US-India
Nuclear Deal: More Divergence than Convergence
of Interests
By Dr Shakil Akhtar Rai
Los Angeles, CA
The US-India nuclear deal signed
between the two countries on March 02 during President
Bush’s visit to South Asia has far reaching
implications for Asia and bilateral relations
between the two signatories. There is limited
and short-term convergence of economic and military
interests but in the long-term the deal is marked
more by divergence of perception and interests
than convergence.
The deal represents a major policy shift on the
part of the US, and vindicates the long-held Indian
position that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) is indeed discriminatory in nature and lacks
moral justification. The US has, thus, climbed
down on the NPT ladder for future strategic gains
as perceived by the right wing hawks in Washington.
The USA has championed nuclear non-proliferation
in the last three-and-a-half decades. Now it has
reversed its policy and effectively declared that
NPT is indeed discriminatory and immoral. The
deal has left the legal foundations of NPT shaken,
and moral pretensions blown off. The US has set
a dangerous precedent for others to follow. It
gives other nuclear powers an excuse to sign similar
deals. One wonders what would be the American
response if some years down the road China or
Russia signs a similar arrangement with Iran or
Pakistan?
India’s real gain is not access to American
nuclear technology; their achievement is moral
victory on NPT, virtual acceptance as a nuclear
power, and expectation that the new partnership
would lead to India’s permanent membership
of the UN Security Council.
The Administration in its bid to sell the deal
to the Congress is saying that by getting access
to 14 of 22 nuclear plants the US has achieved
something big in its quest for nuclear non-proliferation.
The fact is India retains the right to decide
which plants to declare civilian and hence open
to international monitoring and which ones to
keep away from any inspection for military reasons.
The architects of the deal visualize China and
Islamic radicalism as the most serious security
threat to the US and expect India to do the their
bidding in containing China, and fighting Muslim
extremism. They hope the supply of technology
for civilian nuclear power plants would dissuade
India from pursuing the gas pipeline from Iran
to meet its rapidly increasing energy requirements.
This would help strengthen the anti-Iran coalition
and intensify pressure on Tehran to abandon its
uranium enrichment program. According to David
Frum the deal would also strengthen India's nuclear-weapons
capability, which, will be a step toward punishing
the world's two worst nuclear proliferators, China
and Pakistan.
The assumption behind this scenario is that Indians
would be so grateful to the United States for
giving her access to civilian nuclear technology,
and conventional weapon systems that they would
take-on all the neighbors on behalf of America.
This is Cold War mentality. There is unwarranted
obsession with the China threat, and even more
unrealistic assumption that India would choose
confrontation and not coexistence with neighboring
China. The two Asian powers have different areas
of interest in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. Their
territorial disputes are well managed and are
not likely to boil over.
History and geography of the two mature civilizations
have taught them better lessons in coexistence
than confrontation. The geography dominated by
the Himalayas has effectively separated the two
and yet provided enough cultural osmosis to learn
from each other. Those who do not have the benefit
of long history are at a disadvantage in comprehending
the range of foresight anchored in the annals
of history. If at sometime in distant future the
two powers have a conflict of economic or strategic
interests in say Central Asia they would take
decisions in their own interest and not in the
interest of a distant friend or foe. India and
China would opt for peace or conflict for their
own reasons, not for others pleasure.
The deal is not likely to diminish India’s
thirst for oil. At present nuclear power constitutes
only three per cent of electricity produced in
India. According to experts even with 30 new nuclear
plants that India plans to build in the next two
decades nuclear power would be only five per cent
of its electricity production and barely two per
cent of its total energy requirement. Under the
circumstances gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan
is an option India can delay but not abandon.
India has sided with the US in the IAEA meetings
on the question of Iran’s nuclear program.
But it is obvious that this coincidence of interests
would go only a short distance. The deal has vindicated
the Indian position on NPT and weakened the American
stance. How then is India expected to pressurize
Iran to not only abide by a discriminatory regime
of non-proliferation, but also to abandon what
she is allowed to pursue under the NPT, namely,
the pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program.
The US-India nuclear deal and the subsequent visit
of President Bush to Islamabad have demonstrated
that in the new era Pakistan is not visualized
as a strategic partner of the US. In the eyes
of the US policy makers Pakistan because of her
nuclear past, and relationship with militant Islamists,
is more of a problem to be watched than a business
partner to be trusted. This is a shortsighted
view and may prove more problematic than realized
at present.
The deal shows lack of understanding of Pakistan’s
security interests, its importance in the region,
and its future role in maintaining peace and stability.
The situation leaves Pakistan little choice but
to pursue its nuclear and missile program more
vigorously to make up for the disadvantage it
has in conventional forces against India. Cold-shouldering
Pakistan so soon in the war on terrorism will
only strengthen anti-American forces not only
in the political field but also within the establishment.
This likely scenario is not helpful to the US
interests.
- drshakilakhtar@yahoo.com
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