Book & Author
General Gul Hassan Khan: Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan
By Dr Ahmed S. Khan
Chicago, IL

 

Lieutenant-General Gul Hassan Khan (1921-1999) was the last Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army. He was an officer and a gentleman and belonged to a rare and vanishing breed of professional Generals who did not indulge in acquisition of material wealth, real estate, and abrogation of constitution at will. He was regarded as a General with a good sense of humor. He spent his last years in a room at the artillery mess in Rawalpindi. When he passed away on October 10, 1999, he left behind a small amount of money in his bank account. Before his demise, he had instructed his orderly to buy his Kafan (burial cloth) with that money.

In his frank autobiography — Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan — he dispels many misconceptions about his role in various events. The book has four sections: I. Carefree Days (growing up in Quetta), II. The Fateful Posting (accounts of 1961-1965 period), The End of an Era (narratives of 1966-1971 period), and IV. The Inevitable (accounts of 1971-1977 era). The book is dedicated to: “All ranks of the Pakistan Army Past and Present.”

The author describes his experience of serving as ADC to Viscount Slim, towards the end of World War II. He says that the time he spent as ADC to the Quaid-i-Azam provided him with an opportunity to observe and learn from the great leadership of the founder of Pakistan. Working with two great leaders prepared young Gul Hassan to aim for high standards of leadership — which he exhibited later in his career when he commanded his men. General Gul Hassan also objectively analyses the events of the Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, and the discontinuation of merit for promotion of senior officers. The author concludes the book by describing events after the fall of East Pakistan, and the drama of his sacking (resignation) by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto; he considered Bhutto’s order — to use military force against civilians — as unlawful. Bhutto forced General Gul Hassan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan to resign during a meeting in Rawalpindi, and after the meeting Bhutto’s partymen Mumtaz Bhutto, Khar and Jatoi drove Gul Hassan and Rahim Khan to Governor’s house in Lahore — later that evening Bhutto announced about their resignation (sacking) in his address to the nation. Khar drove them back to Rawalpindi the next day.

Gul Hassan Khan was born in Quetta in 1921. In 1932 he joined the Prince of Wales Indian Military College, and in 1941 the Indian Military Academy. He was commissioned in February 1942. In November 1944, he was appointed ADC to General (later Field Marshal Viscount) Slim. At Partition, he was appointed ADC to Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah. He held several key appointments in the Pakistan Army: he served as the Director Military Operations during the 1965 war, and as Chief of General Staff during the 1971 war. In December 1971, he assumed command of the Army, and was its last Commander-in-Chief. After his forced “resignation/sacking” he served as Pakistan's ambassador in Vienna and later in Athens. General Gul Hasan was awarded Sitara-e-Pakistan and Sitara-e-Quaid-i-Azam for his dedicated services and gallant efforts.

In the preface the author, reflecting on the impetus for the book, observes: “The motivation for writing this account is that fate placed me in close proximity to personalities who were destined to make history. Thus, I was enabled to witness momentous events from a ring-side seat. Towards the end of the Second World War, I was posted as Aide-de-Camp to General (later Field Marshal Viscount) Slim, the redoubtable Commander of the Fourteenth Army in Burma. He has been acknowledged as one of the ablest generals produced by the British in that war; I have recounted episodes as his ADC, and no more: I was not posted as the deputy army commander, to wait in the wings, should it have become necessary to replace him. In addition, I am in no position, even with the aid of hindsight, to reconstruct his battles, which he has described admirably in his book, Defeat into Victory—conceded to be the best general's book of the Second World War. My narrative is therefore restricted to the more mundane issues, and I mention these because I thoroughly enjoyed my stay on his staff. Another reason is to highlight the humane aspects of his personality, notwithstanding the immense pressures he was exposed to. That is why he was affectionately known to the whole of his army as 'Uncle Bill'.”

