What Americans
Think of Pakistan
By Dr. Adil Najam
Tufts University
US
I was talking recently to an
American scholar affiliated with a prestigious
US policy think tank who had called wanting to
discuss the current status of US-Pakistan relations.
It was, for most part, a routine conversation.
The questions he asked were not particularly surprising
to me and, I am sure, my answers were not surprising
to him. Except at the very end – as if as
an afterthought – he asked my assessment
of what Pakistanis really think of America. I
quickly retorted that what Pakistanis think about
America is exactly the same as what Americans
think about Pakistan, or vice versa. This is an
answer that I have also been giving to Pakistani
officials and friends who wonder what Americans
really think of Pakistan.
Let me explain my proposition by looking first
at what Pakistanis think about America. Irrespective
of official proclamations, it is evident that
neither the Pakistani public nor our policy elites
would really consider the United States as a particularly
reliable partner. A majority of Pakistanis, certainly
amongst the policy elites, would describe the
US as a useful, even necessary, ally. But no Pakistani
would really accuse America of being a trustworthy
friend. Any Pakistani you ask, and many who you
do not, will detail the long history of American
‘bewafaai’ (infidelity). They will
detail, for example, how the promised American
fleet never showed up in 1971 or how Pakistan
was callously used when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan
and promptly forgotten afterwards. Given the tenor
of the moment we live in, they will probably also
throw in a lecture about American imperialism
to make the point that the US is untrustworthy
not just towards Pakistan but as a general rule,
and especially towards Muslim countries. However,
you will find as many – and often the same
people – who will explain that an alliance
with the USA is not just important but necessary;
that the alternatives are all much worse; that
walking with a superpower you do not trust is
still better than angering a trigger-happy giant
who cannot be trusted; and that trustworthy or
not, an alliance with America can yield important
economic and societal benefits for Pakistan.
In short, Pakistanis view their relationship with
the US as a pragmatic necessity rather than a
meaningful friendship.
Looking at it from the perspective of an American
viewing Pakistan, one finds a strikingly similar
picture. The designation as ‘non-NATO ally’
(whatever that means!) notwithstanding, Pakistan
is viewed by much of the US public, media and
establishment through multiple lenses of distrust,
and some of outright disdain. This is balanced
only by the grudgingly made assumption that Pakistan
is geo-strategically useful to US interests. American
commentators will eagerly cite Pakistan’s
cavalier nuclear adventures, its history of flirtation
with religious extremists, its spotty human rights
record, and its aversion to established democracy,
as evidence that not only can Pakistan not be
trusted, but that its activities need to be vigilantly
monitored. Given the current climate of hysteria
in the US, they will probably also throw in the
labels ‘Muslim’ and ‘Islamic’
as if simply being so makes a country all the
more unreliable. Of course, you will also hear
– often from the very same commentators
– the argument about the ‘utility’
of Pakistan, particularly in America’s war
against terror. They will argue that support for
a military government and lenience in the face
of irresponsible nuclear behavior is a small price
to pay for getting an important Muslim country
on America’s side and keeping the passions
of its religious fanatics in check.
In short, Americans also view their relationship
with Pakistan as a pragmatic necessity rather
than a meaningful friendship.
And therein lies my point: what Americans think
of Pakistan is exactly the same as what Pakistanis
think of America. Each considers the other to
be unreliable, but useful. This is why we find
so many commentators on both sides constantly
surprised and sometimes embarrassed at how close
their country is to the other. Each country has
the sensibility of a jilted lover when it comes
to this particular relationship. Like couples
bickering at the precipice of divorce, each feels
that it deserves to be treated better. The truth,
of course, is that both have gotten much less
from this relationship than they had hoped for.
Each side exaggerates its case, but there is an
inherent merit in both arguments. The fact of
the matter is that the US has – repeatedly
– let Pakistan down. Equally, Pakistan has
repeatedly embarrassed its American patrons.
There is a minority of extremists on both sides
– mostly religious zealots in Pakistan and
mostly neo-con fanatics in the US – who
actually believe the differences to be irreconcilable
and have been advocating outright divorce. They
should best be ignored because the stakes are,
in fact, too high for both countries, and possibly
for the world. More than that, the logic of each
country needing the other is actually sound. The
problem, of course, is that the basis of the relationship
between the two countries has been and remains
totally instrumental, even transactional. While
there is nothing wrong or unusual with instrumentality
in international affairs, instrumentality has
its limits. A sense of profound usefulness in
the face of deep distrust, can certainly trigger
alliances but it is not a recipe for a meaningful
partnership. The problem is compounded when one
side (the US) is quite comfortable with an instrumental
relationship, while the other (Pakistan) deems
mere instrumentality to be an insult. Consider,
for example, the consensus amongst Pakistanis
that American advances towards Pakistan will last
only as long as it is in America’s self-interest
to make those advances. Importantly, most Pakistanis
posit this as an accusation and as evidence that
Pakistan is somehow being (ab)used for US self-interest.
Interestingly, most Americans would say that is
exactly how it should be. The real difference,
then, is not in what the two countries think about
each other, but the type of relationship they
seek with the other. From a Pakistani perspective,
America has repeatedly failed to be a good friend.
From an American viewpoint, Pakistan has consistently
failed to deliver the services it promised. One
searches for long-term friendship, the other seeks
transactional instrumentality. The conundrum,
of course, is that it is not possible to get the
one without the other. And therein lies the challenge
for what has been, and is likely to remain, an
uneasy, uncomfortable, but enduring relationship.
(Adil Najam is an Associate Professor of International
Negotiation and Diplomacy at The Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, USA)
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