The F-16’s
and Pakistan’s Military Strategy
By Ahmad Faruqui, PhD
Danville, California
The
debate continues to rage on whether a poor nation
like Pakistan, where a third of the population
lives in extreme poverty and more than half is
illiterate, should be spending billions of dollars
on sophisticated multi-role fighters like the
F-16s. This is a very important debate and should
continue not only in the media but also in universities
and think tanks and ultimately in the National
Assembly. The point that national security depends
as much on softer factors such as social, economic
and political development as on harder military
factors cannot be over-emphasized.
However, there is another debate that needs to
be held in parallel. It has to do with the role
of F-16s in Pakistan’s military strategy.
There are three main schools of thought on this
subject.
The first school of thought opines that the weapon
will be used in a purely defensive role, to deter
an Indian invasion. Should the IAF intrude into
Pakistani airspace, the F-16s would be used to
intercept and destroy the invading aircraft. Lesser
aircraft in the PAF inventory, such as Mirages
and F-7s, would be used in a ground attack role
to take out units of the Indian army.
The second and more ambitious school of thought
holds the opposite position, which is that the
weapon will be used in a purely offensive role
to carry out a nuclear air strike deep inside
India. Presumably, such an air strike would be
launched only if India has invaded Pakistan, cut
off its main north-south communication arteries
and destroyed the bulk of Pakistan’s armored
and artillery units. The purpose of the nuclear
strike would be to prevent a second and final
surrender to India.
A third school of thought holds that the weapon
would be used in both roles. But the numbers being
provided to the PAF are clearly insufficient to
encompass both roles simultaneously with any reasonable
probability of success.
Like with anything else related to the F-16 deal,
there is controversy about the number of aircraft
that would be provided to Pakistan. Initial press
reports suggested the number of 25. However, others
have argued that there is no limit to the number
of aircraft that would be provided to Pakistan.
One source suggests that the number is 100 while
another suggests 200.
It is unclear who will pay for the purchase of
100, let alone 200 F-16s. At $60 million a copy,
a 100-aircraft shopping basket would run up a
price tag of $6 billion. This rises to $12 billion
for 200 aircraft. The mid-point of this range
represents about 10 percent of Pakistan’s
entire gross domestic product and is clearly beyond
Pakistan’s financial reach, even if the
economy continues to grow at the Shaukat Aziz
growth projection of 8 percent a year. Phantasmagoric
numbers should not underpin Pakistan’s strategic
calculations.
A more reasonable shopping basket might be 40-50
aircraft, which when added to the 32 F-16s in
the PAF inventory, would be sufficient to equip
six squadrons.
The other question is when would the aircraft
be delivered. It takes several years to build
an F-16 and if new ones would be supplied, late
2008 would be the earliest year of delivery. If
more than 25 aircraft are ordered, final shipments
may run into 2009-11.
All of this controversy notwithstanding, what
is the best military use of the F-16s? The answer
depends on what is Pakistan’s military objective
vis-à-vis India.
In the IAF, the PAF faces one of the best-equipped
air forces in Asia. It outnumbers the PAF by 6:1
in front-line aircraft and is likely to keep at
least a 5:1 edge in the years to come. Aircraft
in the IAF inventory include the first-rate SU-30
and MiG-29 multi-role fighters that can easily
take on the F-16, especially if they are equipped
with beyond-visual-range missiles. In addition,
India has one of the best air defenses in Asia.
The Indian army is much better equipped than the
Pakistani army and double the size. The disparity
in forces is even more pronounced when comparing
the two navies.
The PAF would be foolhardy to assume that its
F-16s can penetrate Indian airspace at will. The
F-16s would be detected at take-off and face a
very high risk of being shot down within seconds
of having intruded into India.
There are additional obstacles that would need
to be overcome before this scenario would come
to pass. Very sophisticated avionics are needed
to deliver nuclear warheads from the F-16 and
it is unlikely that the US would provide such
capability to Pakistan. Of course, Pakistan may
be able to “bootstrap” such capability
through other means. It used such measures successfully
to finesse its nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles
programs. But all of this takes carries with it
technical risks of equipment malfunction. Finally,
it is possible that the F-16s would be destroyed
on the ground in Pakistan were India to carry
out an Israeli-style pre-emptive air strike.
Knowing this, the war planners in Islamabad embarked
on a ballistic missile development program years
ago. The solid-fuel Shaheen I and II missiles
are capable of delivering nuclear warheads almost
anywhere within India. They, rather than the F-16s,
would be the preferred weapon in a doomsday scenario.
However, like any scenario, this scenario carries
its own risks. For Pakistan, the risk would be
that India would destroy the missiles and their
launchers on the ground.
War games at numerous institutions suggest that
Pakistan’s armed forces are not in a position
to hold off a full-scale Indian invasion. The
IAF has strategic air superiority over the PAF
and Indian air defenses are much better than Pakistan’s.
This military imbalance cannot be overcome with
bravado alone.
If the IAF were prepared to lose several aircraft,
it would destroy the PAF within a couple of days.
Without air cover, the Pakistani army would fold
within seven days. Gwadar may save the Pakistani
navy from being bottled up in the harbor, as happened
in Karachi in 1971. However, it will not save
Pakistan from losing the war on the ground.
Thus, the most valuable use of the F-16s is a
purely defensive one, to ward off an Indian invasion
by making it prohibitively costly to India. A
nuclear war is a journey from which few come home.
It is so much better to embark on a journey of
peace and friendship. Perhaps the bus journey
from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad will transform the
relationship between India and Pakistan to the
point that war ceases to be an option for settling
disputes.
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