How Secure
Are Indian Nukes?
By Adnan Gill
Los Angeles, CA
India
already enjoys the dubious distinction of running
the most unsafe nuclear program, now it can hold
the crown for running the most insecure one too.
The Indian nuclear program has become a serious
threat to world security. By and large, the security
threats posed to its nuclear reactors stem from
within. It is a ticking time bomb waiting to be
tripped by the numerous insurgencies and separatist
movements plaguing India, or by natural disasters.
Well over half of India is virtually controlled
by insurgent groups, like the Naxalites, where
the government’s control is minimal to non-existent.
Other security threats emanate from the Indians
choosing to construct their nuclear facilities
on coastlines prone to natural disasters like
the monstrous tsunami of 2004.
India is afflicted with countless insurgencies.
Over 53 per cent of its geographical territory
is under the control of insurgents and separatists.
A debilitating insurgency in the Indian-controlled-Kashmir
is still carried strong by groups like All-Parties
Hurriyat Conference. The Sikh Khalistani movement
seeks to create an independent Sikh State out
of India's breadbasket state of Punjab. Northeastern
India is bled by at least 50 separatist movements,
out of which, the most prominent and oldest one
is the Naga militant group/National Socialist
Council of Nagalim. However, the most serious
threat to Indian national security is posed by
the leftist Naxalite separatists. Prime minister
Manmohan Singh described this Maoist insurgency
as "the single biggest internal security
challenge ever faced by our country".
Once dismissed as little more than an irritant,
the Maoist movement is gaining ground in India.
The Naxalites are fighting the Indian government
in states like Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar,
Karnataka, Kerala, Uttaranchal, Tamil Nadu, and
Andhra Pradesh. Over 45 per cent or two-fifth
of Indian territory is now under Naxalite influence
which extends to 15 States, affecting 509 police
stations. Currently, as few as 25 battalions of
military and central paramilitary forces are fighting
the armed Naxalites who have a presence in 220
districts and are in absolute control of over
160 districts, and spreading wide and far. They
have over 55,000 well-trained, well-armed and
highly motivated cadres, hi-tech weapons in plenty
and a well-honed fighting strategy. Indian intelligence
agencies believe that Maoists of India and Nepal
have also begun joint operations. Sri Lanka's
LTTE and French Maoists are providing full support
to the Indian and Nepalese Maoists. In return,
the Indian Maoists provide shelter and training
camps to Nepal's Maoists.
A day after the British police said they foiled
a major plot to attack transatlantic airliners,
and exactly a month after Mumbai, India's commercial
hub, was hit by a series of bomb blasts, the US
embassy in India warned American citizens of possible
attacks in or around New Delhi and Mumbai. The
US embassy spokesman warned, "Likely targets
include major airports, key central Indian government
offices, and major gathering places such as hotels
and markets." Judging from the September
8, 2006, horrible bomb blast in Malegaon (Maharashtra),
which claimed at least 37 victims, it would be
safe to assume that the warnings issued by the
US embassy were based on credible information.
Even though the public warnings issued by the
Americans did not include direct threats to the
Indian nuclear facilities, still the Indian government
deployed 38 elite commandos at its Kalpakkam fast
breeder reactor in the southern state of Tamil
Nadu. At the same time, the Press Trust of India
reported additional commando deployments at other
nuclear facilities. It reported, “The armed
forces were given the responsibility of securing
[nuclear] facilities and NSG commandoes were deployed
at many nuclear plants.”
Few details are available regarding the security
standards in place for the Indian nuclear program,
but they are believed to be primitive and outdated
at best. Depending on the sensitivity of materials,
it is generally believed that different levels
of security are in place, including fencing and
sentries. Physical barriers are installed at nuclear
facilities in an effort to deny access to the
sensitive areas, and access control is maintained
over personnel by visually verifying paper laminated
identity cards.
Security experts believe a well-conceived attack
on Indian nuclear assets by any number of highly-motivated
insurgents and/or their sympathizers can potentially
materialize in any of the following scenarios:
Scenario # 1: The insurgents steal an intact nuclear
weapon from Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC)
and detonate it in the middle of Mumbai.
Though highly improbable, of all the separatist
threats facing India, perhaps the gravest is the
possibility of militants obtaining a fully assembled
nuclear weapon and detonating it in a metropolitan.
Insurgents could potentially acquire nuclear weapons
through one of two plausible ways. They could
steal an intact nuclear weapon from existing arsenals,
or they could buy a stolen weapon. If an Indian
separatist group exploded just one nuclear weapon
in a major metropolitan, hundreds of thousands
of Indians could die and millions will be seriously
injured.
Scenario # 2: The insurgents fashion a crude nuclear
weapon by stealing fissile material from the Kalpakkam
Atomic Reprocessing Plant (KARP) and explode it
in Chennai.
In November/December 2004, the Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists reported that India possesses
300-470 kilograms of plutonium, enough to produce
up to 120 nuclear weapons, and a reasonable amount
of highly enriched uranium (HEU). According to
the report by David Albright and Kimberly Kramer
titled ‘Stockpiles still growing’,
“India may now be producing HEU in significant
quantities at a gas centrifuge plant it has been
working on for many years.”
Since only a relatively small amount of HEU or
plutonium is needed to build a bomb, separatists
could potentially steal enough material to build
one or more nuclear weapons. A crude nuclear weapon
would need 40-50 kilograms of HEU. However, a
more sophisticated design would use approximately
12 kilograms of HEU or 4 kilograms of plutonium.