Describing his association with Quad-i-Azam, the author states: “At the partition of India in August 1947, I was appointed ADC to Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the founder and the first Governor-General of Pakistan. I did not have to persuade myself that he was in no need of any guidance from me to help him launch the new State, but someone had to fill the post of his Army ADC and the privilege fell- to me…His passing away so soon after Independence was the biggest tragedy for Pakistan, which, in next to no time, became a playground for enduring gangsters, inveterate opportunists, and chronic freebooters. And of these species there appeared to be no dearth in our country.”

Expounding on wars and martial law, the author observes: “I have narrated the events connected with our two wars with India as I saw them. I do not absolve myself of the blunders committed. I have mentioned these, and I share the responsibility. In an army, effective leadership at the top makes all the difference between success and failure: so, it is with the Pakistan Army. Our environment went askew because Martial Law became a part and parcel of our very existence, thereby burdening the army with the dual tasks of administering the country and defending it in any emergency. I shall frankly state that we failed miserably in both these undertakings. Our commitment to Martial Law was total in 1971, when in spite of the fact that the Army was all-in-all, there was no communication whatsoever between the Government and the General Headquarters. The void was absolute, and it had to be experienced to be believed. As far as I can foresee, the specter of Martial Law will be ever-present in Pakistan, unless she produces political leaders who can look beyond provincial horizons, be above-board, possess honesty of purpose, command the solid support of the masses, and be genuinely concerned with their welfare, and, last but by no means least, be patriots. (The meaning of the last word is a person who loves, supports, and defends his country and its interests.)”

Commenting on the personality of Bhutto, the author states: “Bhutto was a showman of high caliber. He always gained political mileage by playing to the gallery, thus enhancing his own image. He achieved this by constantly appearing on public platforms, and not by sitting in an office directing the administration.”

Discussing the role and leadership of General Ayub Khan and the impact of the lack of democratic institutions, the author notes: “I thought of Ayub Khan, who had rendered constructive and demonstrable services to the country despite the corruption. It was a period of prosperity and stability unknown to Pakistan, yet he had been hounded out of office by the very same public who had acclaimed his achievements. The reasons were not far to seek. In a situation of one-man rule, there are no institutions which can absorb shocks. The good, and especially the bad, rebound on the man at the helm of affairs. Those who serve him never miss a chance to acknowledge the accolades, but they are smart enough to duck when the going gets rough.”

Reflecting on the personality of General Hamid and the evolution of mediocrity in the promotion of army officers, the author states: “General Hamid was a complex man, and it was never easy to figure out what he had in mind. He was astute enough not to air his views, if he had any, in the presence of those whom he was not familiar with, but he gave the impression of 'knowing all'. His influence gradually took root in all our activity in the Army. It had been a time-honored custom that officers promoted to the ranks of lieutenant colonel and above were vetted by a Selection Board comprising all the generals of the Army. I recall the vehement protests when the dossiers of two brigadiers were produced before the Board: they were just not fit for further promotion. In deference to the views expressed at the meeting, no judgment was passed on the two cases but later, to everyone's astonishment, they did get promoted. One of these brigadiers I had thrown out of 1 Armored Division when I was commanding that formation. …The second one landed in GHQ as my Director of Artillery…This officer had been promoted major-general by impugning traditions of vital consequence, just because he may have rendered personal service at some time or another. To reimburse favors to individuals at the expense of the Army, and in the face of opposition from the majority of senior officers, was an unacceptable deviation from the norms.”

Discussing the 1970 elections, the author observes: “The long and lingering period before the elections was beneficially utilized by the younger political leaders—Mujibur Rahman and Z A Bhutto. The former had been provided with a particularly welcome breathing space to spread more venom against the West, and his Six Points were preached with such enthusiastic diligence that it would put Goebbels' propaganda antics during the Second World War in the shade. Bhutto was more circumspect. He strengthened his hold on his party and advocated a more rational autonomy for the provinces with a viable center. The seasoned politicians decided to take it easy, hoping that their vast experience would harvest the votes for them.”

