From 1976 to 2011, Tariq Khosa rose from a young police officer to its highest rank as Inspector-General of Police. He also headed up the Federal Investigation Agency and retired as secretary. His memoir, Walking a Tightrope: Police, Politics and the People of Pakistan, published by Lightstone Publishers, offers searing insight into the challenges and political pressures facing Pakistan’s police infrastructure

 

 

Police and Politics in Pakistan

By Tariq Khosa
Pakistan

 

It was the afternoon of August 17, and I was back in my apartment in the [Federal Investigation Agency Training] school, trying to take a nap before the evening games when my bedside official phone rang. It was the DG’s [Director-General’s] private secretary, and he sounded disturbed. “Sir, an army C-130 aircraft carrying Gen Ziaul Haq has crashed near Bahawalpur. DG sahib wants a meeting in his office at 9pm later tonight with you and some directors at headquarters in attendance.”

That was shocking news. The mighty Gen Zia had perished along with the US Ambassador Arnold Raphael and 29 other passengers who took off in the C-130 aircraft after a US-sponsored tank display at Bahawalpur. Was it an accident or sabotage? That question was being discussed instantly in the media all over the world.

A grim-faced DG held a meeting of four officers in his camp office at 9pm. He had been in touch with interior secretary S.K. Mahmud and some officials from the presidency. Someone from the US embassy had also alerted him about the imminent arrival of an FBI probe team since a high-profile US diplomat had died in the crash. The FBI always requested the FIA for facilitation and assistance. Interpol was offering to fly in a highly technical investigative team. What was to be done in the next 24 hours?

The director of the Central Zone at Lahore, Iftikhar Ahmed Khan, was tasked with coordinating with the Punjab Police and obtaining all possible information that would be required to initiate a formal inquiry by the FIA or any other joint investigation team to be created by the federal government. Discussion started on the possible causes of the crash in which so many senior army commanders had been killed.

The C-130 was a robust and well-maintained military aircraft. The consensus that emerged among the experienced police officers in the room was that it must have been an act of targeted sabotage. How would the FIA or police be allowed to probe an event that was the exclusive domain of the army and air force? Who could have done it? Conspiracy theories started being spun around.

A director who had served with the Punjab Police previously and who had sat quietly in the meeting till then said in half-jest: “Sir, in my view, those who chose to avoid sitting in the aircraft with Gen Zia are the prime suspects.” Everyone looked at him, trying to read his face when the DG said: “Do you mean to say that the senior military command, who said goodbye to their chief at Bahawalpur, had an inkling of what was to come?” The director appeared nonplussed and replied that a typical Station House Officer (SHO) of the Punjab Police would think so.

Well, this was no ordinary murder case that the police dealt with in their daily routine. It entailed technical and forensic expertise that only the FBI or Interpol could handle. It was concluded that further orders would be awaited from the interior ministry, if FIA were tasked to play any role in the probe. Let the Punjab Police register the case first, as it was in their jurisdiction.

The next day, we learnt that an FBI team was en route and wanted to visit the crash site to examine the debris, which was under strict army control. Some coordination was done with the Punjab Police, who advised contacting GHQ (General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army) in Rawalpindi. The question was: who would bell the cat? “Wait and See” became the preferred option. We waited, but the FBI team never engaged with us. A source in the US embassy informed us that the FBI was not allowed to conduct its probe despite being mandated to do so due to the US ambassador’s death. Why didn’t the Justice or State Departments pursue the matter? Was there some turf issue between the CIA and the FBI? Conspiracy theorists were having a field day.

Meanwhile, the federal government decided to initiate a joint probe by Pakistan and US Air Force technical teams… Their task was to investigate the circumstances of the Hercules C-130 Aircraft S No 62-3494 crash on August 17, 1988 and, among other things, to apportion blame, if any.

The technical inquiry, completed in early October 1988, yielded several key findings:

• The aircraft was fully serviceable upon departure from Bahawalpur airport.
• No evidence of in-flight fire was found in the wreckage analysis.
• Two crates of mangoes and a presentation case of aircraft models were loaded on board at Bahawalpur.
• Engine speed was normal at 100 percent RPM, with no indications of malfunction at the time of the mishap.
• Fuel contaminants were not a factor in the accident.
• The aircraft remained structurally sound until impact and did not disintegrate in flight.
• The accident was not attributable to ground fire (missile, rocket etc).
• The captain and co-pilot were in excellent physical condition, ruling out poor judgment or technique during the critical take-off stage.

Having ruled out weather, in-flight fire, propeller failure, engine failure, fuel contamination, structural failure in flight, or external ordnance as causes, the Board focused on control problems, specifically elevator control failure or the possibility of sabotage.

