US Nuclear
Deal with India More a Gamble Than a Risk
By David J. Karl
Director
Pacific Council on International Policy
CA
One of the most significant of the
Bush administration's foreign policy accomplishments
is the nascent strategic partnership it has brought
about with India. To cement the relationship,
the administration signed a controversial agreement
to share sophisticated civilian nuclear technology
with New Delhi. The agreement, which was passed
recently by the US Congress, will effectively
accept India as a de-facto nuclear weapons power,
something the Clinton administration steadfastly
refused to do.
The agreement provoked a storm of debate since
it marks a departure in US nuclear policy, which
for decades has sought to strictly control nuclear
exports to countries -- like India -- that remain
outside the framework of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Because New Delhi is seen in much of the
world as something of a proliferation pariah,
it has been the subject of a rather effective
international embargo on nuclear materials and
technologies that has retarded the growth of its
nuclear power industry. New Delhi wished to see
this embargo lifted in order to meet its burgeoning
energy needs, which are projected to double during
the next two decades.
Although the Bush administration is ready to oblige
New Delhi, opponents of the nuclear deal offered
two basic criticisms. The first is that ending
the embargo against India would undercut vital
global efforts to curb the spread of nuclear weapons
at exactly the moment when such efforts should
be reinforced. In this view, granting India with
what amounts to an amnesty from non-proliferation
rules sends a dreadful signal to such countries
as North Korea and Iran that would like to parlay
their own nuclear intransigence into foreign concessions.
It is true that the global non-proliferation order
is at a critical juncture. Yet the risks the deal's
critics point to are likely exaggerated. The decision-making
calculus of would-be proliferators is affected
less by international double-standards and hypocrisies
than by hard-nosed calculations of gains and costs.
A second line of criticism has been less prominent
but perhaps more trenchant: The deal represents
a bad bargain since India will receive major concessions
that it has long desired, but it is unclear what
tangible benefits the United States will get in
return. New Delhi reportedly wants to buy at least
eight nuclear reactors in the coming years, but
the administration failed to secure a promise
of preferential consideration for US companies
vis-a-vis their Russian and French competitors.
Despite strong fears of a nuclear arms race between
India and Pakistan, the administration likewise
did not receive any guarantee that New Delhi would
limit the growth of its own nuclear arsenal. And
although New Delhi plays an important leadership
role among developing countries, the White House
did not insist on Indian support of US efforts
to reform the United Nations or to conclude a
world trade pact.
In the end, the proposed deal with New Delhi is
a geopolitical gamble whose prospects for success
are still uncertain. Given its expanding economic
and military power, there are compelling strategic
reasons for the United States to seek a close
partnership with India. Having New Delhi as an
ally, for example, would be a strong hedge against
the possibility of a hostile China.
Yet it remains to be seen whether New Delhi will
be able to play the geopolitical role the Bush
administration envisions. Unlike China, India
is not yet well integrated into the global economy,
and it is arguable whether New Delhi has the political
will to undertake the painful economic reforms
that would place it on the same power trajectory
as Beijing. Moreover, given India's history of
pursuing its own course in world affairs, it is
uncertain how far New Delhi elites are willing
to ally themselves with US interests. India's
unconstructive role in the recently collapsed
world trade negotiations offers a cautionary note
in this regard.
Despite the uncertainty, the nuclear deal is a
bet the United States should take. India is emerging
as a factor on Asia's diplomatic and economic
landscape, and it is a smart move to try to cultivate
a closer relationship with the country.
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