Describing how Bhutto manipulated General Yahya to change his mind about holding the national assembly session and its adverse impact on East Pakistanis, the author states: “In the second week of January, the President visited Dhaka, where he informed the Sheikh that the National Assembly would be convened in early February. On his departure, he referred to the Sheikh as the future Prime Minister of Pakistan, which must have pricked Bhutto's ego…In West Pakistan, Bhutto's aspirations also received a grievous setback: he appreciated that he would have no say in the making of the Constitution or the Government. He accordingly vented his anger by declaring that if the Assembly met, there would be flames from the Khyber Pass to Karachi. And later, when some of the minority party members made known their intention to attend the Dhaka session, Bhutto warned that he would break their legs and that they would be well advised to buy one-way air tickets. These utterances were meant to add spice to what he had said earlier that 'no party should even think of framing a Constitution without the People's Party'. The President must have discerned that he was check-mated.”

Expounding on Indira Gandhi’s friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, the author notes: “When the perspective fell into focus, Indira Gandhi concluded a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Co-operation with the Soviet Union on 9 August 1971. In order to cater for current and future contingencies, this treaty was valid for a period of twenty years. It will be of interest to mention that this document had been hanging fire, owing to opposition to it in India, since 1969. But when Indira Gandhi determined that our predicament in East Pakistan had reached a point of no return, she ratified it with undue haste, notwithstanding India's avowed non-aligned status and taking most of Delhi by surprise. The agreement suited both the signatories. India perceived her chance of undoing the partition of the subcontinent, at least in some measure, and for this she had acquired the backing of a superpower. The Soviet Union had to square accounts with Pakistan for the role we played in facilitating the rapprochement between the USA and China. Moscow also seized this opportunity to demonstrate that China was an impotent ally, because the latter could not possibly come to the assistance of Pakistan without inviting retaliation from the Soviet Union. Indira Gandhi visited Moscow in late September to reassure herself that all would be well when she set in motion her grand design to bring Pakistan to book. While in Moscow, she also obtained additional military hardware to augment her existing awesome arsenal.”

Explaining the reasons why he did not oust Bhutto in 1972, the author observes: “In 1977 a compatriot asked me, in all earnestness, why I had not, in the supreme interest of Pakistan, ousted Bhutto in March 1972, when I was fully aware of what he was up to. I had replied that, firstly given time, I knew he would accomplish this feat without any help from me; secondly, I was just not interested; and, thirdly, I did not divulge to him that at the back of my mind was the lurking fear of screwing things up. At the end of a long and, at times, sticky innings, I can without much compunction state that while my attainments may be spectacular, my achievements, in correlation, fall far short.”

The author concludes the memoir by observing: “I was very much a part and parcel of the General Staff at GHQ. It is, therefore, logical and realistic to terminate the story on this note, otherwise, the reader is likely to perceive that I had assumed the role of an official umpire to record events from the sidelines. I do not deny that I have been critically harsh on occasions, but then that criticism is apportioned to all, including my person. Under the circumstances it will not be easy to envisage why I did not quit the scene in 1971; but the fact is that though I did not go to that extent, I did request General Yahya Khan to send me back to 1 Armored Division. Thereafter we were so inundated by overwhelmingly traumatic issues that I considered it infra dig to abandon a sinking ship, having been one of its crew members.”

Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan is an important book. The author — the last Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army — has candidly summarized highlights of his 30-year military career and the background details about two wars and three Martial Laws. It is a historic document — an essential reading for students of history and all civilian and military officers in Pakistan so that they can learn from mistakes made during the past seven decades and benefit greatly from General Gul Hassan’s advice and insights on politics and military affairs.

(Dr Ahmed S. Khan - dr.a.s.khan@ieee.org - is a Fulbright Specialist Scholar)

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