Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto Revisited - Part III
Pakistan under Bhutto
By Siyasi Mubassir
(Similar
in-depth articles on other leaders who have dominated
the political scene in Pakistan will appear in
these columns. – Editor)
After conquering East Pakistan, Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi was planning to invade West Pakistan
with the burning desire to take care of the “Pakistan
problem” once and for all. She wanted to
create an emaciated neighbor on India’s
western borders or, preferably, to balkanize it.
The man who saved Pakistan from this tragic and
humiliating eventuality was American president
Nixon, whose unrelenting pressure on the Soviet
Union to restrain its Indian ally from invading
the western wing saved what is now Pakistan. Nixon’s
and Kissinger’s memoirs provide a vivid
account of this rarely-discussed episode.
With one-third of Pakistan’s army in Indian
hands, India’s quantitative superiority
in all kinds of military hardware, and demoralization
sweeping through the rest of the Pakistan army,
one could assume that, after losing its eastern
wing, Pakistan was in no position to withstand
an Indian onslaught on its western front for longer
than a few weeks. Had a full-fl edged war taken
place, it would also have resulted in a great
deal of destruction in Pakistan. Nixon, through
Kissinger, convinced the Soviets that the US would
not tolerate further dismemberment of Pakistan.
Among the reasons for Nixon’s unflinching
support for Pakistan was the fact that he had
little love for pro-Soviet India and was unhappy
with Indira Gandhi’s unwillingness to help
solve East Pakistan’s problem through peaceful
means. Also, during the Eisenhower administration,
Nixon, as the Vice President, had been an active
supporter of Pakistan because of the latter’s
membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later
called CENTO) and the US-Pakistan defense agreement
of 1956. Moreover, Nixon did not want India, a
Soviet ally, to become the preeminent power in
South Asia, and Pakistan to become another Bangladesh,
a country without any teeth.
Nixon’s famous “tilt” towards
Pakistan paid off when 10 years later, Pakistan
became a bulwark for the Afghan war against the
Soviet Union, and the Mujahedeen-Pakistan-US alliance
forced the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.
The question may be asked why, if Nixon was so
passionately pro-Pakistan, he allowed India to
take over East Pakistan. The truth of the matter
is that the Pakistani military action and the
resulting atrocities in East Pakistan had sealed
off any international sympathy for Pakistan’s
case. As the Turkish ambassador in Pakistan told
me at the time, “Your friends did not know
whom to support-- the Pakistan government, or
the majority of the people of your country (meaning
the Bengalis).”
Few Pakistanis are aware of Nixon’s historic
rescue of their country and those who are aware
are reluctant to acknowledge its historic significance.
Thus, when on 20th December 1971, Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto was sworn in as the President of Pakistan
and the first civilian (and so far the last )
Chief Martial Law Administrator, most Pakistanis
had no inkling that they could have faced a worse
fate.
Economic
policies
Soon after coming to power, Bhutto started implementing
the economic policies enunciated in the Pakistan
People’s Party manifesto. On January 1,
1972, the central government assumed the ownership
and management of public utilities (electricity,
gas, and oil) as well as of thirty-one units belonging
to the following industries: iron and steel, basic
metals, heavy engineering, heavy chemicals, motor
vehicle assembly and manufacture, tractor assembly
and manufacture, heavy and basic chemicals, petro-chemicals,
and cement. The process of nationalization continued
unabated, despite “warnings from many quarters,
including from Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai”
(a staunch communist!), writes Rafi Raza, one
of the top advisers in the Bhutto government,
who later became minister in-charge of nationalized
industries (Rafi Raza, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and
Pakistan: 1967 - 1977, Karachi, Oxford University
Press, 1977, p.148).
On 18th March, 1972, life insurance businesses,
including foreign companies, were taken over by
the government. More than a year later, (on 16th
August 1973), the vegetable ghee (shortening)
industry was nationalized. “The government’s
encroachment into this industry,” writes
Shahid Javed Burki, “was resented by its
own constituency” as “a good proportion
of the cooking oil industry was owned by small
and middle-sized entrepreneurs. Some of these
people had been active PPP supporters and many
others belonged to social groups that were favorably
disposed towards the (People’s) party.”
(Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1971
-1977, London, Macmillan Press, 988, p.117). Burki
maintains that the “government’s takeover
of the vegetable oil industry also disturbed for
good the uneasy truce that had been reached between
Bhutto and the business community. Bhutto had
broken his promise; his assurance of no further
nationalization until the elections of 1977 no
longer seemed meaningful and the little confidence
that the businessmen had developed in the regime
was now completely gone.” (Burki, pp. 117
-118)
Despite the negative implications of these policies,
the nationalization bandwagon continued to roll
on with full speed: in January 1974, all domestic,
privately-owned banks were nationalized, a step
which Bhutto described as his “present for
the New Year to the people of Pakistan”
which eventually proved to be a present not to
the people but only to those who had political
clout: these government-owned banks failed to
provide any benefits to the common man and became
a source of loot for the influential individuals
connected to the PPP, who started borrowing hefty
sums of money from these government-owned banks,
with no intention or ability to repay the loans.
Many of these loans were usually written off by
the government authorities.
In July 1976, the process of nationalization reached
the rural areas as well, where more than 3,000
small units engaged in flour milling, rice milling,
and cotton ginning were taken over by the government.
According to Rafi Raza, this nationalization “was
both an economic and a political blunder.... It
was absurd to nationalize the small rice mills,
some of which were literally located in the backyards
of the houses; these were later handed back, and
some other anomalies corrected. But the main damage
was done, because now even small businessmen were
hesitant to invest. Worse, the entire bazaar became
hostile and played a significant part in the 1977
post- election agitation against ZAB (Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto).” (Raza, pp.284 -285) Why did
Bhutto choose to make this decision? According
to Rafi Raza, “He wanted to establish his
peerless position; having outperformed the rightists
on the Qadiani issue (by having the National Assembly
declare that they were non-Muslims), he now sought
to outdo the left within the Party, quite apart
from trying to strengthen his support among the
small farmers.” (Raza, p.284)
The official explanation of the PPP government’s
overall nationalization policy was the following:
1. The “commanding heights of the economy”
should belong to the people. Concentration of
economic power should be reduced.2. The economy
should be subservient to socio-political objectives.3.
Financial resources should not be under the control
of a few rich families. (Saeed Ahmad Qureshi,
Privatization and Economic Policy, Islamabad,
Government of Pakistan, 1993, p.4)
Notwithstanding the government’s stated
rationale for nationalization, there could be
other motives as well for the adoption of this
most controversial policy. Anwar Syed has referred
to one of them. According to him, “…
Bhutto’s nationalization measures substantially
expanded the domain in which his will to power
could express itself. Not only the government
departments, their budgets and personnel, but
banks, insurance companies, schools and colleges,
industrial plants and trading corporations, including
their posts and funds, would be under his sway:
thousands of jobs to which friends and supporters
might be appointed and from which those hostile
toward his regime removed.” (Anwar H. Syed,
The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
New York, St. Martin’s Press. 1992, p.125)
Burki has also commented on the adverse effects
of Bhutto’s economic policies: “It
can be said with some confidence that their overall
impact was negative.” ( Burki, p.163) According
to Burki, “The performance of the economy
during the 1970s was much poorer than in the 1960s.
In some respects it was even worse than in the
1950s.” ( p.164) He also argues that the
“income distribution worsened during the
Bhutto period.” ( p. 166) He adds, “(T)here
is little doubt, ... that the middle classes were
worse-off as a result of the economic policies
adopted during the Bhutto period. They also suffered
political and social deprivation.” ( p.167)
Burki believes that the “PPP emerged as
a political party in which the power of such well-established
groups as large landlords and such new groups
as industrial workers and peasants was much in
evidence.” (p.167) However, the countrywide
agitation against the Bhutto regime in 1977, with
the participation of large sections of industrial
workers, does not support this assertion.
It can thus be argued that the negative outcomes
of Bhutto’s nationalization program outnumbered
its benefits. The main beneficiaries of this policy
were the PPP leaders, their family members and
supporters, the bureaucrats, laborers of state-owned
industries, and the employees of state-owned banks
and insurance companies. The PPP leaders were
able to have their relatives and supporters appointed
to various positions in the new “industrial/commercial
empire” acquired by the government. “Provincial
governments and local politicians forced the absorption
of an uneconomic number of employees in the state
sector,” admits Rafi Raza, who later became
the minister in-charge of nationalized industries.
( Raza, pp.147-148) The bureaucrats found their
jurisdiction extended and many of them lined up
lucrative positions in the new public enterprises.
Laborers employed in such enterprises gained greater
job security and more benefits, with less pressure
to work hard since it became very difficult to
terminate the services of even the most inefficient
employees. Productivity was no longer the main
criterion for personnel decisions in the public
enterprises and the economy, on the whole, suffered
from the nationalization policy.
