Litmus-Testing
the “Irreversible Peace”
By Tahir Ali
USA
“Pre-testing the conceptual
design and the likely outcomes of the present
negotiations between India and Pakistan can help
ensure a just and lasting peace”, contends
political scientist Dr. Agha Saeed. “The
time has come to dispense with euphoric pronouncements
and start reading the fine print of history”.
The proceedings of a recent strategy meeting called
by the Pakistan American Democratic Forum (PADF)
to design such a test are summarized below.
In paragraph 5 of their Joint Communiqué,
issued in Delhi on April 18, 2005, President of
Pakistan Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf and the Prime
Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh declared
the peace process “irreversible”.
The referenced paragraph ends with a definitive
statement: “They determined that the peace
process was now irreversible.” If that indeed
is the case then it is logical to ask, what shall
be the dividends of this “irreversible”
peace? Who will benefit, when and how?
Even after assuming that any future peace accord
will be premised on the resolution of all outstanding
disputes, one still needs to analyze four sets
of questions about the intended and unintended
consequences of such a peace accord.
The first set of questions deals with future politico-military
relations between India and Pakistan.
1. Will the termination of hostilities end the
arms race? Will it prevent the incipient round
of arms race blithely promoted by the United States
and other arms-selling nations? A notification
by US defense officials puts a $1.3 billion price
tag on the arms package for Pakistan. The cost
of the 126 F-16s and F-18s offered to India will
be at least four times that much. That’s
only the tip of the iceberg. As reported by the
Associated Press, the US “companies would
offer major sops in the form of technology transfer
and co-production” to India, which will
exacerbate the arms race, accentuate imbalance
of power in the region, and force new types of
dependencies on Pakistan.
According to the CIA Fact Book 2005, 51 million
Pakistanis (32% of the total population), and
250 million Indians (25% of the total population)
live below the poverty line. A new arms race will
once again deprive these suffering Pakistani and
Indian masses from gaining much needed resources.
2. Will this peace lead, albeit slowly and gradually,
to reduction in the size of armed forces and military
arsenals on both sides? If not, then can we truthfully
describe the outcome as peace or merely as deferment
of conflicts?
3. Given its asserted defense needs vis-à-vis
China, if India is to continue to increase its
defense spending, as it has been for the last
three decades, what will be Pakistan’s realistic
options? Will it keep pace with India or unilaterally
reduce its military capabilities? Have these options
been worked out as a part of a comprehensive peace
accord? Has the nation understood, debated and
agreed on the medium and long-term consequences
of unilateral reduction? (Isn’t it a bit
unnerving that the national assembly has been
kept out of this crucially important policy discussion?)
4. Will the peace accord, whether achieved and
enshrined in a single document or negotiated piecemeal
in several small steps, reinstate mutual obligation
to faithfully comply with previous agreements,
such as the Indus Water Treaty of 1960? If not,
then how much trust could one place in the new
accord?
Archives are full of treaties never honored by
the dominant party. For example, The Indian Removal
Act of 1838, ratified during the President Andrew
Jackson’s term in office, solemnly promised,
“The United States will forever secure and
guarantee to them [American Indians], and their
heirs or successors, the country so exchanged
with them.” Alas, this was one more promise
not kept and soon thereafter the European-American
colonizers systematically took away most of the
Indian lands.
Similarly, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of
1848 brought the Mexican-American war to an end.
Mexico surrendered a large portion of its territory
to the United States with the understanding that
“Mexicans now established in territories
previously belonging to Mexico” would be
guaranteed their rights to property, religion,
and liberty. However, the Congress never passed
the specific provisions guarding these rights;
consequently Mexicans suffered major losses of
property, liberty and religious freedom.
The second set of questions deals with the impact
of the peace process on Indo-Pak relations beyond
South Asia? How will they regulate their divergent
interests in Central Asia, Middle East, Europe,
the US and the UN? Have the two nations contemplated
a framework for peaceful competition in the above
regions? Have even the intellectuals engaged with
tier two diplomacy conceptualized such a framework?
An immediate test has arisen in the US Congress.
Two US legislators, Reps. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(R-FL) and Gary Ackerman (D-NY), co-chair Congressional
Caucus on Indo-US Relations, have written a joint
letter to President Bush urging him “to
stop the sale of F-16 fighters to Pakistan”
because “the sale could negatively affect
US interests in South Asia.” They did not
oppose sale of weapons and transfer of military
technology to India.
