Questioning
the F-16 Deal
By Ahmad Faruqui, PhD
Danville, California
The Bush administration’s
decision to sell 25 F-16s to Pakistan was balanced
by its decision to offer India 125 upgraded F-16s
or F-18s and broader cooperation in systems for
military command and control, early-warning detection,
and missile defense. Washington said it was creating
“a decisively broader strategic relationship”
with India that might even encompass the sale
of nuclear power plants.
Even then, there was jubilation in Islamabad.
In theory, the F-16 can prevent the intrusion
of hostile aircraft into Pakistani territory,
engage enemy army formations on the ground and
carry out long-range offensive missions. It is
one of the best multi-role combat aircraft in
the world and 4,400 of them fly in two dozen air
forces. They are even flown by the USAF aerobatics
team, the Thunderbirds.
But everyone has a different interpretation of
the F-16 deal with Pakistan. Commenting on the
sale, Condi Rice said, “What we are trying
to do is solidify and extend relations with both
India and Pakistan… at a time when they
have improving relationships with one another.”
Brookings policy wonk Stephen P. Cohen argued
that the deal would give Bush more influence in
Pakistan. “This gives us leverage on Musharraf
in pushing him in the direction of accommodation
over Kashmir and other disputes,” Cohen
said. Pakistan, he added, remained a top priority
for Washington: “It’s got nuclear
weapons, it’s in a critical part of the
world, and we can’t afford to let it go
down the drain.”
The chief of the PAF, Air Chief Marshal Saadat,
saw it is as a symbolic victory that would help
stem the tide of growing anti-Americanism in Pakistan.
From day one, he said, Pakistan had been impressing
upon the US government that by selling F-16s to
Pakistan, the Americans would convince the Pakistani
people of their sincerity. He said the number
of the aircraft was irrelevant since “10,
15, 20 aircraft would not make a world of difference
in our operational capability.”
But are the people of Pakistan that emotional?
They know that war is a numbers game. True, the
acquisition of 25 F-16’s represents a boost
of some 80 percent in the PAF’s current
inventory of front-line aircraft, which is limited
to 32 F-16s. The PAF is outnumbered by the Indian
Air Force (IAF) by about 6:1 in the ratio of front-line
aircraft, which include about 195 SU-30s, Mirage
2000s, MiG-29s and Jaguars.
But 25 F-16s will not make a dent in this adverse
combat ratio. To place Pakistan’s deal in
perspective, even the tiny nation of Bahrain has
22 F-16s in its inventory. More than 50 are in
Thailand’s inventory, Singapore has about
70, UAE 80, Taiwan 150, Turkey 240 and Israel
362.
A serious commitment by the US to Pakistan’s
air defenses would require the sale of a hundred
aircraft. In the 1950s, the US sold Pakistan 120
F-86 Sabre aircraft, which were front-line fighters
in those days. The 14 Starfighters that came later
were a token. The small number of Mirage IIIE’s
in Pakistan’s inventory during the 1971
war became a liability, and the PAF ending up
husbanding them rather than risking them in combat.
A total of 40 F-16s were inducted into the PAF
between 1983-87, during which time Pakistan fought
Washington’s proxy war against the Soviets
in Afghanistan. These deliveries comprised the
A/B Block 15 variants equipped with short-range
Sidewinder missiles. Through attrition and combat,
the number is now down to 32 aircraft, which are
flown by Squadrons 9 and 11. Incidentally, the
Jordanian Air Force flies the same of F-16s.
Pakistan ordered 71 copies of the advanced C/D
derivative in the late 1980s/early1990s. The aircraft
were expected to cost about $25 million a piece
but the Pressler Amendment blocked their delivery.
By the end of 1994, 17 of these planes had been
built and were placed in storage. The rest were
never produced.
Pakistan, which had already paid $685 million
on the contract for the first 28 F-16s, insisted
on either having the planes delivered or getting
its money back. It is unclear what happened. There
are rumors that the US has now paid varying amounts
back to Pakistan in cash and in kind (white wheat).
In the mean time, the PAF was forced to deploy
the F-7P, a Chinese variant of the Soviet MiG-21
and a decidedly inferior aircraft than the F-16.
The PAF operates some 185 F-7s and they are equipped
with the Sidewinder missile.
The F-16 deal raises five questions. First, why
has Washington changed its mind about supplying
F-16s to Pakistan? As noted by Cohen, it has pegged
Pakistan as a state with nuclear weapons that
is brimming with jihadis and a rogue scientist
nuclear proliferation network. Only the military
can keep the baddies in check. India, on the other
hand, is the world’s largest democracy and
an enlightened state. It has been charged with
keeping the Chinese in check, in a replay of the
post-1962 India-China war strategy on a grander
scale.
Second, against whom will the planes be used and
for what purpose? They cannot be used to fight
non-state actors like Al Qaida. And since Pakistan
has no external enemies anymore, to quote General
Musharraf, they are not needed against India.
Third, should there be another India-Pakistan
war, will America not impose an arms embargo on
the belligerents, as it did in1965? This will
hardly affect India, which has a domestic production
capability, but it will cripple Pakistan’s
war-fighting capabilities.
Fourth, who will gain from the sale of the F-16s?
Clearly, Lockheed Martin that builds the plane
in Texas. And, of course, the military rulers
of Pakistan who can claim that they negotiated
a strategic breakthrough with the Americans.
Fifth, who will lose from it? The people of Pakistan,
for whom the prospects for democracy have been
pushed that much further off in the future. Millions
will go hungry to bed and remain illiterate since
their government thought it better to spend $60
million a copy on the F-16s.
The people of South Asia are the losers as well,
now that the India-Pakistan arms race has been
rekindled with gusto. China will step up its military
modernization program, creating more pressures
on everyone.
Someone with the job of convincing Congress that
simultaneously selling F-16s to India and Pakistan
is not a bad idea has come up with the gratuitous
argument that no two countries armed with F-16s
have ever gone to war. One could use the same
logic to sell nuclear weapons to every state,
since no two nuclear-armed states have ever gone
to war.
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