Pak-US Relations:
No Room for Illusions
By Dr Shireen M. Mazari
President Bush's visit to South
Asia was all one expected it to be, although the
level of intimacy he achieved with India went far
beyond expectations. In Pakistan, a lot of time
was devoted to a visit that in the end produced
little of long-term strategic value for the country
-- no matter what spin one puts on it. But why do
we always have expectations from the US when they
consistently make it clear that these will be refuted.
In the present context, the most painful example
was the nuclear issue.
Despite consistent statements from US officialdom
-- right from the top down -- that Pakistan could
never be treated to a deal similar to the Indo-US
nuclear deal, we were being told by various utterances
from Scherezade Hotel that we would be demanding
such a deal and it could actually happen. A delusional
air surely hangs heavy in various corridors here!
Of course, the US arguments for sustaining this
differential treatment on the nuclear issue do not
hold in any rational discussion given India's formal
nuclear cooperation with Iran and the Saddam regime
as well as its scientists' work in Iranian facilities,
but then rationality has never been a strong point
of US policies in this region. In any case, President
Bush tried to put the delinking of India's nuclear
status from that of Pakistan's in as polite a form
as he could muster: As he put it, "Pakistan
and India are different countries with different
needs and different histories. So as we proceed
forward, our strategy will take in effect those
well-known differences". Apart from the fact
that he conveniently forgot that the two countries
histories are also interlinked, he was right in
stating that our nuclear histories are different
because India broke the nuclear taboo in this region
and it is India that has an extensive nuclear agenda
as well as a questionable record in terms of nuclear
cooperation officially with regimes like the Saddam
regime! So is India being rewarded for its nuclear
ambitions and past shenanigans?
Even more galling from the Pakistani standpoint,
even on investment and market access opportunities,
nothing was formalized. At the end of the day there
were many promises and a commitment to a strategic
dialogue at mid-level seniority, but nothing concrete.
There can be no delusions as to where Pakistan stands
with the US: We have an issue-specific strategic
cooperation on the issue of terrorism. Beyond that,
the US seeks an intrusive role in our domestic polity
-- be it education or our political structures.
Much has already been written on the Bush visit
to Pakistan but there is nothing new or substantive
for Pakistan that one can discuss. The only substantive
agreement was the Declaration on Principles relating
to the Integrated Cargo/Container Control Program
(IC3), which is part of the anti-WMD and anti-terror
agenda of the US. Even the issue of US forces violating
Pakistan's sovereignty was ignored in terms of an
expression of regret, let alone an apology, despite
the fact that President Bush focused primarily on
the "war on terror". Even the Bush body
language in Islamabad was in marked contrast to
the gushing and euphoric body language we saw in
India. But why was anyone expecting anymore?
On Kashmir, where many Pakistanis went into a state
of heady expectations after the Bush remarks to
the Indian media prior to his visit, Bush clearly
reversed into the traditional US posturing by the
time he arrived in Pakistan from India. So on that
count, too, it was clear that the US was not prepared
to so much as put India in an even mildly irritable
mood. Thankfully, President Musharraf also sought
only US "facilitation" rather than mediation
-- the latter portending dire results for Pakistan
in the face of the new Indo-US relationship.
Far more important, especially in the long term,
is the Indo-US nuclear deal. While the US talks
of declining its relationship with India from its
relationship with Pakistan, this delinkage in the
nuclear field is going to have serious repercussions
for Pakistan, especially when seen in the broader
context of the US-India military pact with its missile
defense component. In fact, the single most critical
factor to come from the Bush visit is the Indo-US
nuclear deal -- which was preceded by a nuclear
agreement between France and India.
Effectively, the US has killed the Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT). After all, any nuclear assistance
to India, even in the civilian field, directly contravenes
the NPT. Such assistance also contravenes the US
Non-Proliferation Act, but the US can alter that.
However, it cannot alter the NPT unilaterally so
it has simply decided to kill it in a most brazen
fashion. The global non-proliferation agenda is
dead as a result of US unilateralism and total disregard
for international treaties. Also, by allowing India
a delinkage between its military and civilian facilities
-- with India deciding which is which -- the US
has accepted India de facto into the nuclear club.
Pakistan remains outside and can now be targeted
in the future on its nuclear program. Not that we
cannot hold our own -- but it will be a source of
future unwarranted threat/political pressure.
To make its rejection of the NPT even starker, the
US has also given out its decision to retain its
nuclear arsenal and to bolster it further -- thereby
writing off Article 6 of the NPT. It is in this
context that the US and Britain conducted a joint
sub-critical nuclear experiment (February 23), Krakatau,
at the Nevada test site. This has been followed
by a statement from Linton Brooks, head of the National
Nuclear Security Administration declaring that "the
United States will, for the foreseeable future,
need to retain both nuclear forces and the capabilities
to sustain and modernize those forces".
Nor is the Indo-US nuclear deal and the US formal
abandonment of disarmament significant only for
Pakistan. There will be consequences in terms of
how the US now challenges Iran's nuclear program.
After all, having laid the NPT to rest, how can
there be any rationalization of taking the Iran
nuclear issue to the UNSC? Also, unless the IAEA
critiques the Indo-US nuclear deal, how can it further
the goals of non-proliferation? Or is there now
going to be a formal acceptance of the discriminatory
approach to non-proliferation where only certain
states' will be targeted for their WMD programs,
while everyone else can continue to develop their
WMD totally unchecked. After all, that is the signal
that has been given to India in terms of its fissile
material and nuclear weapons development. If one
contrasts the manner in which the US is dealing
with North Korea, where dialogue is being sought
to resolve the nuclear issue, and Iran, one can
make a valid assumption that it is the programs
of Muslim states that will be targeted in the future.
In hindsight, Pakistan should have taken note of
the Bush reference to its nationals as "Paks"
in his opening statement to the Indian media in
Washington. That would have better prepared many
in Islamabad for the Bush visit. It would certainly
have removed all delusional notions.
(The writer is director general of the Institute
of Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Courtesy The
News)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
