A Strategic
Choice
By Dr Alon Ben-Meir
New York
Hamas’ rise to power
provides the United States and Israel with a strategic
opportunity to shift their attention to Israel’s
northern front with Syria. Damascus’ interest
in recovering the Golan Heights remains on the
top of its national agenda. Syria is also in dire
need of economic assistance and development, which
will be possible only through normalized relations
with Washington. The Syrian government is therefore
ready for a dialogue. Thus, the Bush administration
and Israel need to look afresh at Syria and examine
what new policy options they can explore in dealing
with it. Although this may seem to defy conventional
wisdom, a new US policy toward Syria can dramatically
change the political landscape throughout the
region.
The opposition to pursuing a more conciliatory
policy rests on numerous serious charges against
Syria. Among these are providing refuges to several
militant groups, especially Palestinian organizations,
which often even operate at the behest of the
Syrian government. Syria also fully supports Hezbollah
in Lebanon and maintains cozy and mischievous
relations with Iran, now in defiance of the international
community. Syria is further accused of being behind
the assassination of the Lebanon’s former
Prime Minister Rafik Harriri, of actively promoting
anti-American and anti-Western sentiments throughout
the Arab world, and of aiding the insurgency in
Iraq. The issue is not whether these charges are
true; rather, the prevailing perception that they
are makes it necessary for Syria to address them.
But, while it is up to Syria to do this, should
not the United States try, at the same time, to
compel Damascus to change direction by appealing
to its national interests?
Until now, Mr. Bush’s Middle East policies
have been driven by the single idea of regime
change, regardless of the current turmoil in the
region and the potentially explosive consequences
of such policies. It is time for the administration
to consider instead a policy of engagement consistent
with the existing environment in the region. In
suggesting this, I recognize that there are three
cogent arguments against this that deserve plausible
counterarguments:
The first argument is that the timing is wrong.
It can be reasonably argued that this is not the
perfect time for any of the key players to take
a far-reaching initiative. But then, what is a
prefect time if it is not based on the reality
on the ground? This reality is that nothing in
the Middle East has turned out the way it was
expected to five years ago. The so-called war
on terrorism is a fledging war; the war in Iraq
is still raging; very little is left of the Israeli-Palestinian
peace process; Islamist groups are winning elections
everywhere; the hatred of America has reached
new heights, and many Arab regimes still fuel
the anti-western sentiments among the masses to
cover up their own incompetence and failures.
It is these realities that warrant a review of
US policy. In the face of them, for Washington
to continue to focus on regime change simply ensures
that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will again
violently explode; Iran will race with all its
might to obtain the technical know-how to produce
nuclear weapons; the insurgency in Iraq will exact
heavier tolls, and Islamist groups will win every
democratic election.
A policy shift toward Damascus could stop the
deterioration and calm the region. But although
such a shift of policy is both needed and timely,
it should not be without conditions. Syria must
undertake some serious policy corrections, but
at the same time, it needs to be able to see light
at the end of the tunnel. Some may call this an
appeasement, wrong! Nobody understands better
than the Syrians the awesome power of the United
States, even with all its troubles in Iraq. Moreover,
feeling beleaguered by its desperate economic
straits, Damascus has one single overriding interest--the
recovery of the Golan and, secondarily, normalization
of relations with the United States.
The second argument against changing US policy
toward Syria is by doing so America is rewarding
a despot: It is true that Washington cannot simply
“make nice” to a leader like Bashar
Asad who has repeatedly crossed the line of internationally
accepted norms of conduct. That said, improved
relations with Damascus are not a one-way street.
The United States and Israel will benefit tremendously.
