War on Terrorism Is Not a 'War'
By Dr Shakil Akhtar Rai
Los Angeles, CA
Terrorism as a tool to achieve political objectives is a centuries old phenomenon. The declining Abbasid Empire of Baghdad was the first, in documented history, to suffer a sustained campaign of terrorism at the hands of the "hashishin' (who gave us the word assassin). But that's history, and it's not always comfortable to look into the mirror of history that gives you an in-depth view of the self. Modern history of terrorism, however, starts only from 1968 when the US Ambassador to Guatemala was assassinated in his car by a group of rebels in that country.
The tragedy of September 2001 brought the scourge of terrorism to the US soil and horrified millions of Americans. The people and the government gave a swift and determined response, demonstrating to the world that they could not be terrified.
Unfortunately this moment of courage and unity was surreptitiously appropriated by a group of people within the state apparatus to pursue their long frustrated agenda of foreign and security policy in the world, particularly in the Middle East. American public was disenchanted, even frustrated when they realized how the 9/11 tragedy had been used as an excuse to create demons of fear in pursuit of a different agenda.
It took almost seven years for a think tank like RAND to come to the conclusion that the 'war on terrorism' should not be called a 'war' and that the current American policy is flawed and 'the United States should fundamentally rethink its strategy'.
The proponents of 'war' and pursuers of pre-conceived agenda must be fuming but the fact remains that it's not late to re-orient American policy against terrorism. The report "HOW TERRORIST GROUPS END: Lessons for Countering al Qa'ida" examines — and critiques — the current US approach, which relies predominantly on military force to target terrorist network. It analyses terrorism related data spread over forty years and concludes that in 43% cases terrorist groups ceased to exist either because their members decided to adopt nonviolent tactics and joined the mainstream political process, and in 40% instances local law-enforcement agencies arrested or killed key members of the group. Military force has rarely been the primary reason for the end of terrorist groups. Military operations were successful only in 7% cases.
Policing and political action with the involvement of the community are the most effective means of alienating and eliminating terrorist groups. The logic for this success is straightforward: Police generally have better training and intelligence to penetrate and disrupt terrorist organizations. Police have a permanent presence in cities, towns, and villages; a better understanding of local communities than other security forces; and better intelligence. This enables them to be best suited to understand and penetrate terrorist networks.
The report suggests that the law enforcement agencies should actively encourage and cultivate cooperation by building strong ties with community leaders, including elected officials, civil servants, clerics, businessmen, and teachers, among others, and thereby enlist their assistance and support.
Unlike police action, the use of military force against terrorist groups has a number of organizational and structural limitations. In most cases, these groups are small, making it difficult to engage them with large, conventional forces. Military forces may be able to penetrate and garrison an area that terrorist groups frequent and, if well sustained, may temporarily reduce terrorist activity. But once the situation becomes untenable in one area (say in Iraq), terrorists simply transfer their activity to another area (say Afghanistan), and the problem remains unresolved. Also, military force is usually too blunt an instrument for countering terrorism. The use of massive military power against terrorist groups also runs a significant risk of turning the population against the government.
Contrary to government claims that the 'terrorists are on the run' the RAND report argues that al Qa'ida has been involved in more terrorist attacks in a wider geographical area since September 11, 2001, than it had been during its previous history. It quotes a CIA veteran to claim that "Al Qaeda is a more dangerous enemy today than it has ever been before."
The report calls for police-oriented counter-terrorism rather than a "War on Terrorism". The authors take issue with the government and media for looking at the counter-terrorism campaign as a 'war'. Seth Jones, the lead author of the study, is reported to have said that "terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy warriors, and our analysis suggests there is no battlefield solution to terrorism" The key to the success of proposed strategy is replacing the war-on-terrorism orientation with the kind of counter-terrorism approach that is employed by most governments facing significant terrorist threats today.
The trouble is 'war on terror' has become a cliché and a means of scoring political points here and a debating point there. A number of countries in the world are facing terrorism in various forms and have been fighting against them with various measures of success and failure, but none has declared a 'war on terrorism'.
The law enforcement approach to counter-terrorism is not new, but this time it's backed by a serious study based on the analysis of a huge database. If it have any meaningful influence in the corridors of power remains to be seen.
