Lal Masjid
Theatrics: Mob Rule or 'Topi Drama'?
By Prof Adil Najam
The Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy
Tufts University, US
The standoff created by the attack on a 'massage'
center in Islamabad by the Lal Masjid militia
and the abduction of a number of Chinese nationals
lasted less than a day. The criminality of this
shameful act notwithstanding, the matter was thankfully
resolved and the 'pious posse' from Jamia Faridia
and Jamia Hafsa released the kidnapped individuals.
However, far from resolving the larger crisis
of puritanical vigilantism, this episode has only
deepened it.
The government has succumbed, yet again, to the
militant tactics of the Lal Masjid leadership
who have, in turn, declared victory. This episode
will further embolden the already violence-prone
brigands at the two madressahs and we are likely
to see an escalation in their demands as well
as their tactics. Meanwhile, the government has
once again demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness
to act decisively. The much-cherished 'writ of
the state' continues to rot in tatters.
This loss of control by the state apparatus --
not only in the far reaches of the tribal belt
but in the very heart of the federal capital --
is much more than a spiraling 'law and order'
situation; it is an erosion of state sovereignty.
The militants from Lal Masjid have been acting
not just with impunity, but in equality to state
functionaries. With all the pretensions of a state
within a state, Lal Masjid 'authorities' are now
negotiating as equals with government 'authorities.'
And they have been doing so with increasing frequency
and with amazing success.
What is even more surprising than the abdication
of control by the state is the lack of outright
outrage amongst the public. Somehow our national
passions are far more likely to be flared by the
award of meaningless honors to unimpressive novelists
by foreign governments thousands of miles away
than by the spectacle of crumbling state sovereignty
in the very heart of our national capital. This
lack of public outcry is partly -- but only partly
-- explained by the political savvy of the Lal
Masjid leadership. Maulana Abdul Rashid Ghazi
and his comrades have shown great ingenuity in
their choice of issues and in operational execution.
By focusing on issues of public morality and highlighting
the government's failures in enforcing its own
laws, they have been able to present themselves
as reformers rather than as bullies and as guardians
of social virtue rather than as promoters of intolerance.
Much more than that -- and even amongst those
who fully recognize the gravity of situation --
one finds a pervasive feeling that there is more
to the Lal Masjid theatrics than meets the eye.
Even members of parliament have been suggesting
that the government and its intelligence agencies
are manipulating the Lal Masjid militancy. There
is a widely held view that even if the intelligence
agencies are not actively 'managing' the Lal Masjid,
the government is choosing to tolerate and possibly
encourage its antics for its own short-term goals.
The common refrain is that everything happening
at the Lal Masjid is part of an elaborate 'topi
drama' -- an intricate, carefully calibrated,
stage-managed confrontation which is not a confrontation
at all.
But why would the government (either directly
or through its intelligence agencies) collude
with the leadership of the Lal Masjid to produce
or tolerate situations -- the continuing capture
of a children's library, abduction of alleged
brothel workers, hostage taking of policemen,
and now the kidnapping of Chinese nationals --
that are clearly embarrassments for the government?
That the government, despite all the instruments
of force at its command, has been repeatedly caving
in to the demands of the stick-totting madrassah
students has fuelled rumors of secret deals and
devious deceptions. But it also makes the Lal
Masjid crowd look like heroes even as the government
comes out looking ineffectual.
What possible benefits does the government derive
that would outweigh this embarrassment? Two reasons
are commonly given. First, there is the theory
of domestic payoff. It is argued that strategically
timed eruptions from Lal Masjid can provide valuable
respite and distraction from other irksome political
crises, especially the continuing saga of the
chief justice debacle. The second theory posits
the possibility of international payoffs. In this
case, the argument is that since each eruption
from the Lal Masjid is quickly contained, but
never fully resolved, the military regime is sending
a message to its US patrons that (a) Pakistan
remains a country at the brink of fundamentalist
fervor and (b) military control is needed to keep
such militant groups in check.
Even if there were some in the realm of power
who once actually believed in such ideas, neither
of these theories is empirically defensible today.
In relation to the first, it is now abundantly
evident that Lal Masjid woes add to, instead of
distracting from, the domestic political mess.
Quite clearly, nothing that has happened by or
in the Lal Masjid has made even the slightest
dent in the public or media enthusiasm for following
the minutia of the chief justice story. The second
theory stands equally discredited. Instead of
viewing the Lal Masjid skirmishes as evidence
of just how bad things are in Pakistan, most analysts
in Washington now see this unending drama as proof
that the military government is increasingly unable
to contain the rebirth of Talibanism in Pakistan.
In short, the continuation of the Lal Masjid crisis
is not merely an embarrassment for the government,
it is actually dangerous for the regime, both
domestically and internationally.
I am, of course, not privy to the inner thinking
of the intelligence apparatchiks in Pakistan.
However, it is at least likely that this is less
of a 'topi drama' than people seem to believe.
That whatever the relationship between intelligence
agencies and the Lal Masjid might have been in
the past, today the 'movement' (as Maulana Ghazi
likes to call it) has assumed a life all its own
as a very potent -- and ugly -- manifestation
of self-sustaining vigilantism and mob rule. If
so, the government's inaction against this 'movement'
can be explained either as a gross miscalculation
of the lurking dangers, or it could be based on
a real fear that touching the hornets nest at
Lal Masjid would unleash demons so horrific that
our already divided society will be further torn
apart. The government's own statements suggest
that it is the latter.
Just like standing still in the middle of the
road at the sight of the blinding lights of a
truck speeding towards it does not save the life
of the stunned deer, doing nothing about this
escalating crisis out of fear that doing anything
will only make things worse is not going to help
the government, or Pakistan. Something needs to
be done, and done fast.
Contrary to popular logic, there may be important
payoffs for the government if it does act to judiciously
dismantle militancy at Lal Masjid. Internationally,
it will be seen as an important victory and a
real step against rising Talibanisation. Domestically,
it will mean one less crisis to worry about and
could rally support from the moderate majority
in Pakistan who once supported General Musharraf
but have now become disenchanted. Ultimately,
however, the most important reason to dismantle
the militancy is that it is the right thing to
do.
