Partition
Players’ Politics: III
By Dr. Khan Dawood L. Khan
Chicago, IL
On the pre-partition stage,
there was another player, casting a long shadow
-- the not-so-silent creeper, World War II. Parts
1 and II of this series emphasized Jinnah’s
role, with references to other players who are
featured here.
Gandhi/Nehru:
To say that Gandhi and Nehru tried to use all
opportunities to keep India united wouldn’t
be true. Nor would it be true to say that the
tactics used were entirely supportive of their
goal. Among the latter fall their attempts to
exploit the British preoccupation in WWII, and
which include: Gandhi’s refusal to support
the British in WWII against Hitler; his letters
to “my friend” Hitler; Gandhi’s
“open” letter to the British; failure
of the Stafford Cripps Mission, and launching
the “Quit India” movement in the depths
of the WWII.
Since India was part of the Empire, the Viceroy,
exercising his colonial power, committed the Indian
resources to it, without any prior discussion
with the Indian public or leaders. Obviously,
this angered Indian politicians, particularly
Gandhi and Nehru. The Congress party refused to
support or cooperate with the British and did
not approve of seeing India dragged into it. Tired
of the continued British ambiguities on ‘transfer
of power’ (their preferred term) to India,
Congress politicians thought it best to use this
British preoccupation to intensify their demands.
While Hitler was taking over Europe and threatening
British invasion, Gandhi wrote two letters to
what he called “my friend” Hitler.
Besides being totally ineffective, the letters
were not only politically naïve and unhelpful,
given the circumstances. They put Gandhi in hot
water with many groups in India and around the
world, no matter how opposed he may have been
to Hitler’s atrocities. In his first letter
(23 July 1939), which the British government didn’t
permit to go through, Gandhi seemed more defensive
about his letter:
“Friends have been urging me to write to
you for the sake of humanity. But I have resisted
their request, because of the feeling that any
letter from me would be an impertinence.”
But because of the worsening situation (occupation
of Czech-populated Bohemia-Moravia and impending
invasion of Poland), he continues, “Something
tells me that I must not calculate and that I
must make my appeal for whatever it may be worth…It
is quite clear that you are today the one person
in the world who can prevent a war which may reduce
humanity to the savage state. Must you pay that
price for an object however worthy it may appear
to you to be? Will you listen to the appeal of
one who has deliberately shunned the method of
war not without considerable success? …
I anticipate your forgiveness, if I have erred
in writing to you. I remain, Your sincere friend,
M. K Gandhi.”
His second letter on Christmas eve (24 December
1940), also cited by Elst, was lengthy and in
a similar vein, except that the situation had
worsened: Germany and Italy controlled most of
Europe, with Churchill still forced to defend
the British Isles but most of the rest of the
world wasn’t aware of the massacre and deportation
of Jews. Gandhi said, among other things:
(1) “That I address you as a friend is no
formality. I own no foes. My business in life
has been for the past 33 years to enlist the friendship
of the whole of humanity by befriending mankind,
irrespective of race, color or creed.” (2)
“We have no doubt about your bravery or
devotion to your fatherland, nor do we believe
that you are the monster described by your opponents.”
(3) “But your own writings and pronouncements
and those of your friends and admirers leave no
room for doubt that many of your acts are monstrous
and unbecoming of human dignity, especially in
the estimation of men like me who believe in human
friendliness. Such are your humiliation of Czechoslovakia,
the rape of Poland and the swallowing of Denmark.