The theft of HEU from uranium enrichment plants
like the ones at Trombay and Mysore would be especially
worrisome, because it is relatively straightforward
to make a bomb using this material. The insurgents
could acquire enough fissile material to build
a nuclear weapon and the expertise to construct
a workable bomb.
Scenario # 3: The insurgent sympathizers smuggle
highly radioactive material out of the Nuclear
Fuel Complex to detonate a radiological dispersion
device or ‘dirty bomb’ in Hyderabad.
In an example of security blunder that could have
resulted in the theft of fissile material, in
August 2006, security was tightened in and around
the Narora nuclear power plant after three men
working there were arrested for giving fake addresses
at the time of their appointments. Unbelievably,
the men were given access to the facilities without
first conducting thorough background checks.
The problem is that India does not only have 22
declared -- including under construction -- nuclear
reactors, but it also has about 60 -- less secure
-- agencies connected with nuclear activities.
India is well known for lax security and overworked
systems; security experts believe smuggling of
radioactive materials to be highly probable.
Scenario # 4: Naxalites sabotage KARP facilities
to cause large release of radiation in Chennai.
Security experts think the nature of specific
threats to Indian nuclear facilities may include
an attack with explosive laden trucks driven through
the security parameters to be exploded next to
the nuclear reactors or next to the turbines spun
by highly radioactive steam. In the past, such
tactics had been employed with marginal success
by the Iraqi insurgents who breached the Green
Zone (Baghdad) security wall by exploding a truck
next to the wall. A second truck drove through
the hole in the wall and exploded inside the Green
Zone by the second suicide bomber. India is no
stranger to suicide bombings. In the first recorded
instance of suicide bombing in South Asia, ex-Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a Tamil
suicide bomber.
Insurgents may even employ other innovative tactics
like mounting an aerial attack using an Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV) or an aircraft in a suicide
mission. Naxalites are believed to be armed with
short- and long-range rockets. An attack on the
nuclear facilities with rockets is also a realistic
possibility to cause panic and facilitate breaching
of security parameters.
The consequences of such attacks could include
release of radioactive matter such as contaminated
heavy water, pressurized radioactive steam, uranium
dust clouds, iodine or cesium, and the associated
fires and explosions could cause catastrophic
structural failures. In fact, the Indian nuclear
program has a history of structural failures.
For example, in 1994, owing to faulty design,
the concrete containment dome of the Kakrapar
Atomic Power Station (KAPS) collapsed.
Scenario # 5: The most realistic scenario. In
the aftermath of a massive tsunami, insurgents
effortlessly get their hands on unguarded nuclear
weapons stored at the unsecured military bases,
and fissile materials from the KARP, BARC and/or
Tarapur Atomic Power Stations and disperse these
weapons and fissile materials all over India.
They also sell the loot and stage multiple nuclear
attacks.
The December 26, 2004 tsunami devastated the coastal
stretches of Tamil Nadu. The unimaginable force
of the tsunami literally uprooted or flattened
every security boundary that was supposed to protect
the peripheries of the 500MW prototype fast breeder
reactor coming up at Kalpakkam. The security personnel
at the facilities were either killed or fled,
virtually leaving the nuclear reactor insecure
and unguarded for days to come.
In March 2006, the under construction 1,000 MW
Koodankulam nuclear power plants were rocked by
earthquake tremors. The tremors were strong enough
to create severe panic and fear among the local
population about the safety and security of the
nuclear power project. According to a statement
released by the People's Movement Against Nuclear
Energy and the South Asian Community Center for
Education and Research, "The quake, very
close to the Koodankulam reactor site, raises
urgent and important questions about the safety
of the plants and the security and well-being
of the people in Kanyakumari and other southern
districts of Tamil Nadu and Kerala". The
statement further addressed the slack attitude
of Indian authorities towards the safety and security
of its nuclear plants: "The local people's
concerns about the impact of these plants on their
safety, health, livelihoods and well-being have
all been simply dismissed so far." Arguably,
their fears are not unfounded. It’s not
if, but when someone will take advantage of a
natural disaster by stealing the fissile materials
and/or nuclear weapons from the Indian facilities.
Unfortunately, that’s not where Indian nightmare
scenarios will end. In its mad pursuit to become
a mini-nuclear power, India is going to ridiculous
lengths to amass nuclear technologies in an amateurish
hope to enhance its ability to generate additional
fissile materials for its nuclear stockpiles.
In an example of ultimate irresponsible and reckless
behavior, the Indians have tried to negotiate
with the Russians to build nuclear reactors even
in the open seas. On November 19, 2003, the Indian
news daily, The Hindu, reported a conversation
between the Indian national security adviser Brajesh
Mishra and the Russian atomic energy Minister
Alexander Rumyantsev on a Russian offer of floating
nuclear plants in international waters off the
Indian shores, because then, the ownership of
the plants can remain with the supplier. How India
and Russia planed to protect the floating nuclear
power plants in open seas against hurricanes,
accidental collisions, terrorist attacks, aerial
or underwater attacks, or sabotage is anybody’s
guess.
As a member of the Convention on Physical Protection
of Nuclear Materials and under UN Resolution 1540,
India is required to establish the highest standards
of security for its fissile materials. Sadly,
so far, the security standards at Indian nuclear
facilities are believed to be rudimentary and
primitive at best.
The Indian nuclear program is fast becoming a
serious threat to world security. Rising radioactive
plumes from the sabotaged Indian facilities or
nuclear explosions will certainly poison the food
and water supplies in the Subcontinent. Depending
on the time of the year, the radioactive dust
from India can be carried by the prevailing upper
atmosphere winds all the way to Western Europe
and even to the United States!
Adnan.Gill@cox.net
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