Opinion

Did We Learn Anything from March 25, 1971?
By Dr Ahmad Faruqui, PhD
Danville, CA

This may be the most important date in Pakistani history. Yet no one who listened to Gen. Musharraf during his first address in October 1999 would have thought so, since the general told the nation, “Your armed forces have never let you down.” A few years later, he would be dismissive about the events of 1971, saying that he did not care about what happened more than 30 years ago.
Denial, in a nutshell, is the military’s hallmark. By refusing to learn from history, it is condemning history to repeat itself.
Then, as now, the country was under military rule. Then, as now, the generals believed they were giving “true democracy” to the country. Then, as now, they were fighting insurgencies in “far flung” regions and labeling their opponents as “irritants.” And then, as now, they were out to restore the “writ of the state” by force.
In the national elections of 1970, widely viewed as the fairest in Pakistani history, the Awami League won a majority of seats. General Yahya, the army chief who had seized the presidency, referred to the head of that party, Sheikh Mujib, as the future prime minister.
Yahya convened the National Assembly on the 25th of March in Dhaka. For one brief moment, it looked like nothing could stop the march of democracy.
But hope died quickly. Yahya and the generals began a smear campaign against the Awami League. They brought in Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the great equalizer. He was the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), a distinct second to the Awami League in terms of seats.
Pakistan’s first military dictator, Gen. Ayub Khan, had plucked Bhutto out of political obscurity and given him a cabinet position. Bhutto eventually became Ayub’s foreign minister. However, he fell out of favor after the Kashmir war of 1965.
In 1967, Bhutto created the PPP and repositioned himself as the champion of Islamic Socialism. In 1971, seeing that his ambitions to become the prime minister would not be fulfilled, he floated a proposal that represented the constitutional dissolution of the country. It called for two prime ministers, one in the West and one in the East.
His rationale was that neither party could represent the interests of the other wing. This overlooked the obvious demographics of the situation. Fifty-five percent of the population lived in East Pakistan and Mujib’s party did not need to form a coalition government.
Bhutto went on to say that unless his proposal was accepted, his party would boycott the proceedings of the National Assembly. He forbade his party members from journeying to Dhaka and said that anyone who did so risked having their legs smashed in. This precipitated an impasse.
With the hindsight of history, it is apparent that the generals snared Bhutto into coming up with this “constitution-be-damned” proposal. His blackmail gave the army political cover for its forthcoming military action.
Thus it was that the day that was to be the most joyous day in Pakistani history became the saddest. Yahya and Bhutto had been in Dhaka for several days, conferring day and night with Mujib. At some point, Yahya abruptly left for West Pakistan. In the dead of night, on March 25th, the army launched Operation Searchlight.
Troops stormed into the campus of Dhaka University, the intellectual epicenter of the Awami League, and began firing indiscriminately in the dormitories. Hundreds if not thousands were killed that night, as confirmed by the mass graves that were found later. Mujib was arrested and brought to West Pakistan. The official picture showed him sitting with a policeman, like a common criminal.
Bhutto too landed at Karachi but as a free man. With obvious elation he said the four words that he would come to regret later: “God has saved Pakistan.” He had been the unwitting tool of the military and would pay for his foolishness with his life later.
Yahya, who had at one point commanded the solitary army division that was posted in East Pakistan, the 14th, insisted that he knew the province “like the back of his hand.” Even if that was true of the physical terrain, it was untrue of the political.
The brutal army action simply provoked the flames of rebellion. The insurgency dragged on and the hastily flown in troops from three other divisions, who knew neither the culture nor the geography of the east, were thrown into a losing battle against the “miscreants.”
The misbegotten army action drove millions of refugees into India, giving it the perfect excuse in November to begin attacking Pakistani army units in the east. The fatigued force of 93,000 soldiers found itself facing an overwhelming external enemy while still having to contend with a raging counterinsurgency that had now enrolled the entire population of some 70 million.
The end came quickly when Yahya blundered into attacking Indian airbases in the west on December 3. Vainly, he had hoped to emulate the swift Israeli air victory of the Six Day War of 1967. Instead, he gave Prime Minister Indira Gandhi the excuse she needed to launch a full-scale invasion of East Pakistan.
In less than two weeks, the beleaguered garrison under Lt.-Gen. Niazi, H.J., surrendered its arms. With the loss of its majority province on December 16, the Pakistan that Jinnah had painstakingly won from the British passed into history. Later, while testifying to the judicial commission on the war, Yahya would blame the tragedy on “the treachery of the Indians.” In reality, it was caused by his foolhardiness in using the army to restore “the writ of the state.”
The war caused perhaps as many as three million civilian causalities. Even if that number is an exaggeration, there is little doubt that causalities numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Yet no one was tried for genocide. Nor was anyone tried for military incompetence. The generals never apologized to the people of Bangladesh. In fact, they covered up their horrible exploits for 30 years until the Indian media published the judicial commission report.
The worsening situation in Waziristan and Balochistan confirms that today’s generals are no better at fighting insurgencies than their predecessors in 1971. No inquiry has been established into the misadventure in Kargil in Pakistan, even though India has already published its version.
Musharraf’s plans to get re-elected by the existing assemblies, even it means firing the Chief Justice, confirm his unbridled ambition. The Parliamentarians have to put a stop to this chicanery. History does not give nations a second chance.

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