Truth about
the Abbasi Report
By Zubeida Mustafa
Three months after
the chairman of the Technical Committee on Water
Resources (TCWR), Mr A.N.G. Abbasi, had presented
his report to the president and the prime minister,
the Kalabagh Dam issue has burst on the scene in
a big way.
The president brought this contentious issue to
the forefront when he first spoke of forging a national
consensus and creating ‘awareness’ on
the KBD. Now he has dispensed with the need for
any political understanding and has declared that
the dam will be built at any cost.
The president has come under attack from the opposition
which accuses him of politicizing the issue and
creating a confrontation between Punjab and the
smaller provinces. But the most alarming aspect
of this situation is that the president is projecting
himself as the savior of Pakistan and Sindh which
according to him will be “committing suicide”
if the dam is not built.
This “I know best” approach can be dangerous.
That is the conclusion one draws after reading the
case for the KBD made out by the president in his
fact-sheet released on Saturday and studying the
Abbasi report which our reporter, Khaleeq Kiani,
obtained for this paper (published in Dawn of December
27-30). Now that the report is public knowledge,
it is time leaders and experts stopped politicizing
the issue and studied this document to weigh the
pros and cons of the KBD.
The report is itself an intriguing piece of work.
The committee that was announced in August 2003
did not become functional until March 2004 on account
of unexplained red tapism and bureaucratic delays.
Comprising eight members and a chairman, this body
failed to produce a consensus report. Seven members
lined up behind WAPDA without any independent input.
One member from Sindh, Dr Iqbal Ali, who had earlier
pleaded in an article in this newspaper (March 17,
2003) for alternatives to conserve the Indus water,
changed his stance once he became a member of the
TCWR. The other member from the province, Sardar
Ahmad Mughal, was forceful in marshalling arguments
against Kalabagh and was broadly supported by the
chairman who has raised many pertinent questions
that testify to his integrity and courage.
Strangely though, the chairman does not categorically
recommend that the KBD project be abandoned. He,
however, goes in a roundabout way to point out the
disadvantages of KBD and the overall thrust of the
report is against the dam. The most important issue
to emerge from the report is that enough water is
not available in the River Indus to fill a dam of
KBD’s size optimally and to allow sufficient
flow of water below Kotri as is needed to prevent
sea water intrusion. Critical of WAPDA’s failure
to make water availability computations on a regular
basis, the chairman points out that this has led
to discrepancies in the information provided. Thus
according to WAPDA’s upstream approach method
of calculation, the net water availability in the
Indus is 6.4 million acre feet (MAF). The seven
members of the TCWR put it as 31.6 MAF while Mr
Sardar Mughal puts it as — 17.7 MAF.
The report states that there is no surplus water
available for storage on an annual basis, though
there are flood years when the situation is not
so bad. Studying the pattern of river flow in the
post-Tarbela dam period, the TCWR found that on
an average storable surplus water was available
in only 10 out of 28 years and a dam of 6.0 MAF
will be able to trap only 22 per cent of the surplus
flood flow. Three dams will trap 84 per cent of
the flood water but each will be filled for 10,
seven and three years out of 28 respectively.
According to the chairman’s conclusions: “The
future storages have to be planned for storage of
surplus water in occasional flood years for use
in subsequent low flow years. These surplus flows
are of higher magnitude but with lesser frequency
of occurrence. Thus the filling of future dams will
be an occasional event ... The distribution of water
from future reservoirs should not be considered
according to their full capacity, but keeping in
view the fact that the stored water will need to
be used over a number of subsequent low flow years.”
Similarly, in giving the data for the outflow of
the water to the sea downstream of Kotri, the figures
vary widely. The international consultants asked
to study the case have suggested 2.6 MAF of water
every year and 25 MAF every five years should be
available to check seawater intrusion. This works
out to less than the 10 MAF per annum provided by
the 1991 water apportionment accord. Yet it will
have to be taken into consideration.
The moot point is: Is it wise to proceed to build
such expensive dams which may remain under-utilized
and may not offer the advantages they are supposed
to?
Admittedly, Pakistan’s water storage capacity
is very limited and its cultivated area of 36 million
acres is under pressure on account of water shortage.
The 117 MAF provided under the 1991 accord is not
always available and the availability of water will
fall with the silting of the Tarbela and Mangla
dams. Hence, according to the president, there will
be a shortfall of 20 to 30 MAF in the next two decades.
WAPDA has identified storage sites — Kalabagh,
Akhori, Bhasha, and Skardu. The TCWR said that the
construction of dams need to be prioritized. The
president has announced that the dams will be built
in the order given above. What is surprising is
that the government seems set to proceed with the
KBD on the basis of a feasibility study carried
out in 1984-88 that may be obsolete now. Mr Abbasi
strongly recommends that this be updated since the
cost ($6 billion) will need to be revised and the
reservoir filling study will have to be re-calculated
keeping in mind the 1991 water apportionment accord
which has been violated in years of shortages by
reverting to historic use that put Sindh at a distinct
disadvantage. Since it has now been agreed that
the accord is sacrosanct any new dam will first
have to meet the shortfall in the water accord allocations.
The mathematical calculation used by the government
is at best simplistic. The president says that 30
to 35 MAF of water flows into the sea in the flood
season every five to seven years. That will be stored
in the four dams planned. The use of this extra
water will be spread over a five-year period. In
other words on an average the projects will yield
barely six MAF of extra water. That does not take
count of the 25 MAF the consultants have suggested
for countering seawater intrusion.
Is all the economic investment, the indebtedness
and political alienation worth this meagre quantum
of water Pakistan will get? True there is a water
and power shortage in the country. But there are
other strategies available to meet the water and
power needs.
Dr Iqbal Ali spelt out comprehensive strategies
to save water losses through lining the canals and
preventing seepage which according to him causes
a loss of 18.3 MAF per annum (equal to the capacity
of two KBDs). According to him the farmers over-irrigate
their fields on account of wrong practices. Thus
they lose 12 MAF of water that can be saved by adopting
the drip irrigation system.
Similarly the power generation — 2,400 MW
from KBD and 4,000 MW from Bhasha — can be
obtained by using coal-based plants, building small
hydel projects and generating solar and wind energy.
One wonders why the government does not explore
these options rather than going after KBD with such
obstinate determination. The negative aspects of
big dams have been pointed out by the World Commission
on Dams in its 2000 report. Only the World Bank
which will be financing KBD seems to be keen about
pursuing this project. Why? The attraction appears
to lie in the big money involved which the Pakistani
taxpayer will end up parting with, while highly
paid American consultants will reap the benefits.
The fact is that there is no inter-provincial politics
involved in Kalabagh, as is widely believed. It
is the World Bank that appears to be behind this
scheme. The bank has been the greatest single source
of funds for the construction of large dams —
500 in number — all over the world. It has
promised Pakistan a massive loan extended through
the bank’s commercial lending program and
not at concessional rates. To lure the country it
has promised to increase other funding by about
10 times. (Courtesy Dawn)
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