Musharraf
Emerges as Mythmaker-in-Chief
By Ahmad Faruqui, PhD
Dansville, CA
Another October 12th came and went in the United
States un-noticed. It was the seventh anniversary
of a military coup against a secular democratic
government in a strategically vital country. Yet
not a word of protest was put out by the Washington
establishment. Perhaps those neo-conservatives
who have waxed eloquent on the need to establish
democracy in the Muslim world have taken a vow
of silence when it comes to Musharraf.
Of course, this was nothing new in the history
of American foreign policy toward Pakistan. Over
and over again, Washington has sacrificed its
long- term interests on the altar of expediency.
Relations between Washington and Islamabad have
been the coziest when generals have ruled in the
latter and Republicans in the former. During the
Ayub era, the Pakistani army was enlisted to contain
the Soviet Union. During the Zia era, it was enlisted
to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan by training
and arming the mujahideen. And now, during the
Musharraf era, it has been enlisted to fight the
mujahideen.
This fight, which has taken place in the high
mountains bordering Afghanistan and in the cities
of the Indus Valley, has generated high drama.
This has given the general a unique opportunity
to pen his version of history. With his memoirs,
Musharraf has staked his claim to being not only
an enlightened ruler but also a scholar. However,
even the casual student of Pakistani history will
notice that the general’s memory is in conflict
with the “the ground realities.”
By writing such a book, the general did not intend
to impress the scholars. His audience is the decision
makers in Washington, who want to convince the
American people that the US has a solid ally in
Musharraf as it wages the global war on terror.
That explains why the book was released in the
US, why Musharraf went on US television to promote
it, why he timed it to come out just before the
mid-term elections in the US and why President
Bush endorsed it during a White House press conference
by asking people to buy it.
Courtesy of this media blitz, Musharraf has emerged
in the eyes of the average American as the only
alternative to chaos and upheaval in a Muslim
country over-run with extremists who are perhaps
just a heart beat away from acquiring nuclear
weapons.
All of this mythmaking has improved the general’s
personal image in American eyes while worsening
Pakistan’s image. Only a general who has
over-stayed his retirement by five years, courtesy
of a Faustian bargain he made with the religious
parties, and who rules without a mandate of the
people would claim that he has restored Jinnah’s
vision.
Musharraf’s political narrative is structured
around seven carefully woven myths, six of which
can be found in his book. The first myth has received
the most media attention. This is the general’s
reference to a US threat to bomb Pakistan back
to the Stone Age if it did not comply with US
demands after 9/11. Musharraf says this threat
was conveyed to Pakistan’s intelligence
chief by then-deputy secretary of state, Richard
Armitage. This has been flatly denied by Armitage
and Bush.
Secondly, he asserts that the US paid millions
to the government of Pakistan to turn over terror
suspects without a trial. Realizing that this
has irked many in the Bush administration, Musharraf
now says that his comments were misinterpreted.
The third myth is Musharraf’s assertion
that the “peace deal” he signed with
tribal leaders in the FATA is not really a peace
deal with the Taliban but a pact with “tribal
elders” to eradicate Talibanization. Since
it was signed, the Taliban have stepped up their
attacks in Afghanistan.
Fourthly, Musharraf says that he has no clue on
Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts. If that is
the best he can do after five years of hunting
with 80,000 troops, then he does not deserve his
general’s uniform.
Fifthly, he says that the Pakistani army defeated
the Indian army in Kashmir in the spring of 1999.
He blames the civilian prime minister of the time,
Nawaz Shariff, for caving in to US pressure and
ordering a withdrawal. Independent experts agree
that after some initial successes, the operation
had ground to a halt and Pakistan was facing a
full-scale counter attack by Indian forces. The
US intervened in order to stop the belligerents
from endangering regional and world peace by using
nuclear weapons. This was not the army’s
finest hour, as asserted by Musharraf, but just
another high risk gamble that failed.
In the sixth myth, he says that he did not seize
power in October 1999, arguing that his action
was a counter coup designed to offset Shariff’s
removal of him from the army. Shariff’s
decision to sack Musharraf while the latter was
abroad was indeed in bad taste but did not violate
any constitutional norms. Musharraf’s was
an act of high treason.
The seventh myth is the assertion that he remains
committed to restoring democracy to Pakistan and
his even more egregious suggestion that it is
already a functioning democracy. Musharraf initially
legitimized his position by holding a referendum
that only drew 10 percent of the electorate. Later,
he held parliamentary elections under restricted
conditions and got Parliament to elect him president,
but that was then a titular position. Subsequently,
he amended the constitution so he would become
the most powerful figure in the country and also
got the national assembly to pass a bill that
allows him to serve simultaneously as the president
and the army chief.
The Bush administration is committed to bringing
democracy to the Muslim world, a laudable goal
from which the only dissenters are likely to be
the dictators and monarchs that rule most Muslim
countries, mostly with US blessing. Yet this goal
is undercut when it makes a military dictator
an icon of enlightened moderation in Pakistan.
It is time for the US to push the general into
retirement before next year’s elections
are held in Pakistan. That is the only way to
ensure that true democracy takes root there. Without
the emergence of a secular polity, Pakistan will
continue to spawn terrorists that will threaten
regional and world peace. Many of them are associated
with extremist groups that have links with the
Pakistani army, which has long viewed them as
indispensable in fighting the proxy war with India
in Kashmir. To expect the army to disarm them
is like expecting the fox to guard the henhouse.
The writer, an economist based in San Francisco,
has authored “Rethinking the national security
of Pakistan,” Ashgate Publishing, 2003.
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