Demilitarizing
American-Pakistani Ties
By Ahmad
Faruqui, Ph D
Danville, California
During its second term, the
Bush administration has an opportunity to broaden
American-Pakistani ties from the first-term focus
on fighting the war against armed terrorist networks.
Given the pivotal nature of the Pakistani Army
in waging this war, the relationship came to be
vested in the person of the Army chief and military
ruler, General Pervez Musharraf.
The narrow first-term focus has two problems.
Firstly, such a policy reflects a unilateral focus
on short-term US priorities and does not serve
the long-term interests of Pakistan, which involve
the development of democratic civilian institutions.
Secondly, it does not serve the long-term interests
of the United States. The US cannot win the war
on terror simply by disabling, arresting or killing
terrorists. As the experience of the last three
years has borne out, terrorism cannot be eliminated
by killing the terrorists, since there is no finite
pool of terrorists. For every terrorist that is
killed, one or more are created.
Terrorists are being spawned in Pakistan (and
other Muslim countries) due to a variety of factors,
including widespread poverty, years of social
neglect, domestic political oppression often time
abetted by US administrations, a misguided educational
curriculum in the madrassas (Islamic seminaries)
that encourages the killing of innocent civilians
in a jihad (holy war) against the West and long-held
grievances about US support for Israel.
The US, working in concert with the government
and people of Pakistan, has to address the process
through which otherwise normal people become terrorists.
It cannot hope to win the global war on terror
simply by enlisting the Pakistani military.
Last fall, during his last visit to South Asia
as US Secretary of State, Colin Powell said the
war on terror would not have been possible without
Pakistani co-operation. He added that the US was
working in close partnership with President Musharraf
to help him to move his country forward ‘at
a pace that the Pakistani people could absorb.’
Essentially, Powell had given the Pakistani army
a carte blanche on democracy. The new US Secretary
of State, Condoleeza Rice, reiterated this theme
during her recent visit to Pakistan and India.
Lack of public American pressure has removed any
pressure on the Musharraf administration to restore
democracy at home. Musharraf continues to believe
that he has restored ‘real’ democracy
in Pakistan, because he has taken many steps to
empower women and minorities and guarantee a lively
and free media. ‘The amount that I, in uniform,
have done for democracy has never been done in
the past in Pakistan,’ he has said. Not
seeing the obvious contradiction, he asserts that
under his military rule, ‘there is total
democracy.’
This policy of supporting the Pakistani Army to
the exclusion of other Pakistani institutions
has led the United States into a trap. Pakistan’s
military leaders have drawn the wrong conclusion
from the counter-terrorism focus of US policy.
Many appear to believe that as long as they still
kill or capture suspected Al Qaida operatives,
the US will largely ignore Pakistani actions in
other areas – even those that conflict with
US objectives.
General Musharraf is following in the footsteps
of prior military rulers, Ayub, Yahya and Zia,
his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
Soon after seizing power five years ago, he told
journalist Mary Ann Weaver that unlike Zia, ‘who
wanted to be there forever, I have a timeframe,
a specific agenda.’ Musharraf proceeded
to say, ‘Zia was a manipulator; he used
religion to insure his own power, and I strongly
believe that religion should not be manipulated
for political gains. Also, the people of Pakistan,
perhaps, were not really with Zia, but they certainly
are supportive of my government and me.’
But the reality is that the General is fighting
a crisis of legitimacy at home. Musharraf has
adopted a bargaining strategy vis-à-vis
the US of alternatively emphasizing his vulnerability
and his indispensability: the former to weaken
US interest in pressuring him to deliver on democracy;
the latter to convince Washington, après
moi, l’deluge.
During its first term, the Bush administration
held elections in Afghanistan and developed plans
to hold elections in war-torn Iraq, which were
held during the second term. It pressured Ukraine
to hold a re-election when it became clear that
the first one was marred by serious irregularities.
Yet, it said nothing about holding elections in
Pakistan. In fact, it sought to put a gloss over
military rule in Pakistan by saying it was progressing
toward democracy at a reasonable pace.
US strategy was focused on ‘renting’
the Pakistani Army, to use Stephen Cohen’s
term. In return, it rewarded the military regime
with $3.2 billion in aid over a five-year period,
wrote off $1 billion in bilateral debt and facilitated
the rescheduling of $12 billion of multilateral
debt. During its second term, the Bush administration
should ensure that genuine democracy is restored
in Pakistan. It should put pressure on Musharraf
to hold elections to the National and Provincial
Assemblies this year.
In the past half century, America has given short-term
gains priority over long-term concerns in its
dealings with Pakistan. This is no longer feasible,
since ignoring the long-term consequences of supporting
the mujahideen in the Afghan-Soviet war led to
the rise of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. While
terrorism tops the American agenda today, it needs
to be given a long-term preventive quality, not
a short-term military quality.
Anti-Americanism is on the rise in Pakistan and
this represents a long-term threat to American
national security. According to a survey conducted
last year by the Pew Research Center, only 16
per cent of Pakistanis support the war against
terror and 7 per cent have a favourable view of
President Bush. They are concerned about the pro-Israeli
tilt in American foreign policy and about the
invasion and occupation of Iraq. It is not just
the conservative religious groups, many of whom
have ideological connections with the Taliban,
who are against the US. The majority of Pakistan’s
liberal elements are also turning against the
US, because of continuing American support for
military rule in Pakistan.
A recent report by the US Congressional Research
Service, while discussing the salience of Pakistan
to the US war against terror, notes ominously
that Pakistanis have now become the most anti-American
nation in the world.
Only when it begins to demilitarize its relationship
with Pakistan will the US have a chance to develop
a relationship with the people of Pakistan. Such
a broadening of ties will reverse the tide of
anti-Americanism in the Muslim world and stem
the growth of terrorism, both critical to America’s
national security.
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