They proposed two hypotheses:

a) Control problems in the pitching plane could have been caused by a mechanical or hydraulic fault in the aircraft systems.

b) The problems could have been induced by the pilots, either voluntarily or involuntarily.

The investigators’ main concern was the possibility of a criminal, mischievous act that could have caused the loss of control and subsequent accident. They considered several potential forms of sabotage:

a) Mechanical or deliberate interference with the flight control system.

b) Physical interference with the controls in the cockpit.

c) Incapacitation of the pilots at the controls as a result of a criminal act.

d) Use of explosive devices to achieve (a), (b), or (c).

The Board concluded that deliberate contamination of the elevator boost package was possible, though remote. This could have been done by a knowledgeable person with suitable tools and opportunity, requiring only two to three minutes if practised.

Without a cockpit voice recorder, the possibility of physical interference with cockpit controls could not be ruled out entirely. This could have included a hijacking attempt or a suicide attempt to crash the aircraft. The control problem persisted for about two minutes before impact.

The Board considered the possibility of a chemical agent being used to incapacitate the flight crew. Such an agent could have been smuggled on board in innocuous containers like beverage tins, gift parcels, aerosol cans, or thermos flasks. The activation of these gases during flight, manually, remotely or automatically, could have resulted in the insidious incapacitation of the crew.

Carbon monoxide, being colourless and odourless, was mentioned as a possible agent, with an absorption rate of 200 to 300 times that of oxygen. It could impair judgment and deteriorate muscle coordination before causing death. The Board speculated that other, more effective agents might exist. The presence of such chemical agents would not necessarily create alarm, preventing the crew from taking preventive measures like donning helmets and oxygen masks. Evidence from the crash site indicated that the flight crew were not wearing helmets and oxygen masks at the time of impact.

Strangely, no proper autopsies were conducted on the bodies of the crew and persons on the flight deck, leaving the possibility of chemical agent use unresolved. Why was this basic requirement denied? The only autopsy conducted was on Brig-Gen Wassom of the US, who was seated in the VIP capsule. As such, the conclusions drawn from his autopsy would relate only to the conditions within the capsule and were not indicative of the environment on the flight deck.

Analysis of aircraft structure and debris samples by the PINSTECH (Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology) laboratory revealed unusual elements not usually present in the aircraft structure, fuel, lubricants or other equipment. These included:

• High levels of potassium in a mango seed

• Antimony and chlorine on mango peel

• High levels of phosphorus and antimony on the cockpit supporting rod

• High levels of phosphorus, antimony, and sulphur in the aft cargo door area

The Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) Laboratory in the US reported traces of PETN (Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate), a secondary high explosive, on the butt end of the emergency escape hatch rope in the aft cargo door area. Although the ATF report discarded the theory of a high-intensity explosion, the presence of PETN was unusual, especially when considering the presence of antimony and phosphorus in the same vicinity.

The Board considered the possibility of low intensity explosives being used to fire pressurised bottles containing poisonous gases, which could have resulted in the total or partial incapacitation of the pilots and persons on the flight deck. The action of such gases could have been so sudden and insidious that no one in the cockpit or flight deck would have had time to don helmets and oxygen masks.

In its final analysis, the Pakistan Air Force Board of Inquiry concluded that, in the absence of a technical reason, the only other possible cause of the accident was “the occurrence of a criminal act or sabotage leading to the loss of aircraft control and the eventual aircraft impact with the ground.” The Board acknowledged that it lacked the expertise to investigate non-technical reasons for the accident and recommended that “appropriate government agencies be tasked to investigate further.”

On October 17, 1988, the author presented the report to the DG FIA, requesting “further action as deemed proper.” However, instead of initiating criminal investigations, the federal government, under President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, constituted another inquiry commission under F.K. Bandial. It was intriguing to note that neither the ISI under Gen Hamid Gul nor the military under Gen Aslam Beg insisted on further criminal investigations. Moreover, it was strange that FBI investigations were not carried out in a case involving the deaths of their ambassador and defence attaché.

The outcome of the Bandial Commission remains unclear. It was reported that he did not receive assistance or cooperation from the concerned national and international stakeholders. Most likely, he submitted an interim or incomplete report to the government that was never made public. Like most high profile mysterious murders in Pakistan, this case of death of a mighty army chief remains unresolved too.

 

Gujranwala: A Crime Haven

[Inspector General of Police Chaudhry Manzur] sent a proposal for my posting as District SP [Superintendent of Police] Gujranwala. I was slightly surprised as SP Humayun Raza Shafi had been posted in that district since May 1990. Why was he being shifted only after six months? I got my answer when I reported as commander of Gujranwala Police on November 19, 1990.

Gujranwala was a haven for criminals involved in heinous offences like murders, robberies and kidnappings. Fighting crime is always a challenge for a police officer, but what posed a greater threat was the nature of the political elite of the district; the elected representatives there were a class apart. Most of them were active patrons of criminals, and their jurisdictions were like fiefdoms where fugitives were provided sanctuaries.

