Revisiting
Zia’s Legacy
By Dr Ahmad Faruqui
Dansville, CA
General Muhammad Zia ul Haq
died in a still-mysterious plane crash on the
17th of August 17 years ago, after ruling Pakistan
longer than anyone else. Many of Pakistan’s
travails can be traced back to his rule, making
this an apt time to revisit his legacy.
On deposing Bhutto in July 1977, Zia issued an
apology: “The Army takeover is never a pleasant
act … the country should remain in the hands
of the representatives of the people who are its
real masters… I genuinely feel that the
survival of this country is in democracy and democracy
alone.” However, since the two leading parties
had failed to reach a compromise, he felt there
was a serious risk that the country would be plunged
into a serious crisis. Under such conditions,
it was “an inexcusable sin for the Armed
Forces to sit as silent spectators…the Army
perforce had to intervene to save the country.”
Zia’s “Operation Fair Play”
was expected to last only for 90 days during which
elections would be held and power handed back
to the elected representatives. Soon enough, it
became clear that Zia was in no hurry to leave.
His indecisiveness during the first two years
caused some to wonder whether his CMLA title,
which stood for Chief Martial Law Administrator,
really meant “Cancel My Last Announcement.”
When it became clear that Bhutto would be re-elected
and probably try him for treason, a crime punishable
by the death penalty under the 1973 Constitution,
he decided to pursue a judicial course of action
that resulted instead in Bhutto being hanged on
April 1979. Sir John Harrington’s remark,
made in 1600, was validated once again: “Treason
doth never prosper; for if it doth prosper, none
dare call it treason.”
Zia became an international pariah after Bhutto’s
hanging. However, the Soviet Union handed a Christmas
present to Zia by invading Kabul. As Pakistan
was transformed into a frontline state in the
Cold War, Zia’s fortunes underwent a complete
reversal. Over the next five years, American aid
flowed in to the tune of $3.2 billion, producing
an industry that had little to do with fighting
a jihad against the infidels and a great deal
to do with profiteering. Of a typical case of
100 AK-47 assault rifles shipped by the CIA for
use in the war against the Soviets, the actual
fighters were lucky if they got 50. The rest would
be resold on the black market or stolen by warlords
during transit.
Zia committed the Pakistani military, through
the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) division,
to arming the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Their
operations took a heavy toll on the Soviet garrison.
Unable to withstand armed resistance, the Soviets
withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. This palpable
victory for Zia soured quickly since it turned
Pakistan into an urban jungle and may even have
led to his death.
The presence of three million Afghan refugees
in Pakistan, many of them armed with AK-47s and
many others engaged in narcotic trafficking, brought
a new wave of anarchy that resulted in large-scale
random violence. Smuggling across the Afghan-Pakistani
border became a major drain on the Pakistani treasury,
causing an estimated loss of $3 billion a year.
The refugees were not interested in going home
and their presence in major urban areas exacerbated
the myriad ethnic fissures that permeate Pakistani
society. Even more than Ayub, Zia appointed retired
and even serving general and flag officers to
top positions in public sector corporations, ensuring
the loyalty of the military to his rule.
More dangerously, Zia’s poorly conceived
program of Islamization stirred sectarian violence.
Worshippers of one sect were gunned down by extremist
elements of another sect in mosques. Zakat funds
were made available to the social arms of religious
political parties to promote human development.
Unfortunately, they found their way to religious
militias that were initially fighting the Soviets
in Afghanistan and now shifted their focus to
fighting Indian forces in Kashmir.
Additionally, Zia sanctioned the covert provision
of arms to Sikh separatists in Indian Punjab.
India responded to Pakistan’s covert programs
in Kashmir and Punjab by sending agents provocateurs
into the bordering Pakistani provinces of Sindh
and Punjab.
In 1983, there was a rebellion in Sindh. Zia brought
in the army to pacify Sindh, further compounding
the situation. Military rule has always heightened
inter-provincial tensions in Pakistan, since Sindh
and Balochistan are poorly represented in the
armed forces.
In 1984, Indian forces occupied the Siachen Glacier,
causing major embarrassment to the general. Later,
when Sikhs assassinated Indira Gandhi, Zia flew
to India to attend her funeral where he got a
chance to bond with her son and future prime minister,
Rajiv Gandhi. Nevertheless, border tensions escalated
between the two countries. At one point, war games
initiated by Indian General Sunderji to test a
new concept of rapid warfare threatened to escalate
into an all-out invasion of Pakistan. Zia flew
to India to watch an Indo-Pakistan test match,
successfully pioneering cricket diplomacy.
In spite of his modest demeanor and affable personality,
Zia never gained personal popularity within Pakistan.
He was increasingly isolated, and even his handpicked
prime minister, Junejo, began to pursue independent
policies. Matters came to a head when a large
ammunition dump exploded at Ojri, near Islamabad,
killing a hundred people and injuring thousands.
It contained supplies for the mujahideen and was
due for an American audit. The prime minister
ordered an inquiry into the explosion. It came
up with damning evidence against the ISI and found
that the Stinger missile and other American arms
had been sold off on the black market. Zia fired
Junejo and the inquiry never took place.
On his death, the Economist magazine portrayed
Zia in military uniform with a black beret on
its cover and captioned it, “Lost Lynchpin.”
While some have argued that Zia prevented a Soviet
invasion of Pakistan being carried out, it is
unlikely that such an invasion was ever planned.
Zia had promised new elections in November but
was not destined to carry out this promise. Even
had they been carried out, they would have yielded
another puppet prime minister who would have served
at the pleasure of the president.
Thus, the strongest charge one can levy against
Zia is not that he was a usurper, because there
have been military rulers before him and after
him. His biggest mistake was that as the Supreme
Commander, he failed to anticipate that by energizing
the jihadis in Afghanistan against the Soviets,
he was opening a Pandora’s box that would
release forces that would threaten the body politic
of Pakistan.
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