The Latest
Crisis in Pakistan
By Dr M. A. Muqtedar
Khan
Associate Professor
University of Delaware
US
On
November 3, President-General Musharraf declared
emergency in Pakistan, suspended the interim constitution
and essentially placed the Supreme Court under military
arrest. His move has generated a crisis in the region
with serious global implications.
Pakistan to this day remains along with Malaysia,
Indonesia, Turkey, Iran and Bangladesh, one of the
few Muslim states where democratic processes have
taken roots over the years. Even when Pakistan is
governed by military dictators, as it is frequently
(1958-70, 1978-88, 1999-present), it is still able
to sustain a free press, active political parties
and independent judiciary. Its ability to retain
liberal political institutions even under military
dictatorship is an important characteristic that
we must keep in mind as we watch the current spiraling
sequence of political disasters in Pakistan.
Coup against Liberalism
Some political theorists talk of illiberal democracies.
Polities where there are elections but often in
the absence of other important democratic institutions
such as free speech, free media and independent
judiciary. Pakistan is in a curious way the opposite
of an illiberal democracy, it is a liberal dictatorship.
The declaration of emergency by General-President
Musharraf in Pakistan on November 3 is essentially
an attempt to pull a coup against an important liberal
dimension of Pakistan – against the independent
judiciary. In October General-President Musharraf
won the presidential elections while holding on
to the position of the Chief of Pakistani military.
But according to the current Pakistani constitution,
government employees cannot run for elections and
therefore Musharraf cannot hold his position as
the head of the military and still be eligible to
run for political office. His election was challenged
in the Supreme Court and right before the Court
was to give its decision on the constitutionality
of Musharraf's election as President of Pakistan,
he has declared emergency, laid siege to the Supreme
Court, blacked out independent news media and detained
those who had moved the Supreme Court to test his
eligibility and the legality of his election.
This last year has seen Musharraf move against two
institutions, the judiciary and the media, which
otherwise have enjoyed much free reign under a dictatorship.
These moves are clearly indications that Musharraf
feels insecure about grip on power as his popularity
declines.
Musharraf's Declining Utility
In the last one year Musharraf's popularity has
diminished both in Washington and in Pakistan. The
primary reason for that is that he has become less
and less useful both at home and abroad.
In Pakistan he has failed to curb the extremist
violence which has taken over 450 lives. The military
campaigns in the tribal areas against Taliban supporters
and against the Red Mosque and the adjunct seminary
in Islamabad has generated unprecedented amounts
of resentment and anger against Musharraf. He is
seen by his critics now primarily as a Washington
tool who does nothing except to fight America's
war against terror which most people in Pakistan
view as a war against Islam. Musharraf is waging
wars against his own people in cities and provinces
and that has made the citizenry as well the military
nervous and unhappy.
Musharraf brought a degree of stability to the society
and gave impetus to its declining economy after
the coup in 1999. His alliance with the Bush administration
after September 11 2001, also brought billions of
dollars worth of military and economic aid and the
economy has definitely benefited from it. He has
also provided, thanks to the professionalism of
the military, both efficient and corruption-free
governance. Pakistan's military is one of the few
professional, competent and stable institutions
in the country and it essentially assumed the responsibilities
of the state after 1999 and things got better. The
Pakistani population however has got used to the
positive changes, forgotten the corruption and chaos
under the previous democratic governments from 1988-1998,
and now are dissatisfied with the turmoil that Musharraf's
desperate efforts to retain power are bringing to
Pakistan.
Even some of the secular elite who have supported
Musharraf's undemocratic ways are becoming wary
of his highhandedness. They appreciated his enlightened
approach to Islam and saw him as a force that while
subverting democracy minimally (only at the top),
since the rest of Pakistan's governments, local
and national, were elected; nurtured a degree of
secularity and religious freedom necessary against
the rising tide of Taliban style Islamism. But what
they have finally ended up with is more Islamic
militancy with extremist violence and less and less
democracy.
American Policy and Democracy
Since September 11, 2001, Pakistan essentially became
the frontline state against al Qaeda and Taliban
and America's major ally in the so-called war on
terror. Musharraf's coup in 1999 was described by
many analysts as a coup against Washington since
the then PM Nawaz Sharief was seen as too close
to Washington and President Clinton. Until 2001
Musharraf was a persona non grata in Western capitals,
but since then he has become the face of enlightened
Islam and Muslim cooperation in America's war against
Islamic extremism.
Musharraf was seen as the guy in eliminating al
Qaeda from the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and as
the bulwark that kept the extremists from taking
over Pakistan and its nuclear arsenal. In return
the US provided military and economic aid and did
not pressure him to restore democracy in Pakistan.
When two of the four provinces in Pakistan fell
to Islamist leaning parties in state assembly elections,
the dangers of instant democracy became easily apparent
to Washington.
But lately there are rumblings in Washington. General
Musharraf has not fully succeeded in suppressing
Islamic militancy; Al Qaeda (according to the National
Intelligence Council) has reconstituted itself to
pre-September 11 strength and Taliban continue to
wage their war against Western forces in Afghanistan
from bases in Pakistan. Muslims of Pakistani origin
are also seen as the main source for recruitment
by radical groups in Britain. Pakistan has steadily
become the most critical state for American and
western security and given the fact that it is a
nuclear armed state, the strategic significance
of a state failure or collapse in Pakistan is so
much more.
In recent weeks, Washington has been facilitating
a rapprochement with Benazir Bhutto that could enable
Musharraf to make a transition to democracy, remain
President, with Bhutto as Prime Minister and sustain
a secular alliance in power in Islamabad. The declaration
of emergency by Musharraf is his second coup against
Washington. It not only derails the latest effort
to usher in democracy but also emboldens the Islamist
opposition who recognize that by taking this aggressive
step the General himself has brought Pakistan to
the tipping point. It remains to be seen if they
can muster the capacity to go the distance.
Washington cannot and will not abandon Musharraf.
Indeed his move, which brings Pakistan closer to
collapse, basically forces Washington to stand behind
him more firmly, albeit unhappily. In the end, the
current crisis can be defused, if an early rapprochement
between Musharraf and the Pakistani Supreme Court
can be arranged. It is here that Benazir Bhutto
can play a role and reestablish herself as a major
player both at home and in the eyes of Washington.
(Dr. Muqtedar Khan is Director of Islamic Studies
and Associate Professor at the University of Delaware.
He is a nonresident fellow of the Brookings Institution
and a fellow of the Al Waleed Center at Georgetown
University. His website is www.ijtihad.org)
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