A quick look at the geo-strategic conditions in
the Middle East makes it clear that the repercussions
of supporting regime change without knowing what
type of government will be ushered in would be
at best, reckless, and at worst, ominous, for
it has the great potential of creating even more
turmoil. The Bush administration should instead
persuade Syria to change its policies in return
for substantial inducements, including normalized
US–Syrian relations and the opening of serious
talks on the return of the Golan. A change of
policy that includes the prospect of Syria regaining
the Golan will upset the entire political calculations
of the major regional players and significantly
benefit Israel: It will isolate Hamas and put
huge pressure on it to moderate its ways; further
isolate Iran and deny it an access to the Mediterranean
through Hezbollah while also seriously disrupting
its pursuit of a nuclear weapons’ program.
It will shut down all the militants’ sanctuaries
in Syria; reduce the level of the insurgency in
Iraq; bring about a peace between Israel and Lebanon,
and lead to Hezbollah’s disarming. I believe
that Syria is willing to pay the price for any
real chance to reclaim the Golan and normalize
relations with the United States. Damascus will
seize the opportunity to break free of its suffocating
isolation.
The third argument against a change in US policy
is that Israel will be very resistant to returning
the Golan: True, the Israeli government and many
of its supporters will reject, out of hand, the
return of the Golan, especially because Israel
has no compelling reason to do it. Syria cannot
recapture the Golan by force and is unable to
exert pressure on Israel to regain it through
negotiation. But Israel should not interpret this
failure to mean that Damascus has given up or
assumed a policy of benign neglect toward the
Golan. As long as the status quo is maintained,
Syria will remain the spoiler in the Middle East.
Because the hope of regaining the Golan is nationally
ingrained in every Syrian’s psyche, it will
not diminish over time. Moreover, this hope is
constantly reinforced, with the Syrian public
made increasingly more aware about the need to
salvage its national honor by attaining this goal.
Regardless of what government rules Syria, the
demand for this national matrimony will not only
continue, it will shape Syrian regional policies.
This is not a question of right and wrong, and
without dwelling on the historical account, we
know that there cannot be any comprehensive peace
between Israel and the Arab world without Syria
being an integral part. But peace with Syria will
never happen unless the Golan is returned. All
Israel is doing by not dealing with this reality
is delaying the inevitable. But the day of reckoning
will come, and the conditions then may not necessarily
be more favorable than they are today. Why not
negotiate on the Golan from a position of strength
when Syria is eager to shed its isolation? Damascus
may be willing to accept a less stiff price than
“a leg in the water” as was coined
by Ambassador Mohamed Basiony. The reference here
is to the June 4 ceasefire line versus the 1923
international border, which was one of the critical
bones of contention at Camp David in May 2000
that thwarted the negotiations.
The recent appointment of Syria’s Deputy
Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moualem (and formerly,
Ambassador to the United States), to the post
of foreign minister could offer a fresh beginning.
No one is more familiar and better informed about
the American scene, US sentiments, and the Israeli-Syrian
negotiations -- he was his country’s chief
negotiator. Mr. Al-Moualem understands the complexities
of the problems facing Syria, but he is also very
pragmatic and sensitive. I speak from personal
experience: through many meetings with him, I’ve
come to appreciate his grasp of the issues and
his commitment to a peace of reconciliation between
Israel and Syria. His appointment should not go
unnoticed.
Another critical player that can initially mediate
between the United States and Syria is Turkey.
Ankara has mended its relations with Syria, enjoys
tremendous respect in Israel, and maintains a
solid relationship with Washington. It can use
its influence to prepare the grounds for the Syrian
government to make some important gestures to
the United States, such as closing some offices
of militants groups in Damascus and also visibly
increase its monitoring of its borders with Iraq
to slow, if not, prevent the infiltration of insurgents
into Iraq from Syrian territory.
In sum, the United States must find a way to open
a dialogue with Syria, while persuading Israel
to focus on the Syrian track now that Hamas controls
the territories. This will not be the first or
the last time America has cooperated with an authoritarian
regime. But it is time for the United States and
Israel to make a strategic choice to move in a
dramatically different direction, with far-reaching
implications for decades to come.
(Alon Ben-Meir is professor at the Center for
Global Affairs at NYU and is the Middle East Project
Director at the World Policy Institute, New York.
Alon@alonben-meir.com)
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