Bhutto’s Style of Governance: Rule
by Fear
As is generally known, Bhutto belonged to one
of the richest landowner families - waderas -
of Sindh, personally owning more than 100,000
acres of land. Despite his education at prestigious
schools in California and at Oxford, his behavior
as president and prime minister was primarily
that of a wadera. A graphic description of the
life of a typical Sindhi wadera has been given
in the minority report written by M. Masud in
the Hari (peasant) Committee Report of 1948.
(H)e has many servants, fine horses, and a large
supply of weapons. He is fond of ‘pomp and
show’, keeps expensive cars, goes after
women, drinks excessively, and entertains lavishly.
He replenishes his dwindling purse by swindling
his haris (tenants) and by protecting and patronizing
robbers and cattle-lifters. He bribes civil and
police officials who reciprocate his attention
by overlooking his atrocities. He makes a show
of his high living, official connections, and
command of gangsters to overawe other zamindars.
His prestige and feudal honor are at stake in
his rivalries with them. He has ... to maintain
his prestige among his retinue and the haris who
would lose faith in him if they were to know that
he was weaker than his rivals. He must, therefore,
keep a reputation of zulm (cruelty) and zabardasti
(high-handedness) by spreading awe all around.
(M. Masud, Hari Report: Note of Dissent, Karachi,
The Hari Publications, n.d., pp. 9 - 14, quoted
material on p. 11, quoted in Syed, p. 8).
To what extent Bhutto’s style of governance
was influenced by his wadera background is an
issue that will next be examined.
Zulfi-Rahim
Effect
Very early in his presidentship, Bhutto made it
known that even his old friends should not show
any familiarity with him. In a cabinet meeting
also attended by senior bureaucrats, when a member
of his cabinet, who also happened to be an old
friend, addressed him as “Zulfi”,
he retorted in coarse graphic language, which
cannot be reproduced here verbatim, but could
be roughly paraphrased as: “If I have intimate
relations with your wife it doesn’t mean
that you should also be on intimate terms with
me.” This was a clear message to Bhutto’s
friends that they should not treat him as their
friend but as their supreme boss. It is small
wonder that some of his ministers started calling
him “Aali Jah,” meaning “Your
Exalted Highness.”
Another incident, one that sent shock waves to
the ruling class was the criminal treatment of
J.A. Rahim, the senior most cabinet member, by
Bhutto and his thugs. Wolpert gives a graphic
description of Rahim’s “brutal and
tragic fall.”
Until 3 July 1974 he (J. A. Rahim) had been one
of a handful of confidants, advisers, even ‘friends’
though some insisted that Zulfi had no friends,
only followers, servants, or family. ... It was
hardly surprising, therefore, that J.A. was one
of a select group of cabinet ministers and important
political advisers invited to dinner at the prime
minister’s house on 2 July. The handsomely
embossed invitation said 8:00 p.m. ... Rahim ...
knew that Zulfi liked his guests to be punctual.
... (H)e showed up on time, as did all the others.
But Bhutto was nowhere to be seen at eight, nor
did he appear even so much as to show himself
from the room “upstairs,” where he
remained closeted on some “more important
business,” at nine, ten, or eleven o’clock.
(Wolpert, p. pp. 239 - 240)
Rahim, an old man, could not wait any longer and
just before midnight, he got up and said, “Pakistan
is becoming a rajwara (raja’s kingdom) and
Mr Bhutto is its raja.” Then he left for
home. According to J.A. Rahim,
About 1.0 a.m. ...(s)ome men of the FSF (Federal
Security Force) were climbing up the front balcony
for the purpose of entering my bedroom.... Said
Ahmed Khan, Chief of the Prime Minister’s
Security, who was at the head of that mob of armed
FSF thugs, ... and several others rushed in ...
armed with rifles or sub-machine guns. ... Besides
being beaten by fists I was hit by rifle butts.
I was thrown to the ground and hit while prostate.
... My son tried to intervene to protect me and
was himself assaulted by FSF men.... I was dragged
out by my legs, then thrown into a Jeep... bleeding
profusely from a wound in the nose, the left nostril
having been ripped open. No medical attention
or first aid was offered. After nearly a couple
of hours Mr. Rafi Raza arrived at the police station.
(Quoted in Wolpert, p. 240)
Rafi Raza has also corroborated Rahim’s
story. According to Raza, “(W)hen I got
home I found that he and his son had been beaten
up and taken to a nearby police station. I brought
them back to their house after two in the morning
and with difficulty, secured the help of a doctor.”
