Questioning
NATO's New Rationalization
By Dr Shireen M. Mazari
The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) has been seeking new
legitimacy and rationality for its existence in
a unipolar world. The disintegration of the Soviet
Union signaled the end of bipolarity and destroyed
any semblance of balance in the system -- with the
US emerging as the sole superpower, determined to
establish global strategic structures attuned to
its policy goals -- and there was and continues
to be little room for hostile states in this new
design.
The tools also altered -- and these altered much
before 9/11. For instance, deterrence (reflecting
maintenance of the status quo) was gradually being
pushed into the background with the advent of the
notion of Missile Defense; and the notion of collective
security was fast degenerating into a collective
defense system for the pursuance of the US strategic
agenda -- as reflected in the manner in which UN
sanctions were used in the case of Iraq and Taliban-ruled
Afghanistan.
9/11 merely accentuated these trends, with the US
moving towards a new concept of collective action
-- through a notion of the "coalition of the
willing" which directly challenges the UN's
collective security system. In fact, one can identify
four major trends that came to the fore with the
end of bipolarity and which became more pronounced
in the wake of 9/11.
First, the disintegration of the Soviet Union physically
altered the Asian map with the creation of a whole
set of new states in the Caucasus and Central Asia.
These states, with heavy structural and economic
dependencies on Russia, created a region of strategic
vulnerability, especially since many of them had
old historico-political cleavages within them that
came to the fore with independence. The war on terrorism,
which brought in external military forces into the
region, added to the instability of the Central
Asian region.
Second, along with the post-bipolar geopolitical
change, the dividing regional lines between the
various Asian sub-regions -- such as South Asia,
West Asia, and Southeast Asia -- also stood dissipated,
with the advent of medium range missiles in the
arsenals of some of the states of the region. Post-9/11,
the parameters dividing South Asia from the neighboring
Asian regions have further weakened -- especially
with both Pakistan and India becoming part of the
international coalition's war on terrorism and the
presence of external military forces not only in
Central Asia but also in the Indian Ocean. Drawing
the Central and West Asian regions more directly
into the South Asian strategic milieu have been
the various schemes/proposals for oil and gas pipelines.
Third, and adding to all these regional changes,
was the already strategic shift in US policy. The
US legitimized state intervention through the pre-emptive
doctrine at the economic, military and political
-- that is regime change -- levels. A major global
theme that is evolving is the notion of "coalitions
of the willing" -- which effectively is a direct
challenge to the UN system, especially the notion
of collective security.
It is in this new milieu that NATO is seeking to
re-legitimize itself. After all, NATO was rationalized
post-WWII as a collective defense system with the
North Atlantic and Europe as its operational milieu.
Within this framework, it acquired legitimacy under
the UN Charter's Article 51. The context of NATO
was regional both in terms of membership and operational
milieu. So, with the disintegration of the Soviet
Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in
1991, questions were beginning to be raised about
the continuing rationale for NATO.
NATO, however, began seeking a new validity almost
immediately with the setting up of the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council as a forum for consultations
between NATO members, East European states and the
former Soviet republics. Since then, NATO has begun
to focus more on bringing into its fold the Eastern
European states, initially through its Partnership
for Peace initiative of 1994, as well as providing
a certain, limited access to Russia through the
NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council set up in 1997.
Despite all these developments and efforts by NATO
to find a new relevancy, debate intensified by the
time NATO reached fifty (in 1999) about its continuing
validity. But to some extent, the sheer weight of
its bureaucratic and organizational structures accounts
for its continuing survivability. That is why NATO
is looking for political rationalizations for its
sustenance. In the process it is undergoing a transformation
from its original shape and purpose into a wider
politico-military institution that seeks to encompass
a wide range of agendas -- from peacekeeping to
anti-proliferation of WMD to disaster relief.
While NATO may well have been effective in complying
with its new multitasking agendas, a shift in its
basic collective defense identity to something more
encompassing raises some serious issues in terms
of the basics of international relations and the
laws, norms and principles that govern these relations.
To begin with, while the NATO agenda has expanded,
its membership remains confined to Europe and the
US -- a sort of bridge between the North Atlantic
and Europe. So, if it represents collective interests,
these are the interests of these two geographical
entities. Yet, its theatre of operations on the
ground has become increasingly Asian -- a region
that has little say in the NATO agenda or functioning.
Unless NATO alters its very identity through Asian
members, it will by definition be plugging US-European
agendas in Asia.
Closer to us in Pakistan, the NATO presence in Afghanistan
raises a host of questions including whether this
presence is going to be a permanent one? If the
answer is yes, then it will raise security concerns
for countries like Pakistan, Iran and China because
our national interests may not always coincide with
US or NATO interests.
Even more troublesome at a basic conceptual level
is the idea that NATO is being transformed from
a collective defense organization (Article 5 of
the NATO Charter is surely in the context of collective
defense?) to a collective security organization
to serve the interests of future "coalitions
of the willing". There is no legitimacy for
any collective security organization other than
the UN with its universal membership. Will NATO
now push itself as a collective security organization
promoting the values of the Atlantic-European community?
Internationally, there is no legitimacy for such
an organization because Article 51 (Chapter VII)
of the UN Charter provides a very clear and limited
framework for collective defense organizations.
Article 52 (Chapter VII) of the Charter relates
to regional arrangements in connection with maintenance
of peace and security and talks in terms of these
organizations coming into being "as are appropriate
for regional action." Also, under Article 53,
there can be no action without authorization of
the Security Council except against an enemy state
as defined in Article 53:2.
Is NATO going to be an alternative to the UN system
of collective security, peacekeeping, and so on
-- just as the notion of "coalitions of the
willing" is a direct alternative to the UN
and its Security Council? If that is the case, then
NATO is functioning in a legal and moral void especially
given its continuing limitations in terms of membership.
(The writer is director general of the Institute
of Strategic Studies in Islamabad. Courtesy The
News)
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