I am aware that your view of life regards such
spoliations as virtuous acts. But we have been
taught from childhood to regard them as acts degrading
humanity.” (4) “…we cannot possibly
wish success to your arms …. But ours is
a unique position. We resist British imperialism
no less than Nazism… If there is a difference,
it is in degree. One-fifth of the human race has
been brought under the British heel by means that
will not bear scrutiny.” (5) “Our
resistance to it does not mean harm to the British
people. We seek to convert them, not to defeat
them on the battlefield.” (6) “We
know what the British heel means for us and the
non-European races of the world. But we would
never wish to end the British rule with German
aid.” Koenraad Elst, author of several books
including ‘The Saffron Swastika,”
has discussed these letters in some detail. Most
of these initiatives by Gandhi were criticized
and ridiculed, typified by a comment by Kristien
Hemmerechts, a Flemish professor and author: “…Gandhi
was a naïve fool who tried in vain to sell
his non-violence as a panacea to the Führer.”
As if this weren’t enough of political naiveté`
and gratuitous advice to other groups he didn’t
know much about, Stanley Wolpert refers to Gandhi’s
“open” letter to the British people
(1940) as another unhelpful gesture:
“I want you to lay down the arms you have
as being useless for saving you or humanity. You
will invite Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini to
take what they want of the countries you call
your possessions. Let them take possession of
your beautiful island with your many beautiful
buildings... If these gentlemen choose to occupy
your homes, you will vacate them. If they do not
give you free passage out, you will allow yourself,
man, woman and child to be slaughtered... I am
telling His Excellency the Viceroy that my services
are at the disposal of His Majesty’s government,
should they consider them of any practical use
in enhancing my appeal.” Among those who
criticized this “open” letter, perhaps
Sri Aurobindo (in his book ‘India’s
Rebirth’) put it most succinctly: “He
must be a little cracked.”
This was not much different from his advice to
the Indians when the Japanese, having taken over
Burma, were threatening India: Gandhi’s
strategy was to let them occupy as much of India
as they liked and then to “make them feel
unwanted,” according to Richard Grenier
(in an article “The Gandhi Nobody Knows,”
in the March, 1983 issue of “Commentary,”
a monthly published by the American Jewish Committee,
NY). It was, however, diametrically opposed to
what he had thought of other wars -- he had supported
three wars: the Boer War, the “Kaffir War,”
and WWI, the last with considerable enthusiasm.
When war broke out in August 1914, he was in Britain,
and according to an account by Grenier, he (unlike
his views on WWII) “instantly contacted
the War Office, swore that he would stand by England
in its hour of need, and created the Indian Volunteer
Corps, which he might have commanded if he hadn’t
fallen ill with pleurisy.” On his return
to India in 1915, he wrote to the Viceroy, more
than once, to offer his help, e.g.: “I would
make India offer all her able-bodied sons as a
sacrifice to the empire at this critical moment.”
When other pacifists expressed horror at this,
he rationalized his comments, based on ‘Bhagavat
Gita’ and the wars described in it showing
how Indians “have always been warlike, and
the finest hymn composed by Tulsidas in praise
of Rama gives the first place to his ability to
strike down the enemy.” On the insensitive
comments Gandhi made about Jews and tried to minimize
the magnitude of their suffering with a “direct
parallel” to another situation, a Jewish
philosopher, Martin Buber in his response (24
February 1939) reminded Gandhi of his own comments
of 1922 on the matter of Indian rights: how Gandhi
had “repeatedly said that I would have India
become free even by violence rather than that
she should remain in bondage.”
One more event that could have kept India united
was the pledge by Stafford Cripps (March 1942):
full Dominion status for an Indian Union, the
Constitution to be framed by the Indians and option
to withdraw from the Commonwealth. But certain
clauses (e.g., option of provinces and princely
states to withdraw from the Union; British rule
through the war, or the Clause E) were totally
unacceptable to Congress. Gandhi called it “a
post-dated cheque on a failing bank.” Although
the League saw an opening for a possible ‘Pakistan’,
and was interested in pursuing it, the rejection
by Congress left no option for it. “Many,”
says Chadha, “blame Gandhi’s uncompromising
attitude for Cripp’s failure,” as
well as that of Congress party in general refusal
to support the British in WWII against Hitler.
(To be continued)
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