There is always a quid pro quo for such patronage: criminals were used as instruments to browbeat political or personal adversaries. Rivalries were acrimonious and invariably ended in tit-for-tat vendetta. Above all, the operational-level police officials were known to be thoroughly politicised and mostly steeped in corruption. Therefore, my first task was to set my own house in order. I had to act tough; otherwise, they would take me for a ride. I learnt what happened to my predecessor, Humayun, a gentleman and soft-spoken noble police officer.

Major [retd] Mazhar Qayum was DIG of Gujranwala Range. He was soft-spoken and a gentleman. He advised me not to confront the aggressive political elite of the district who were close to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. My response was to treat everyone as equal before the law and to break the nexus of the criminals and their patrons.

During that first tenure as PM, Nawaz Sharif was conscious of his image as a strongman against crime. However, the political expediency and weak leadership style of [Chief Minister Ghulam Haider] Wynne proved a political embarrassment for the government.

In that scenario, a strongman was needed at the helm in Punjab. So, a novel way was found to address this issue. While removing Wynne as CM would have been perceived as an ill-advised move, it was decided that matters related to law and order would be brought under the domain of Governor Punjab Mian Azhar, who had proved his mettle as mayor Lahore in an earlier stint by launching an effective anti-encroachment drive against the influential traders and businessmen of Lahore, in which an encroached shop of a maternal uncle of PM Nawaz Sharif was demolished. The image of a tough administrator had propelled Mian Azhar to be elevated as Governor Punjab. And now he was tasked to deal firmly with the criminals and outlaws of the province.

I had never met Mian Azhar, even when he became governor. I got a call from Farooq Haroon, Secretary to the governor, to come and see the governor for an important meeting. I had yet to learn why I was being summoned. Anyway, I reached the Governor’s House and was ushered in. A simple, fidgety but smiling governor shook my hands warmly. He came straight to the point. Law and order in the province were deteriorating, and he wanted the police to be given a free hand to bring to book those who considered themselves above the law.

He wanted to start from Gujranwala, a crime haven, and could he trust me to start Operation Clean-Up? My response was straight and simple: I would not violate the trust being reposed in me, but he should know that the ruling party might have to pay a political price as most of the political bigwigs were involved in patronising criminals and fugitives. They were likely to complain to the prime minister. The Governor looked me in the eyes with assurance and, with a stern expression, said: “Go do it. I have faith in you. Produce results.”

This was music to my ears. I resolved to make a difference.

Three officers were to play a key role in an operation that I was about to launch all over the district in the next 48 hours. ASP Hussain Asghar, sub-divisional police officer at Kamoke (MPA Wakeel Khan and MNA Rana Nazir); ASP Ejaz Hussain, subdivisional police officer at Hafizabad (MPA Mehdi Bhatti) and SP Hamid Mukhtar Gondal to organize an early morning police raid at the crime-infested area in the jurisdiction of Wandho police station.

Meanwhile, my spadework was complete in terms of hardened criminals, fugitives and political patrons at different deras of influential district persons. My friend Deputy Commissioner Khushnood Lashari discreetly handed me detention orders for three months each for more than two hundred of the targets that we planned to pick in a one-night swoop across the district.

The raids had to be planned in complete secrecy and military precision. We could not afford any leakage. Therefore, the local police station staff was kept in the dark till the last minute about the targets or destinations. They were told to be ready and armed for a deployment outside the district. Only a select few senior officers knew about the plan to surprise the criminal networks completely.

Finally, on a Friday night, we got the force lined up at the Police Lines Gujranwala. I addressed them briefly. Meanwhile, our ASPs and DSPs were alert at their respective sub-divisional headquarters. It had to be a synchronised and coordinated move. I moved to Wandho area and surrounded village Sukhana Bajwa while SP CIA Gondal went after a notorious fugitive Afzal “Ton Ton” who had created a state within a state with barriers outside the village.

A house-to-house search was launched. A huge cache of lethal weapons was recovered; some were even dug and hidden under the mud floors of the rooms in houses. No one could escape. Scores of outlaws and hardened criminals surrendered. ASP Hussain Asghar made a beeline to the households of henchmen of the MNA and MPA of the area and brought them to Kamoke police station. Meanwhile, ASP Ejaz Hussain got hold of the brother of MPA Mehdi Bhatti, a senior revenue officer in Pindi Bhattian.

The operation was not confined to limited pockets of crime but was extended to the length and breadth of the district. Some resistance offered was easily quelled. The operation continued at daybreak, and many arrests followed the next Saturday morning and well into the afternoon. By the time we returned to headquarters in the evening after a 24-hour continuous operation, we had achieved remarkable success with little resistance or violence.