Congressman Ackerman did not stop with the letter.
Moving swiftly, he and Frank Pallone, (D-NJ) Chair
Congressional Caucus on Indo-US Relations, have
introduced a bill – HR 1553: Pakistan Accountability
Act – in the House of Representatives to
block sale of F-16s to Pakistan. A number of Indian-American
lobby groups are working hand in glove with the
Congressional Caucus on Indo-US Relations.
Continuation of this pattern by Indian and pro-Indian
groups in the West will only mean cessation of
hostilities in the region but continuation of
conflict in areas of Indian advantage. If continued,
these adversarial acts will openly contradict
the notion of “irreversible peace”
and may even cause its reversal.
The third set of questions deals exclusively with
Pakistan.
1. What will be the new definition and parameters
of Pakistan’s defense needs, goals and strategies?
Who will determine those definitions and parameters?
The military or the parliament? Or, alternately,
the entire nation?
2. What are the expected ramifications of these
new definitions and parameters on the budgetary
allocation of resources? Will this “irreversible”
peace lead to a reduced military budget and a
smaller army? Will the Musharraf government, hereafter,
transfer at least 20% of the defense budget to
education and health care? If yes, when? If not,
why not?
3. Will this peace, once and for all, end the
military rule in Pakistan? If General Musharraf’s
expected answer is an enthusiastic yes, will he
immediately shed his uniform and bring himself
in compliance with the Constitution of Pakistan?
4. Will General Musharraf dispense with the National
Security Council or insist on perpetual military
domination on the Turkish model?
5. Will this peace help mitigate the all-pervasive
economic presence and multi-institutional control
of the Pakistani society by the Pakistani army?
Moreover, will this cause the termination of direct
appointments of retired and serving military officials
to lucrative positions in the civilian sector?
General Musharraf must clarify his position to
the nation on these key issues.
The fourth set of questions deals with the way
this peace process will pattern interests and
orientations of China, Russia, Europe and the
United States toward South Asia.
1. In the context of India-Pakistan rapprochement,
will the world, particularly the West, see Pakistan
as a stronger country because it transcended its
historical limitations, successfully unlocked
its creative capacities, and catapulted itself
to higher level of excellence; or a weaker country
because it failed to safeguard its vital interests
and capitulated under regional and international
pressure?
2. Will this peace increase or decrease Western
control over and interference in Pakistan? Noted
political analyst Dr. Shereen M. Mazari has correctly
and courageously pointed out that “there
seems to be a growing disconnect between our national
sovereignty and developments on the ground….
we now have foreign personnel actually examining
our passports within our own territory - in our
departure lounges. No other state would accept
this micro level usurpation of sovereignty --
certainly not a state that is a major regional
player and a nuclear power.” The answer
to this question will, among other things, depend
on the answer to the first question above: If
Pakistan is perceived to be stronger, the interference
will decrease; if it is perceived to be weaker,
the interference will increase.
3. Will this peace increase or decrease the Western
capacity to control oilfields and oil routes?
For example, how would it influence the US attitude
toward Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline?
4. Will peace in South Asia mitigate or magnify
the emerging proxy war between China and the United
States? Will it persuade the Western powers to
stop fanning the flames of armed rebellion in
Baluchistan and not to obstruct China’s
secure and stable long-term access to the port
of Gwadar?
5. What will be the Western attitude toward Pakistan’s
nuclear power? Will Pakistan be admitted to the
nuclear club or subjected to strategically coordinated
pressure to denuclearize unilaterally?
Admittedly answers to these questions will evolve
in time, and may have to be discovered by trial
and error, yet they cannot be postponed forever,
nor the nation asked to give its full and final
assent to Gen. Musharraf’s excited assertions
about the “irreversibility of peace”
without knowing the answers to these questions.
The 162 million people of Pakistan cannot be expected
to ignore the fact that agreements are only as
good as the intentions behind them and the outcome
of any peace process cannot be separated from
the overall goals of the negotiating parties.
(Tahir Ali is the author of the book "The
Muslim Vote: Counts and Recounts" published
by Wyndham Hall)
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