Reforming
Pakistan’s Military
By Dr Ahmad Faruqui
Dansville, CA
The highest priority of a modern state where
the military has failed to distinguish itself
in its myriad combat encounters should be military
reform. However, by arguing that they have the
best understanding of national security, the generals
have forestalled all civilian attempts to define
the reform agenda. This is no more than a smoke
screen, since the generals know that genuine reform
will take away their institutional primacy and
the rents that flow from it.
During Musharraf’s tenure, the Pakistani
military has set about reforming the state through
a seven-point agenda. It may have undertaken military
reforms but they are hard to evaluate, since they
are carried out in secret. The memoirs of retired
generals, beginning with those of Lt.-Gen. Gul
Hasan, tell us that previous reforms have been
piece-meal and self-serving in nature.
Is military reform an oxymoron? Perhaps but it
is not improbable. The media has emerged as an
important institution in Pakistan’s polity,
second in importance to the military. By discussing
the topic, it can empower the establishment of
a parliamentary commission on military reform.
The parliamentarians should review the example
of Taiwan, whose experiences are discussed by
Michael Chase in “Asian Survey” (May/June
2005). Some might find the Taiwanese example distasteful,
since China is a major friend of Pakistan’s
and Taiwan is China’s enemy. However, there
are many analogies with Pakistan that make the
comparison useful. Like Pakistan, Taiwan has a
long history of military rule, from 1949-87. It
also faces an existential threat from a much larger
enemy, which is rapidly emerging as a global powerhouse.
And it has close ties with the US military.
How is Taiwan dealing with China? It is not ignoring
the threat from the mainland or taking a pacifist
road. Nor is it provoking a Chinese invasion of
the island. Taipei is devoting its creative energies
to fostering a strategic environment where a Chinese
invasion across the Strait would become either
unnecessary or very costly for Beijing.
It has co-opted China through economic ties. Taiwanese
investments in China are in the $55-100 billion
range and are growing by 10 percent a year. Bilateral
trade has reached $62 billion. China is now Taiwan’s
largest trading partner and the destination of
a quarter of its exports. By contrast, Pakistan’s
trade with India is miniscule and there is almost
no cross-border investment between the two neighbors.
Moreover, the recent explosions in Mumbai have
put the composite dialogue on hold.
Second, Taiwan is developing realistic expectations
about China. It no longer wishes to take over
the mainland, which was the original goal of Chiang
Kai-shek’s nationalist party. The “period
of mobilization to end the communist rebellion”
ended in 1991 and this opened the road to new
strategic thinking. At one time, Pakistan’s
strategic elite had ambitions of flying the green-and-white
flag over the red fort in Delhi. That dream ended
when America imposed an arms embargo in 1965.
But even today, there are some who support containing
India by waging countless jihads.
Third, Taiwan has restored civilian supremacy
over the military. During the first four decades,
the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) reported
directly to the president. This minimized legislative
oversight of defense affairs. The armed forces
were the military arm of the nationalist party
and were heavily involved in suppressing political
opposition. This allowed the ruling party to maintain
a democratic façade. In Pakistan, the relationship
is inverted, since the ruling party serves as
the political arm of the military.
Fourth, Taiwan has begun to reform its military.
This involves refining its strategic doctrine
and reorganizing the military. Two defense laws
were passed in January 2000 and are scheduled
to take effect over several years. The laws increase
the power of the civilian defense minister by
placing both the ministry staff and the armed
forces under him. The CGS is no longer the de
facto head of the defense establishment.
New strategic doctrine is being formulated, calling
for the replacement of a purely defensive strategy
by an offensive-defensive strategy, where Taiwan
would be capable of striking valuable targets
in the mainland with ground-launched missiles.
This would make a Chinese invasion of Taiwan very
costly.
Critics argue that this approach may destabilize
the balance across the Strait by coming across
as too aggressive to Beijing. But whether or not
this is the correct doctrine, the important message
is that the doctrine is being openly debated by
civil society. The Ministry of Defense publishes
periodic reports for discussion and debate. It
no longer equates criticism with treachery. In
Pakistan, the military has developed a 15-year
plan without any input from either parliament
or the public.
Taiwan is making major changes in the defense
organization. While the army accounts for 50 percent
of the military strength (compared with 90 percent
in Pakistan), this share is expected to decline,
allowing the creation of a fully integrated all-services
fighting machine. The armed forces have declined
from 450,000 in 1997 to 340,000 this year and
are expected to decline to 300,000 by 2012. A
parliamentary report issued in March 2003 called
for an optimal defense force of 256,000 (or half
the size of the Pakistani military). In addition,
several general officer positions are being eliminated
to reduce the number of layers in the chain of
command (while the number of generals in Pakistan
continues to grow).
The defense budget now accounts for only 2.6 percent
of the GDP, forcing the military to put off buying
equipment that was approved for sale by the Bush
administration in 2001. Parliamentary scrutiny
of defense spending is on the rise. In 1993, only
39 percent of the budget was open for review.
That share rose to 78 percent in 2002. In Pakistan,
the share open to review has remained at zero
percent since independence.
None of this is meant to suggest that reform of
the Taiwanese military has been easy. The generals
resent the loss of their influence in policy making
and are fearful that civilians will make the wrong
strategic choices. The legislature’s limited
expertise in defense matters creates an additional
barrier. But even with all of these limitations,
genuine reform has taken root in a culture that
was heavily militaristic for four decades.
This message should inspire candidates taking
part in next year’s general elections to
make military reform an important part of their
campaign manifesto. Otherwise, historians will
record that the hard work that Mr. Jinnah had
put into gaining independence from the British
Raj in 1947 came to naught a decade later when
the Khaki Raj took over.
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