Challenges before Pakistan
By Dr. Nazir Khaja
Los Angeles
CA
In a popular television game show in Pakistan, the contestant has to come up with answers to questions of increasing difficulty in order to win a prize. If he is unable to answer himself, he can call for help from the lifeline, or call his friend on the phone or he can seek help from the studio audience.
Pakistan, in its current predicament, is like the player in the game. So far it has remained in the game or survived only with lifeline and outside help.
Now it seems that Pakistan's luck is running out. A jihadist
insurgency, a lack of coherent and consistent policy by Islamabad in dealing with it, deteriorating relations with Washington and the global liquidity crunch are all making things even more difficult for Pakistan.
Political instability, corruption and economic problems are woven into Pakistan's political fabric. In its 61-year history its affairs were mostly managed by the military through direct or indirect interventions and by deals with the United States. Now the change in the political scenario within Pakistan and the region is having its impact on the role of the two interlocutors, the US and the military, demanding a change in their involvement in Pakistani affairs.
The US unpopularity not just within Pakistan, but in the entire region is at its highest. More and more it is perceived as an occupying force.
The US dependence on President Pervez Musharraf in its war on terror led to nowhere. The situation in Afghanistan has only gotten worse.
The Taleban insurgency is growing stronger both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The United States no longer sees Pakistan as a responsible ally in the war on terror, but instead as a battleground. It can hardly depend on the weak government that has come to power after sidelining Musharraf.
The US is determined to continue with its war in Afghanistan and also within Pakistan's border as it deems fit with or without Pakistan's consent and without any regard to Pakistan's sovereignty. This is only possible because Pakistan does not have any option but to follow US
dictates, whatever they may be.
The country has been dependent on US aid for a long time and in its present economic condition, it is believed that it would face bankruptcy and collapse within a few days if US financial assistance was withdrawn.
The US has announced a $10 billion aid package to Pakistan that will be delivered over a period and is earmarked for nonmilitary use. The US realizes the strategic importance of Pakistan in its war on terror and is committed to help Pakistan despite its lack of confidence in the new government in Islamabad. Yet with US elections and possible change in the administration, aid to Pakistan
may not arrive in time. The country's reserves are at their lowest and bankruptcy will increase tensions within Pakistan causing more civil disturbances and riots.
Pakistan's internal political turmoil was always controlled by the military. The military's ability to deal with political troubles is now limited. The results of the recently held election were more a reflection of the rising tide of anti-Musharraf sentiment than a clear mandate for any candidate or party. Musharraf's lapses, especially during the last two years of his regime, have reflected adversely on the army itself. The army's popularity and credibility within Pakistan
is at its lowest since its surrender to Indian forces in what used to be East Pakistan (now Bangladesh).
The spurts of the so-called "democratic rule" in Pakistan have not been the result of a grassroots movement. It was always engineered by the elite.
The question whether only the elite should rule has not surfaced in the political discourse of Pakistan; rather, the question has been which elite should rule when the military is not at the helm.
Pakistan's people remain in the grip of this "elite" - whether
politicians or religious leaders. This explains the political anomaly of leaders dismissed for or tainted with corruption repeatedly returning to power. This is also the explanation for the party leadership remaining in the hands of certain families.
There is nothing that has not been said already about Pakistan's failure to thrive. The question now is what needs to be done to save Pakistan. The recently elected government does not have the capability to clear the mess. It has little credibility within and outside of Pakistan. Still it has to be supported. A group of nations have joined
together as friends of Pakistan to help ease the burden. Also
President Asif Ali Zardari has requested Saudi Arabia and Iran to help Pakistan meet its energy shortages. China has recently signed an agreement with Pakistan to build nuclear reactors to meet the country's energy needs. President Zardari has made an urgent appeal to overseas Pakistani community to come to Pakistan's help by raising $10
billion.
But time certainly is not on Pakistan's side. There is also the issue of lack of transparency and accountability within Pakistan's political culture. Pakistanis are hopeful that the world community will respond to their country's urgent appeal for financial aid; they are, however,
apprehensive that without any safeguards the money will again be pocketed by corrupt politicians.
So the question that Zardari needs to address urgently is how he is going to reassure everyone that every cent of the financial aid package will be spent on addressing the people's needs rather than going to the foreign accounts of the leadership.
All must help but must demand this of Zardari.
nazirkhaja@nazirkhaja.com
