The US Doesn't Understand Pakistan
By Frankie Martin
Washington, DC
The recent New York Times article implicating elements of Pakistan's intelligence service, the ISI, in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, is a public airing of American policymakers' longstanding differences with Pakistan.
The Americans have become frustrated with a perceived reluctance among Pakistanis to attack militants in the country's volatile tribal areas, as well as a failure to rein in the ISI, which is accused of pursuing a foreign policy that is at odds with its own government.
This diplomatic bombshell – which has gone further than any such assertion in the past – comes in the context of a deteriorating security situation, not only in Pakistan's tribal areas but in cities like Islamabad and districts like Swat. It has also coincided with an increasingly bold Taliban insurgency against NATO forces in Afghanistan, which has sparked talk of a new American troop "surge" endorsed by both Barack Obama and John McCain.
But an increase in overwhelming force – which has already been tried by Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf multiple times to no avail – is unlikely to work unless the US and its allies gain a better understanding of the tribal areas in which they are so intimately engaged.
Pakistan's tribal areas are populated mainly by Pashtuns, an ethnic group that also extends into Afghanistan.
Constant warfare in recent years has led many Pashtuns to believe they are fighting a tribal war to preserve their way of life. They feel threatened by the Pakistani government and military, composed mainly of urban ethnic Punjabis; the government in Afghanistan, composed mainly of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras; as well as by the US. Although the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, is a Pashtun he is perceived by many fellow tribesmen to have "sold out".
Because the Pashtun tribes are Muslim, they feel Islam is under attack and seek to defend it. Clerics have even denied Islamic burial for Punjabi soldiers on the grounds that they are not Muslim.
The larger war many Pashtun tribesmen are fighting to defend Islam against the perceived attacks of the US, the west, Hindu-dominated India, and the forces of globalization, has its roots in this tribal micro-conflict and the one cannot be seen in isolation from the other. In this charged environment any apparent attack on Islam, be it from US drones or Danish cartoons, adds fuel to the fire.
The ISI also counts many Pashtuns in its ranks – especially at its lower levels – for whom this tribal identity takes centre stage. The organization has been structured since its founding in 1948 to fight Pakistan's traditional arch-rival, India. Many ISI operatives would sympathize with the Pashtun tribesmen who share their culture – which include actively opposing India for its policy in Kashmir, for example – regardless of the policies of their superiors in Islamabad.
The US has suffered as a result of a confusing labeling of the enemy – the line between Pashtun tribesmen, Taliban, and al-Qaida remains dangerously ill-defined.
To improve the situation, the US can take several immediate steps. First, it should work with the Pakistani government to reinstate the civil service in the tribal areas, which was removed by President Musharraf. This created a power vacuum which was filled by firebrand Taliban clerics.
The US should also support gestures of dialogue with the tribes made by the new democratically-elected Pakistani civilian government instead of actively opposing them.
This does not mean "appeasing" those that would attack America but administering more effectively. By combining the threat of force with efforts to gain the respect of the tribes by working within their cultural and religious framework, the US can swing the pendulum away from Taliban clerics who preach that Islam is under attack from the west. It can also put more American aid into education and development and away from unnecessary military expenditure which has cost the US more than $10bn since 9/11.
This would also improve Pakistan's relationship with India by allowing the Pakistani government to continue its policy of engagement without the distraction of Pashtun tribesmen who wish to continue their fight. The calmer the situation becomes in the tribal areas, the calmer the situation will be in places that concern India, like Kashmir, and the less likely it will be that Pashtun elements in the ISI stir up trouble.
If the US does not change course quickly, it will continue the global march toward disaster that has seen it get bogged down in other Muslim tribal societies such as Iraq and Somalia. Instead of going after only those in Pakistan's tribal areas who wished America harm, it has taken on the fierce Pashtun tribes which have successfully bled such empires as the British and Soviet. By implementing smart, effective, culturally sensitive policies, the US can avoid a similar fate.