“Operation Clean Sweep” was a great success. Hundreds of criminals were apprehended, and a huge cache of illicit weapons was in our possession. The news of the operation spread like wildfire. The governor, through his sources, had got the update. He wanted to visit Gujranwala the same evening. We requested him to wait until we consolidated reports about arrests and recovery of weapons. He conveyed his decision that he would come the next morning.

That Sunday morning in the Circuit House was a proud display of what police could achieve against crime and criminals, given a free hand. This is a big if in our governance paradigm. Governor Mian Azhar was elated. He had posted a stamp of being a firm administrator by starting his anti-crime campaign from Gujranwala. He patted me, and a look of gratitude in his eyes was humbling for me. I had done my duty and was not expecting any reward. What was gratifying was that the heinous crime rate curve fell steeply to almost zero within days. ASP Hafizabad Ejaz Hussain had done well in arresting the brother of MPA Mehdi Bhatti, who was a patron of criminals. People wondered how a serving revenue officer ended in the police lock-up.

I was savouring the positive results of the clean-up operation, but resentment against me reached a boiling point among certain political bigwigs in the district. One day, Commissioner Kamran Rasul invited me to his office for a cup of tea and quietly slipped a piece of paper before me. On it was inscribed “SSP Lahore.”

 

Commanding Balochistan Police
I received the following letter from the President on September 12 [2007]:

My dear Khosa Saheb,

I have noted with great satisfaction that all the 30 Revenue Districts of Balochistan have successfully been converted from “B” to “A” areas. I would like to commend you and your team on the successful completion of this important initiative. Indeed, the task was enormous but so was the commitment and response of the Government of Balochistan, especially, its Police Department.

I am confident that bringing the entire province under the jurisdiction of one law enforcement agency ie the Police would yield great benefits for the people of Balochistan. Besides going a long way in improving law and order situation, it would also generate additional opportunities for the youth of Balochistan. Now the people of Balochistan can have new hopes for the future. It is imperative that the Balochistan Police strives hard to come up to their expectations.

I am sure that the people of Balochistan shall reap benefits of this milestone achievement for a long time to come. Please convey my deep appreciation for a job well done to all those who have made this possible. With warm regards,
Yours sincerely,
Gen Pervez Musharraf

During the sixth Command Conference held on September 12, I read out the president’s letter and also appreciated the police performance for maintenance of peace and order on 14 and 26 August.

Another significant decision that I made was to set up a Human Rights Cell for Missing Persons in the Central Police Office. We decided to register FIRs on complaints from missing persons’ kith and kin. This was important as the CJP [Chief Justice of Pakistan] had taken notice and was seeking reports from all the police IGs.

On September 26, the acting SP Investigation, Quetta, Sheheryab Ali Shah, was gunned down by terrorists. This was a personal shock for me as the officer as sub-inspector was my Reader when I was SSP [Senior Superintendent of Police] Quetta in 1985. He had worked out many high profile cases and arrested some known hardened criminals.

DG Military Intelligence spoke to me on October 4. He suggested posting DIG Rafi Bhatti as CCPO Quetta. I told him that DIG Bhatti was a superseded officer who had already served as Quetta police chief a few years back. Additional IG Rahoo Khan Brohi was a mature and professional officer. Assisted by SSP Rehmatullah Niazi as acting DIG Operations and SSP Paracha as acting DIG Investigation, he had a good team that enjoyed my trust.

The Supreme Court Chief Justice heard the cases of missing persons on October 11. All IGs were present in the apex court. The case of Dr Safdar Sarki, a missing person from Sindh, was discussed at length. I did not pay much attention as I was thinking of the list provided by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan regarding missing persons from Balochistan.

In the evening, I got a call from DIG Gwadar that on the pointing of an MI official, Lasbela Police had arrested Dr Safdar Sarki of Sindh with weapons and explosives. Local police were not told that the same person was the subject of petitions moved in the Supreme Court and Sindh High Court. I was also kept in the dark by the MI officers. I hit the roof in sheer disgust.

I rang up Brig Fahim Khawar [of MI] and told him that I should have been informed. I would have said no, as in the case of Saleem Baloch, another missing person from Sindh.

After a while, I got a call from the DG MI, who spoke in an odd tone, addressing me as “IG sahib” and saying that he had got Dr Sarki arrested by Lasbela Police. I mentioned that I should have been informed. He said: “We need to talk.” I responded: “Yes, we need to talk.”

After this conversation, my days as IG of Balochistan Police were numbered.

(Tariq Khosa served as the Inspector General of Police in Balochistan in 2007 and as the Director General of the Federal Investigation Agency in 2009.
He has authored two other books, Pakistan’s Security Landscape and Inconvenient Truths: Pakistan’s Governance Challenges. Published in Dawn, EOS)