the sovereignty
of that tiny territory which had remained an independent
Buddhist kingdom under the Namgyal Chogyal dynasty
from 1642 right up to 1975. Earlier, in 1835, the
king of Sikkim had been forced to give Darjeeling
to the British as a 'gift' and it was at this time
that Sikkim became a British protectorate. When
the present state of India was created in 1947,
it took over the protectorate and as such the foreign
policy and national defense of Sikkim were transferred
to India. But that was never enough for Indian rulers.
Using Nepalese settlers in Sikkim to intrigue and
plan the overthrow of the Choygal, India continued
to increase its influence in this kingdom. In 1975,
Mrs Gandhi annexed Sikkim in a well-planned drama.
On April 8, Indian tanks and soldiers surrounded
the palace and placed the Choygal under Indian surveillance.
On April 10, the Sikkim Assembly unanimously resolved
that "the institution of the Choygal is hereby
abolished and Sikkim shall henceforth be a constituent
unit of India". Then on April 14 a referendum
was held, while Indian forces continued their presence,
which supported the Assembly's resolution. Ten days
later, the Indian parliament accepted the Sikkimese
request of merger and thus India was able to make
this one-time independent kingdom the 22nd state
of the Indian Union. This Indian practice of moving
in its forces was similar to what the Indians had
tried in their occupation of Jammu and Kashmir.
In the case of Sikkim, the pretext given throughout
was one of instability and insecurity of a weak
regime -- what would be referred to as a failed
state in today's political language.
So when Indian leaders talk of the "danger
of a number of failed states emerging in our neighborhood"
and how this will have "far-reaching consequences
for our region and our people", the neighborhood
should certainly be alarmed. After all, India has
sought control over all the smaller states within
its neighborhood, one way or another.
At present, it is experiencing problems not only
with Nepal but also with Bangladesh. Despite the
fact that Maoist rebels use sanctuaries across the
border in India, New Delhi refuses to seal this
border because it has never regarded it as a proper
international boundary. Instead, its forces have
gone across at will to arrest people on the Nepalese
side. Indian political intervention in Nepal is
well known and efforts to control Nepalese foreign
policy are also documented. For instance, how can
anyone forget the stoppage of Nepal's transit rights
as a landlocked state when it chose to purchase
a few anti-aircraft guns (a purely defensive weapon
system) from China? Given the political use India
has made of this situation, Afghanistan should be
grateful that it has uninterrupted transit rights
across Pakistan. Because Nepal has persisted with
displaying a sense of independence as behoves a
sovereign state that was never colonized, India
has become increasingly bellicose towards the Himalayan
kingdom. The remarks made by Singh at the IDSA,
therefore, contain a veiled threat that should not
be ignored. Nor did the threat only target Nepal,
given the reference to refugees and destabilization
of India's border areas. This was a clear reference
to Bangladesh and its ongoing conflict with India
on the issue of refugees and outstanding border
demarcations.
Even more critically, Singh's statement is extremely
dangerous for the neighborhood because the language
is similar to that of the US pre-emptive doctrine
and regime-change notions. As we know, India had
already laid claim to this doctrine so it would
not be fanciful to assume that India, with US blessings,
now seeks greater control over the smaller states
in its neighborhood. This does not mean that it
will necessarily use overt military force to implement
its agenda.
History should never be forgotten and we need to
recall how India gained control over Bhutan's external
affairs. Bounded on three sides by India, Bhutan
has always been a key part of India's strategic
planning. As early as 1949, India signed a Treaty
of Friendship with Bhutan, which remains in force
in perpetuity. This Treaty, comprising ten articles,
assures Bhutan of India's "non-interference"
in its internal affairs in return for Bhutan agreeing
"to be guided by the advice of the Government
of India in regard to its external relations"
(Article 2).
As India's military might has increased and its
strategic partnership with the US has proceeded
by leaps and bounds, it is now seeing itself in
a position to be more forceful and assertive with
states like Nepal and Bangladesh. Eventually, it
can also increase belligerency towards Pakistan.
After all, despite the ongoing peace process, it
continues to remain intransigent over conflictual
issues. Here, it is not just Kashmir but also the
water issue. We have now seen how India kept us
uselessly involved in talks that led nowhere on
the Kishanganga project and that is why we are now
compelled to seek the international arbitration
allowed for under the Indus Waters Treaty. Nor should
we assume that the violence meted out to our diplomatic
staff and their children is simply an odd incident
-- even though our own sudden silence on the beating
up of our High Commission staffer's child is strange
and surely should not be the price we have to pay
for sustaining positive atmospherics for the dialogue
process.
Meanwhile, it would seem that India's insatiable
appetite to gain ever more control over its neighborhood
seems to be overwhelming us all. That is why Afghanistan
is in SAARC and China is not. After all, becoming
a member of SAARC would have allowed China freer
access to trade in this region given the push for
SAFTA, and that would pose a threat to Indian goods.
With Afghanistan as a SAARC member, how will we
now prevent Indian access across the land route
to Afghanistan under SAFTA? India talks of no redrawing
of borders but it has an endless hunger for expanding
its own national frontiers, directly or indirectly.
Manmohan Singh has shown us the new face of this
voracious appetite. We will have only ourselves
to blame if we ignore this warning.
(The writer is director general of the Institute
of Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Courtesy The
News)
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