(Raza, p. 300)
The criminal beating of J. A. Rahim, a highly
respected minister, was according to Rafi Raza,
“intended to serve as a lesson and to instill
fear in others.” (Raza, p. 30) The obscene
rejoinder to a minister, narrated earlier, and
the physical assault on Rahim produced, what might
be called the Zulfi-Rahim Effect. For ministers,
PPP leaders, governors, and senior bureaucrats,
who came in regular contact with Bhutto, the Zulfi-Rahim
Effect became the guideline, making them live
in fear and sapping any possibility of their giving
him bold and honest advice.
When Jam Sadiq Ali, another Bhutto supporter and
PPP leader became the victim of Bhutto’s
wrath, he could have faced a worse fate than Rahim’s
but for his personal connections at the right
place at the right time. According to former Federal
Security Force Director Masood Mahmood, Bhutto
once told him, “ ‘Jam Sadiq Ali is
a mouse. Can’t you find a cat to take care
of him?’ Masood immediately informed his
friend Jam Sadiq Ali, who flew from Karachi to
London the next day.” (Wolpert, p. 309.)
One of Bhutto’s closest lieutenants, Ghulam
Mustafa Khar, who was Governor and Chief Minister
of Punjab stated in the Lahore High Court, that
it was true that “when somebody showed political
differences with Mr. Bhutto he used to be jailed
and based on his personal likes and dislikes,
revengeful action used to be taken against political
opponents but sometimes he also showed tolerance”
(quoted in Wolpert, p.309).
Rule by fear was applied to both friends and foes.
It has been noted by Khalid B. Sayeed that during
the session of the National Assembly in November
1975, when “the opposition members voiced
their bitter opposition to the way the government
was pushing through a constitutional amendment
limiting dissent, the Federal Security Force was
brought in and several protesting members were
beaten and physically ejected from the assembly.”
(Quoted in Khalid B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan:
The Nature and Direction of Change, New York,
Praeger, 1980, p. 107)
In November 1974, during a speech in the National
Assembly, the Pathan opposition leader Wali Khan
“repeated his ‘stale’ old phrase
‘Bhutto and Pakistan cannot coexist.’”
(Wolpert, p. 243) This was a brave statement to
make as Wali Khan had survived four assassination
attempts.
According to an intelligence report reaching Bhutto,
another opposition leader, Ahmad Raza Qasuri,
had said on 27 October 1974 that “’the
Prime Minister ... had broken Pakistan into pieces
to install himself into power and that he was
a traitor and son of a traitor.’”
(Wolpert, pp.243-244). On the night of 9th November,
Kasuri was going home in his car with his father,
mother and aunt. On a dark road, his car came
under attack with automatic gunfire from two directions.
In the shooting, his father, Ahmad Khan Kasuri,
who was sitting next to him, was fatally wounded,
“his shirt and seat soaked with blood.”
Wolpert writes,
In his First Information Report (FIR) Ahmad Raza
told them (the police) exactly what he could remember
... and when they asked if he had any idea of
who the perpetrator might be, he answered without
a moment’s hesitation, ‘Zulfikar Ali
Bhutto!’ That was the name he repeated and
insisted upon having recorded in the FIR.... (N)o
amount of pressure, advice, subtle warnings, or
reasoning could move him to retract one jot of
the FIR accusation. (Wolpert, p.244)
Wolpert adds, ”When Kasuri’s father
was killed, Bhutto’s FSF Director-General
Masood Mahmood recalled, ‘The Prime Minister
phoned me up to say,. Mian (Abbas) has done balls!
Instead of killing Kasuri, he got his father!’”
(Wolpert, p. 244)
Summing up
The economic growth that was a major contribution
of Ayub Khan came to a standstill during the Bhutto
regime and the nationalization of major industries
and other economic concerns proved to be dysfunctional.
The promises Bhutto made in his first speech after
becoming the president and what he actually gave
to the country were worlds apart. He had promised
that he would bring democracy to Pakistan. In
reality, he destroyed whatever democratic institutions
and ethos existed in the country. He had said
in his speech that an ordinary man in the street
could tell him to “go to hell.” These
were hollow words. As we have noted above, the
Zulfi-Rahim Effect permeated the Pakistani establishment
and a dire fate awaited the opposition; their
members were assaulted in the National Assembly
chamber, four assassination attempts were made
on Wali Khan, and Ahmad Raza Kasuri was targeted
to be killed (although he survived, his father
was shot dead). Bhutto’s rule was certainly
rule by fear.
Some Pakistani scholars living abroad, who only
glimpsed the charming side of Bhutto’s personality,
did not see the dark side of his rule. They were
not aware that Bhutto’s Pakistan was a far
cry from Jinnah’s dream of a liberal, democratic
state.
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